When the Security Control Plane Fails: Build a Minimum Viable Defensive System

Posted on August 31, 2026 by Brent Huston

At 2:13 a.m., the SOC receives an alert involving a cloud administrator.

At 2:16, analysts lose access to the SIEM because authentication depends on the identity provider now under investigation.

At 2:19, the incident collaboration channel disappears.

At 2:23, the on-call engineer discovers that the break-glass credentials are stored in the privileged-access platform—which also authenticates through the suspect identity provider.

At 2:27, the cloud console still shows green status indicators, but nobody can establish whether the logs are complete, delayed, or manipulated.

By 2:35, the organization has two incidents.

The first is the security event.

The second is the loss of its ability to respond to the security event.

That second incident is the one most response plans do not adequately address.

Incident Response Has a Hidden Assumption

Most incident-response plans assume the defensive machinery will survive the incident.

The identity provider will authenticate responders. The privileged-access system will issue administrative credentials. The cloud management plane will accept containment commands. The SIEM will provide reliable telemetry. The ticketing platform will maintain the timeline. Email, chat, conferencing, and document-sharing systems will allow the response team to coordinate.

Those systems are treated as infrastructure surrounding the incident rather than as potential components of the incident.

That is a dangerous assumption.

In a recent State of Security post, I argued that controls that look separate on an architecture diagram may actually be “branches of the same tree.” They may share an identity provider, administrative tenant, logging pipeline, automation layer, DNS infrastructure, certificate authority, or cloud control plane. When one of those shared foundations fails, several supposedly independent controls can fail with it. (State of Security)

The next question is harder:

What is the smallest defensive system the organization must be able to operate after that tree falls?

This is not conventional disaster recovery. It is not simply a matter of restoring the SIEM, activating a backup tenant, or retrieving an emergency password.

It is degraded-mode security operations.

The Control Plane Can Fail by Lying

Security teams usually test failures as availability problems.

The identity provider is down. The SIEM is unreachable. The ticketing platform will not load. The primary cloud region is unavailable.

Those are relatively clean failures. They are visible, bounded, and easy to describe during a tabletop exercise.

Adversarial failure is different.

A compromised identity provider may continue issuing tokens. A hostile administrator may alter conditional-access policies while leaving the service operational. A logging pipeline may continue displaying data while silently omitting selected events. A collaboration platform may preserve most messages while exposing the incident channel to the attacker. An automation platform may continue executing containment playbooks after its credentials or logic have been subverted.

The system is not down.

It is lying.

That distinction changes the recovery problem. An unavailable system can sometimes be restored. An untrustworthy system must first be excluded from the response path.

NIST’s cyber-resiliency work provides the right foundation for thinking about this. It frames resiliency around four outcomes: anticipating adverse conditions, withstanding them, recovering from them, and adapting afterward. It also applies that thinking to shared services, common infrastructure, and systems of systems—not merely individual applications. (NIST Computer Security Resource Center)

A resilient security program therefore cannot define success only as preventing compromise or restoring systems. It must be able to continue essential defensive operations while some of its own systems are unavailable, degraded, or hostile.

Start With Inversion

The normal planning question is:

How do we keep the security control plane available?

That is necessary, but incomplete.

Invert the problem:

Assume the primary security control plane is unavailable or cannot be trusted. How do we still defend the organization?

Assume that:

The primary identity provider cannot be trusted.
Existing administrative sessions may belong to the attacker.
The privileged-access platform is inaccessible.
Centralized telemetry is incomplete.
Normal collaboration and ticketing systems are exposed.
Managed responder workstations may be under hostile administrative control.
Cloud automation may be executing unauthorized changes.
DNS, certificate, key-management, or time services may be unreliable.
One or more key responders cannot be reached.

Now ask what responders must still be able to do.

Not which products must be restored.

Not which dashboards executives expect to see.

Not which recovery checklist should be opened first.

What capabilities must exist for the organization to remain defensible?

Define the Minimum Viable Defensive System

A Minimum Viable Defensive System is the smallest deliberately independent collection of people, authority, identities, devices, communications, telemetry, containment mechanisms, evidence storage, and recovery materials that allows the organization to continue defending itself when its normal security control plane is unavailable or untrusted.

