We humans are great at exploiting and expanding new technologies, but we often jump in with both feet before we fully understand the ramifications what we are doing. I cite the Internet itself. The ARPANET and the TCP/IP suite were entities designed to enable and enhance communications between people, not restrict them. The idea of security was ill considered from the beginning and was never a part of the design. Unfortunately, by the time we realized this fact, the Internet was already going great guns and it was too late to change it.

The same thing happened with personal computers. Many businesses found it was cheaper and easier to exploit this new technology than to stay with the main frame. So they jumped right in, bought off the shelf devices and operating systems, networked them together and voila! Business heaven!

Unfortunately, there was a snake in the garden. These computers and operating systems were not designed with businesses, and their attendant need for security, in mind. Such commercial systems have all kinds of functionalities and “features” that are not only useless for business purposes, they are pure gold for hackers.

As with the Internet, once people understood the security dangers of using these products, their use was ingrained and change was practically impossible. All we can do now, at least until these basic flaws are corrected, is try to work around them. One way to make a good start at this is to limit what these systems can do as much as is possible; if it doesn’t have a business function it should be turned off or removed.

For example, why should most employees have the ability to browse the Internet or check their social networking sites on their business systems? Few employees actually need this functionality, and those who do should be strictly limited and monitored. Almost all job descriptions could get by with a handful of websites (white listing), and those that truly do need full Internet accessibility should have their own subnet. How many employees in these times don’t have a smart phone in their pocket? Can’t they go to Facebook or check their bank account on that?

There are also many other examples of limiting the functionality of business devices and applications. USB ports, card readers and disc players are not necessary for most job descriptions. How about all those lovely services and features found in many commercial software applications and operating systems? Why not turn off as many of those as possible. There are lots of things that can be disabled using Active Directory.

In addition to limiting what systems and people can do, it is also a very good security idea to limit what they can see. Access to information, applications and devices should be strictly based on need to know. And in addition to information, users should not be able to see across the network. Why should a user in workstation space have the ability to see into server space? Why should marketing personnel have access to accounting information? This means good network segmentation with firewalls, logging and monitoring between the segments. Do whatever you can to limit what systems can see and do and I guarantee you will immediately see the security benefits.

This month’s theme is nuance detection. As Brent stated in his blog earlier this month, “the core of nuance detection is to extend alerting capabilities into finding situations that specifically should not exist, and if they happen, would indicate a significant security failure.” When IT oriented people think about this, their minds naturally gravitate to heuristics; how can we establish reliable “normal” user behavior and thereby more easily catch anomalies? And that is as it should be.

But it should also be noted that these “situations that should not exist” are not limited only to cyber events that can be detected and monitored electronically. There are also programmatic and procedural situations that can lead to system compromise and data breach. These need to be detected and corrected too.

One such possible programmatic snafu that could lead to a significant security failure is lack of proper access account monitoring and oversight procedures. Attackers often create new user accounts, or even better for them, take over outdated or unused access accounts that already exist. These accounts are preferable as there are no active users to notice anomalous activity, and to intruder detection systems everything seems normal.

I can’t stress enough the importance of monitoring the access account creation, monitoring and retirement process. The account initiation and approval process needs to be strong, the identification process needs to be strong, the monitoring and retirements processes need to be strong and the often ignored oversight process needs to be strong. A failure of any one of these processes can lead to illicit access, and when all is said and done access is the biggest part of the game for the attacker.

Another dangerous procedural security problem are the system users that make lots of errors with security repercussions, or that just can’t seem to follow the security rules. Maybe they are harried and stressed, maybe just forgetful. Or perhaps they just think the whole “security thing” is just a waste of their time. But whatever the reasons, these foci of security incidents need to be detected and corrected just like any other security problem.

And once again, there should be regular processes in place for dealing with these individuals. Records of security and compliance errors should be kept in order to facilitate detection of transgressors. Specific, hierarchical procedures should be put in place for addressing the problem, including levels of discipline and how they should be imposed. And once again, there should be an oversight component to the process to ensure it is being carried out properly.

These are just a couple of the programmatic and procedural security situations that demand detection and correction. I’m sure there are many more. So my advice is to look at your security situation holistically and not just from the high tech point of view.

Detecting incidents is probably the most difficult network security task to perform well and consistently. Did you know that less than one out of five security incidents are detected by the organization being affected? Most organizations only find out they’ve experienced an information security incident when law enforcement comes knocking on their door, if they find out about it at all that is. And that can be very bad for business in the present environment. Customers are increasingly demanding stronger information security measures from their service providers and partners.

In order to have the best chance of detecting network security incidents, you need to record and monitor system activities. However, there is no easier way to shut down the interest of a network security or IT administrator than to say the word “monitoring”. You can just mention the word and their faces fall as if a rancid odor had suddenly entered the room! And I can’t say that I blame them. Most organizations still do not recognize the true necessity of monitoring, and so do not provide proper budgeting and staffing for the function. As a result, already fully tasked (and often times inadequately prepared) IT or security personnel are tasked with the job. This not only leads to resentment, but also virtually guarantees that the job will not be performed effectively.

But all is not gloom and doom. Many companies are reacting to the current business environment and are devoting more resources to protecting their private information. In addition, the security industry is constantly developing new tools that help streamline and remove much of the drudge work from the monitoring and detection tasks. And I surely recommend that businesses employ these tools to their full effect. Use log aggregation tools, parsers, artificial intelligence and whatever else is made available for these jobs.

However, it behooves us not to rely on these new magic bullets too much. As can be easily demonstrated from the history of security in general, there has never been a defense strategy that cannot be overcome by human cleverness and persistence. This continues to be demonstrably true in the world of information security.

My advice is to use the new tools to their maximum effectiveness, but to use them wisely. Only spend enough on the technology to accomplish the jobs at hand; don’t waste your money on redundant tools and capabilities. Instead, spend those savings on information security personnel and training. It will pay you well in the long run.