It is not a second full-sized SOC.

It is not a duplicate of every production security tool.

It is not a collection of individually labeled “break-glass” features.

It is a composed operating system for degraded defense.

At minimum, it must provide six capabilities.

Capability	Minimum viable state	Evidence that it is independent
Authenticate	Authorized responders can establish identity and emergency authority using protected credentials and trusted administrative devices.	The path does not require the primary identity provider, PAM platform, corporate network, normal endpoint-management plane, or primary email account.
Communicate and coordinate	Responders can establish a secure command channel, assign roles, reach critical internal and external parties, and maintain a decision and action log.	Accounts, provider, authentication, network path, and recovery information do not depend on the primary collaboration environment.
Observe	Responders can obtain trustworthy information from critical systems and identify gaps, delay, or tampering in normal telemetry.	Collection, storage, access, keys, and administrative authority do not all share the suspected failure domain.
Contain	Responders can revoke access, disable identities, isolate assets, stop dangerous automation, alter routes or policies, and protect critical systems.	Emergency containment does not require normal SSO, normal PAM approval, the primary SOAR platform, or access to the normal ticketing workflow.
Preserve evidence	Responders can store relevant logs, configuration data, images, exports, notes, and decision records with integrity and provenance.	Primary administrators cannot silently alter or delete the evidence, and responders retain access to keys, timestamps, capacity, and custody procedures.
Reconstitute	Responders can rebuild roots of trust and restore defensive services from known-good materials in a defined order.	Configurations, credentials, keys, backups, tooling, and administrative access do not depend entirely on the environment being rebuilt.

These are capabilities, not products.

A security team may satisfy them through a mixture of cloud-native controls, offline materials, separate accounts, alternative providers, clean devices, manual procedures, direct system access, and preauthorized decision rights.

NIST makes a similar architectural point in its resiliency guidance: survivability comes from combinations of technology, architectural choices, engineering practices, operational procedures, and people—not from one product or control.

Break Glass Is Not an Account

Organizations often point to an emergency administrative account as proof that degraded-mode access has been addressed.

That is only one link in the chain.

Consider an emergency account that:

Is stored in the normal PAM platform.
Uses the normal identity provider for authentication.
Requires a managed laptop that cannot be unlocked without normal SSO.
Can be used only from the corporate network.
Depends on the normal DNS and certificate infrastructure.
Requires an approval recorded in the normal ticketing system.
Sends its alerts to the normal SOC mailbox.

The account exists.

The emergency capability does not.

Break glass is not an account. It is an end-to-end operating path.

Microsoft’s emergency-access guidance recommends multiple cloud-only accounts, authentication methods that differ from normal administrative authentication, secure storage, monitoring, and recurring validation. AWS similarly describes pre-created emergency identities and roles, dedicated emergency access arrangements, hardware authentication, and periodic testing for situations in which the centralized identity provider is unavailable or compromised. (Microsoft Learn)

Those are valuable design ingredients. The security program still has to compose them into a functioning response system.

The responder must be able to retrieve the credential, authenticate, use a trusted device, reach the management interface, execute an authorized action, record that action, observe its effect, and preserve the resulting evidence.

Testing only the login proves only the login.

Independence Is a Property of the Whole Path

Two tools can be different and still fail together.

A secondary messaging platform is not independent if it uses the same identity provider.

A backup SIEM is not independent if it receives data through the same collectors.

A separate cloud account is not independent if the compromised organization administrator can assume control over it.

An immutable log store is not useful during the incident if access to its decryption keys depends on the failed key-management plane.

A responder laptop is not clean if it must contact the suspect device-management service before allowing an administrator to sign in.

An alternate network path is not alternate if it converges on the same DNS, certificate, firewall-management, or telecommunications dependency.

This is why fallback design must be scenario-specific. Nothing is universally independent. It is independent only relative to a defined failure.

NIST’s guidance on diversity and redundancy warns that apparent alternatives can converge on the same underlying foundation. It specifically treats diversity of command, control, and communications paths—including out-of-band paths—as a resiliency technique, and notes that redundancy can be undermined when duplicated capabilities share common resources or homogeneous components.

CISA guidance has likewise emphasized out-of-band incident communications, separate management paths, and logging aggregated into protected out-of-band locations. These practices reduce the chance that the compromised environment can blind or isolate the response team. (CISA)

Again, those mechanisms are necessary.

They are not sufficient until they work together.

Restore Capabilities, Not Products

During a compound failure, organizations tend to restore whatever system has the most visible outage, the loudest executive sponsor, or the clearest recovery runbook.

That can produce the wrong order.

The goal is not to make the security stack look normal as quickly as possible. The goal is to restore trustworthy defensive agency.

A practical priority sequence looks like this.

1. Establish trusted command

The organization needs an incident commander, an emergency authority model, authenticated responders, a protected communications channel, and a functioning decision record.

Without trusted command, every subsequent action is debatable. Responders do not know who is authorized, which instructions are legitimate, or whether the attacker is participating in the response.

This layer should also provide access to an offline or separately protected contact roster covering executives, legal counsel, insurers, outside responders, critical vendors, law enforcement contacts, and communications personnel.

2. Establish a trustworthy view

Responders must determine what they can still observe and which sources remain credible.

This does not require immediately rebuilding the entire SIEM. It may involve direct access to native audit sources, an independently protected log archive, network telemetry, cloud snapshots, system exports, or read-only queries through emergency accounts.

The first question is not, “Are logs arriving?”

It is, “What evidence do we have that these logs are complete, current, and resistant to alteration by the suspected adversary?”

Evidence preservation begins here. Observation and preservation should not be separated into distant phases. The data available during the first hour may not remain available later.

3. Regain safe containment capability

Once responders have enough confidence to act, they need a limited but reliable way to constrain the event.

That may include:

Revoking sessions and tokens.
Disabling identities.
Isolating accounts, workloads, subscriptions, or network segments.
Blocking known infrastructure.
Suspending compromised automation.
Protecting backups and logging repositories.
Restricting administrative paths.
Moving critical services into a predefined defensive posture.

Containment paths should be narrow, preauthorized, observable, and reversible where practical.

They should not depend on the same orchestration layer whose trust is in question.

4. Reconstitute roots of trust

Only after responders have trusted command, sufficient visibility, and safe agency should they begin rebuilding the normal control plane.

Reconstitution must follow dependency order.

Identity may need to be restored before PAM. Key management may need to be restored before protected logging. Trusted administrative endpoints may need to be rebuilt before cloud policy is changed. Logging may need to be reestablished before production workloads are reconnected.

Restoring dependent tools before their foundations are trustworthy creates the appearance of recovery without its substance.

This is a priority model, not a waterfall. Observation, evidence preservation, and containment will often proceed in parallel. The point is to prevent teams from restoring familiar products while critical defensive capabilities remain absent.

Measure Time to Defensible State

Traditional recovery planning uses recovery-time objectives to express how long a system can remain in recovery before unacceptable harm occurs. That is useful for determining when an identity platform, logging service, or collaboration system must return. (NIST Computer Security Resource Center)

It does not answer what defenders can do while those systems remain unavailable.

A security program should add another measure:

Time to Defensible State

Time to Defensible State is the elapsed time between declaring the primary defensive control plane unavailable or untrustworthy and validating that the Minimum Viable Defensive System is operating through independent paths.

A defensible state might require proof that:

Emergency authority has been invoked.
Required responders have authenticated independently.
A secure command channel is operating.
A decision and action record is being maintained.
At least one trustworthy telemetry path is available.
Responders can execute and verify an emergency containment action.
Evidence can be deposited into an independently protected repository.
The team understands which normal services remain prohibited.

“Someone successfully logged in” is not a defensible state.

“We opened the backup chat room” is not a defensible state.

The state is reached only when the capabilities operate together.

Organizations should measure the component times as well:

Time to recognize and declare control-plane degradation.
Time to establish trusted responder identity.
Time to establish out-of-band command.
Time to obtain the first trustworthy telemetry.
Time to execute the first validated containment action.
Time to preserve the first evidentiary artifact.
Time to begin controlled reconstitution.
Maximum duration the degraded system can operate.

That last measure matters.

A fallback that works for 20 minutes but cannot support a twelve-hour investigation is not sufficient. Capacity, credential lifetime, battery life, communications access, evidence-storage volume, staffing, vendor support, and shift turnover are all part of the design.

Test Compound Failure, Not Components

Most organizations test their emergency mechanisms one at a time.

The emergency administrator logs in.

The backup conference bridge works.

The log archive accepts a test event.

The incident-response binder opens.

The cloud backup restores.

Every component passes.

Then the system fails during the exercise because nobody can retrieve the emergency credential without the PAM system, the clean laptop requires the unavailable identity provider, and the alternate communications channel does not include legal counsel or the cloud team.

Component success is not system success.

A meaningful exercise should begin with a compound condition such as:

The identity provider is suspected of compromise. Existing administrative sessions cannot be trusted. The centralized logging query plane is unavailable, although some collection continues. Normal email, chat, ticketing, and PAM systems are prohibited. The cloud management environment may contain unauthorized policy changes.

Then make the team perform the work.

Retrieve the emergency materials using the real custody process.

Start the designated administrative devices.

Use the actual alternate network path.

Authenticate to the necessary systems.

Generate a known event and prove it appears in the independent telemetry path.

Contain a sacrificial asset.

Preserve an artifact and validate its integrity.

Reach an external participant.

Maintain the incident log.

Operate long enough to perform a shift handoff.

Exit degraded mode, reconcile all emergency actions, rotate credentials, and restore monitoring.

Do not allow the exercise controller to hand the team imaginary access, pretend that a credential was retrieved, or declare a containment action successful without executing a safe equivalent.

Every simulated shortcut conceals a dependency.

NIST’s current incident-response guidance treats preparation, response, and recovery as integrated parts of cybersecurity risk management rather than as a separate binder activated after detection. Compound-failure testing is one way to turn that integration into operational evidence. (NIST Computer Security Resource Center)

The Fallback Creates Its Own Risk

An independent defensive system is powerful.

That also makes it dangerous.

Emergency identities may hold standing privilege. Alternative communications channels may escape normal monitoring. Offline credentials can become stale or be mishandled. Direct administrative paths can bypass approval systems. Separate evidence stores may contain highly sensitive information. Dormant devices may miss critical patches.

The fallback cannot simply be hidden and forgotten.

It requires its own controls:

Dual custody for the most powerful emergency materials.
Tamper-evident storage and access records.
Narrowly scoped emergency roles.
Independent monitoring of every activation.
Regular credential, key, and device validation.
Immediate review and rotation after use.
Defined activation and termination authority.
Reconciliation of emergency actions into normal records.
Periodic review for new shared dependencies.

This is a second-order tradeoff.

The organization creates exceptional access to survive the loss of normal access controls. It must then protect that exceptional access without reconnecting it to the same control plane it was designed to bypass.

There is no product setting that resolves that tension. It must be engineered and governed.

A Practical Design Standard

A security program should not claim degraded-mode readiness until it can produce six things.

1. A declared defensive minimum

The organization has explicitly defined what authentication, communication, observation, containment, evidence preservation, and reconstitution mean in its environment.

2. A dependency topology

Each capability has been traced through its identities, devices, networks, providers, administrators, keys, data sources, and human custodians.

Shared failure domains are visible.

3. Independence claims tied to scenarios

The organization does not say that a system is simply “independent.” It states which failures it is independent from and provides evidence supporting that claim.

4. Activation and exit criteria

Responders know who can declare the primary control plane untrusted, what changes when that declaration occurs, and what evidence is required before normal systems can be used again.

5. Measured recovery of defensive capability

The organization has established a target Time to Defensible State and measured it during an end-to-end exercise.

6. Evidence of sustained operation

The fallback has demonstrated that it can support a realistic incident duration, including staffing changes, evidence growth, credential use, containment actions, external coordination, and eventual reconciliation.

This turns degraded-mode response from a collection of reassuring statements into a testable design standard.

Small. Separate. Boring. Measured.

The Minimum Viable Defensive System should be small enough to understand.

It should be separate enough to survive the named failure.

It should be boring enough to operate under stress.

It should be measured often enough that leadership knows whether it is real.

Centralization is not inherently bad. Modern security programs need centralized identity, logging, administration, orchestration, and collaboration.

But centralized efficiency creates concentrated dependency.

A mature program does not pretend those dependencies will always survive. It plans for the moment when the normal tools are unavailable, the dashboards are questionable, and the attacker may be using the same administrative machinery as the defenders.

The question is no longer:

Do we have break-glass accounts?

The question is:

Can we prove that authorized responders can authenticate, communicate, observe, contain, preserve evidence, and begin reconstitution when the primary security control plane is unavailable or hostile—and can they do it within a measured period?

Until the answer is yes, the organization is resilient only while its assumptions hold.

Security programs must do more than defend the business.

They must remain capable of defending it while their own machinery is failing.

More Information and Assistance

MicroSolved, Inc. can help organizations:

Map security-control dependencies and shared failure domains.
Define a Minimum Viable Defensive System.
Design independent emergency identity, communications, administrative, logging, and evidence paths.
Establish degraded-mode activation and recovery procedures.
Run compound-failure tabletop and live validation exercises.
Define and measure Time to Defensible State.

Contact MicroSolved at info@microsolved.com or +1.614.351.1237. Relax. We’re on watch.

* AI tools were used as a research assistant for this content, but human moderation and writing are also included. The included images are AI-generated.

The Evidence Supply Chain: How CISOs Build a Cyber Materiality Data Plane Before the Incident

Posted on May 26, 2026 by Brent Huston

A ransomware incident does not wait for the organization chart to catch up.

At 8:17 a.m., the SOC sees encryption activity on a file server. At 8:31, operations says the plant is still running. At 8:44, finance says revenue recognition may be affected if order processing stays down past noon. At 9:02, legal asks whether customer data was accessed. At 9:18, the forensic team says it is too early to tell. At 9:23, a vendor says the outage may have started in their environment. At 9:41, communications asks whether they should prepare a holding statement.

By hour two, everyone is working hard.

But they are not necessarily working from the same reality.

That is the problem.

Cyber materiality is often discussed as a decision problem. When does a cyber event become a board-level business event? When does it become reportable? When does it become material to investors, customers, regulators, lenders, or strategic partners?

Those are important questions. Public companies, for example, must disclose material cybersecurity incidents on Form 8-K within four business days after determining materiality, including the material aspects of the incident’s nature, scope, timing, and impact or reasonably likely impact.

But underneath that decision sits a deeper problem:

Continue reading →

The Power of Business Impact Analysis: Strengthening Business Resilience

Posted on March 16, 2025 by Brent Huston

The ability to anticipate and mitigate disruptions is more critical than ever. Organizations that lack a structured approach to assessing operational risks may find themselves vulnerable to financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties.

A Business Impact Analysis (BIA) is a cornerstone of business continuity planning, helping organizations identify critical functions, assess vulnerabilities, and allocate resources effectively to maintain operational resilience. This article explores the importance of BIA, its key benefits, and how organizations can leverage it to enhance preparedness against disruptions.

What is a Business Impact Analysis (BIA)?

A BIA is a strategic process designed to evaluate the potential effects of unexpected disruptions on critical business functions. It systematically identifies essential operations, assesses their dependencies, and provides actionable insights to minimize downtime and financial loss.

A typical BIA report includes:

Executive Summary – A high-level overview of the analysis and key findings.
Methodology – The approach, tools, and data collection techniques used.
Findings – Detailed insights into operational vulnerabilities.
Risk Assessment – Identification of potential disruptions such as cyber threats, natural disasters, or supply chain failures.
Recovery Strategies – Prioritized recommendations to minimize downtime and financial losses.

Key Benefits of a Business Impact Analysis

Identifying Critical Business Functions – Prioritizes essential operations to ensure effective resource allocation.
Optimizing Resource Allocation – Helps companies strategically allocate resources for cybersecurity, disaster recovery, and emergency staffing.
Enhancing Risk Mitigation Strategies – Provides quantifiable risk assessments to proactively address potential disruptions.
Supporting Regulatory Compliance – Ensures compliance with industry regulations by documenting risks and resilience measures.
Strengthening Business Continuity Planning – Forms the foundation of an effective business continuity plan (BCP).

How to Perform a Business Impact Analysis

Planning & Preparation – Define scope, secure leadership buy-in, and establish clear objectives.
Data Collection – Conduct interviews, assess dependencies, and document potential financial and operational impacts.
Evaluating Collected Data – Prioritize business functions and define recovery objectives.
Creating the BIA Report – Summarize findings, provide detailed recovery strategies, and develop an action plan.
Implementing & Reviewing – Align recommendations with business continuity plans and schedule regular updates.

Integrating BIA into Business Continuity & Security Strategies

Incident Response Planning – Enables faster decision-making during disruptions.
Disaster Recovery & Business Continuity Testing – Helps validate business continuity plans.
Data Flow & Cybersecurity Risk Management – Supports prioritizing security defenses.
Regulatory & Compliance Readiness – Demonstrates due diligence for compliance frameworks.

Common Challenges & How to Overcome Them

Difficulty Collecting Comprehensive Data – Conduct structured interviews and use automated tools.
Misalignment Between IT & Business Units – Involve both operational and IT leaders.
Lack of Regular Updates – Schedule annual or semi-annual BIA reviews.

How MicroSolved Can Assist with Your BIA

Conducting a BIA effectively requires expertise in risk assessment, data analysis, and business continuity planning. MicroSolved brings decades of experience in helping organizations:

Identify critical business processes and dependencies.
Assess financial and operational impacts of disruptions.
Develop customized business continuity and disaster recovery strategies.
Strengthen cybersecurity posture through integrated risk assessments.

Ready to assess your business continuity strategy? Contact MicroSolved today to schedule your BIA consultation!

Phone: +1.614.351.1237 or email: info@microsolved.com

* AI tools were used as a research assistant for this content.

5 Critical Lessons for IoT Vendors from the CrowdStrike/Microsoft Global Outage

Posted on July 22, 2024 by Brent Huston

Hey there,infosec aficionados! The recent CrowdStrike/Microsoft global outage sent shockwaves through the tech world, and if you’re in the IoT game, you’d better be taking notes. Let’s dive into the top 5 lessons that every IoT vendor should be etching into their playbooks right now.

1. Resilience Isn’t Just a Buzzword, It’s Your Lifeline

Listen up, folks. If this outage taught us anything, it’s that our interconnected systems are about as fragile as a house of cards in a hurricane. One domino falls, and suddenly we’re all scrambling. For IoT vendors, resilience isn’t just nice to have – it’s do or die.

You need to be building systems that can take a punch and keep on ticking. Think redundancy, failover mechanisms, and spreading your infrastructure across the globe like you’re planning for the apocalypse. Because in our world, every day could be doomsday for your devices.

2. Data Recovery: Your Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card

When the data center lights (and flights) went out, a lot of folks found themselves up the creek without a paddle – or their data. IoT vendors, take heed: your backup and recovery game needs to be top-notch. We’re talking bulletproof backups and recovery processes that you could run in your sleep.

And don’t just set it and forget it. Test those recovery processes like you’re prepping for the Olympics. Because when the big one hits, you don’t want to be caught with your data flows down.

3. Updates: Handle with Extreme Caution

Here’s a plot twist for you: the very thing meant to protect us – a security update – was what kicked off this whole mess. It’s like locking your door and realizing you’ve handed the key to a burglar.

IoT vendors, you need to treat every update like it’s potentially toxic. Rigorous testing, staged rollouts, and the ability to hit the “undo” button faster than you can say “oops” – these aren’t just good practices, they’re your survival kit.

4. Know Thy Dependencies (and Their Dependencies)

In this tangled web we weave, you might think you’re an island, but surprise! You’re probably more connected than Kevin Bacon. The CrowdStrike/Microsoft fiasco showed us that even if you weren’t directly using their services, you might still end up as collateral damage.

So, IoT vendors, it’s time to play detective. Map out every single dependency in your tech stack, and then map their dependencies. And for the love of all things cyber, diversify! A multi-vendor approach might give you a headache now, but it’ll be a lifesaver when the next big outage hits.

5. Incident Response: Time to Get Real

If your incident response plan is collecting dust on a shelf (or worse, is just a figment of your imagination), wake up and smell the coffee! This outage caught a lot of folks with their guards down, and it wasn’t pretty.

You need to be running drills like it’s the end of the world. Simulate failures, practice your response, and then do it all over again. Because when the real deal hits, you want your team moving like a well-oiled machine, not like headless chickens.

The Bottom Line

Look, in our hyper-connected IoT world, massive outages aren’t a matter of if, but when. It’s time to stop crossing our fingers and hoping for the best. Resilience, recovery, and rock-solid response capabilities – these are the tools that will separate the IoT winners from the losers in the long run.

So, IoT vendors, consider this your wake-up call. Are you ready to step up your game, or are you going to be the next cautionary tale? The choice is yours.

Need help building an industry-leading IoT information security program? Our vCISOs have the knowledge, experience, and wisdom to help you, no matter your starting poing. Drop us a line at info@microsolved.com for a no hassle discussion and use cases.

* AI tools were used as a research assistant for this content.

3 Key Tips for Rapid and Effective Incident Response in Information Security

Posted on April 13, 2023 by Brent Huston

Incident response is a critical component of any successful information security program. An effective incident response process can help organizations detect, investigate, and respond to threats in a timely manner. This blog post will discuss three key tips to ensure rapid and effective incident response during an information security incident.

Develop a well-structured incident response plan:

A comprehensive incident response plan serves as the foundation for effective incident response. The plan should outline each process phase’s roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Key elements include clear communication channels, escalation paths, and predefined actions to be taken during an incident. Regularly review, update, and test the plan to ensure it remains relevant and practical.
Implement proactive detection and monitoring tools:

The rapid response starts with early detection. Invest in advanced detection and monitoring tools, such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), security information and event management (SIEM) solutions, and endpoint detection and response (EDR) technologies. These tools enable organizations to identify potential security incidents in real time and respond quickly to minimize their impact.
Train and empower your Incident Response Team (IRT):

An experienced and well-equipped IRT is crucial for effective incident response. Provide regular training, including tabletop exercises and simulations, to ensure team members are familiar with the incident response plan and can execute it efficiently during an actual incident. Ensure the IRT has access to the necessary resources and tools, and maintain a culture of open communication to encourage swift reporting of potential incidents.

*This article was written with the help of AI tools and Grammarly.

High-Level FAQ for Incident Response

Posted on April 10, 2023 by Brent Huston

Q: What is an incident response process in information security?

A: The incident response process in information security is a systematic approach to identifying, containing, analyzing, and resolving security incidents that may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an organization’s information systems and data. It involves a set of predefined policies, procedures, and tools designed to minimize the impact of security incidents and facilitate a swift recovery.

Q: Why is the incident response process necessary?

A: The incident response process is crucial for organizations because it helps to minimize the damage caused by security incidents, protect sensitive data, maintain business continuity, and comply with regulatory requirements. A well-defined incident response process can also help organizations learn from security incidents and improve their overall security posture.

Q: What are the critical phases of an incident response process?

A: The incident response process typically includes six key phases:

i. Preparation: Developing and maintaining an incident response plan, training staff, and setting up necessary tools and resources.
ii. Detection and Analysis: Identifying potential security incidents through monitoring, reporting, and analyzing security events.
iii. Containment: Limiting the spread and impact of an identified security incident by isolating affected systems or networks.
iv. Eradication: Removing the cause of the security incident, such as malware or unauthorized access, and restoring affected systems to a secure state.
v. Recovery: Restoring affected systems and networks to regular operation and verifying their security.
vi. Post-Incident Activity: Reviewing the incident response process, identifying lessons learned, and implementing improvements to prevent future incidents.

Q: Who should be involved in the incident response process?

A: An effective incident response process involves a cross-functional team, typically called the Incident Response Team (IRT), which may include members from IT, information security, legal, human resources, public relations, and management. External stakeholders, such as law enforcement, third-party vendors, or cyber insurance providers, may also be involved, depending on the nature and severity of the incident.

Q: How can organizations prepare for incident response?

A: Organizations can prepare for incident response by:

Developing a comprehensive incident response plan that outlines roles, responsibilities, and procedures for each process phase.
Regularly updating and testing the incident response plan to ensure its effectiveness and relevance.
Training employees on their roles and responsibilities during an incident, including reporting procedures and essential security awareness.
Establishing a well-equipped IRT with clear communication channels and access to necessary resources.
Implementing continuous monitoring and detection tools to identify potential security incidents early.

Q: How can organizations improve their incident response process?

A: Organizations can improve their incident response process by:

Regularly reviewing and updating the incident response plan to reflect changes in the organization’s infrastructure, personnel, and threat landscape.
Conducting periodic tests and simulations, such as tabletop exercises or red team exercises, to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness and identify improvement areas.
Implement a continuous improvement cycle incorporating lessons learned from past incidents and industry best practices.
Investing in advanced detection and monitoring tools to enhance the organization’s ability to identify and respond to security incidents.
Providing ongoing training and support to the IRT and other stakeholders to ensure they remain up-to-date with the latest threats and best practices.

*This article was written with the help of AI tools and Grammarly.

Utility Tabletop Cybersecurity Exercises

Posted on September 30, 2020 by Brent Huston

Recently, a group of federal partners, comprised of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) and it’s regional entities released their Cyber Planning for Response and Recovery Study (CYPRES). The report was based on a review and analysis of the incident response and recovery capabilities of a set of their member’s cyber security units, and is a great example of some of the information sharing that is increasing in the industry. The report included reviews of eight utility companies’ incident response plans for critical infrastructure environments, and the programs reviewed varied in their size, complexity and maturity, though all were public utilities.

Though the specific tactics suggested in the report’s findings have come under fire and criticism, a few items emerged that were of broad agreement. The first is that most successful programs are based on NIST 800-61, which is a fantastic framework for incident response plans. Secondly, the report discusses how useful tabletop exercises are for practicing responses to cybersecurity threats and re-enforcing the lessons learned feedback loop to improve capabilities. As a result, each public utility should strongly consider implementing periodic tabletop exercises as a part of their cyber security and risk management programs.

Tabletop Exercises from MSI

At MicroSolved, we have been running cyber security tabletop exercises for our clients for more than a decade. We have a proprietary methodology for building out the role playing scenarios and using real-world threat intelligence and results from the client’s vulnerability management tools in the simulation. Our scenarios are developed into simulation modules, pre-approved by the client, and also include a variety of randomized events and nuances to more precisely simulate real life. During the tabletop exercise, we also leverage a custom written gaming management system to handle all event details, track game time and handle the randomization nuances.

Our tabletop exercise process is performed by two MSI team members. The first acts as the simulation moderator and “game master”, presenting the scenarios and tracking the various open threads as the simulation progresses. The second team member is an “observer” and they are skilled risk management team members who pre-review your incident response policies, procedures and documentation so that they can then prepare a gap analysis after the simulation. The gap analysis compares your performance during the game to the process and procedure requirements described and notes any differences, weaknesses or suggestions for improvement.

Target scenarios can be created to test any division of the organization, wide scale attacks or deeply nuanced compromises of specific lines of business. Various utility systems can be impacted in the simulation, including business networks, payment processing, EDI/supply chain, metering/AMI/smart grid, ICS/SCADA or other mission critical systems.Combination and cascading failures, disaster recovery and business continuity can also be modeled. In short, just about any cyber risks can be a part of the exercise.

Tabletop Exercise Outcomes and Deliverables

Our tabletop exercises result in a variety of detailed reports and a knowledge transfer session, if desired. The reports include the results of the policy/procedure review and gap analysis, a description of the simulated incident and an action plan for future improvements. If desired, a board level executive summary can also be included, suitable for presentation to boards, management teams, direct oversight groups, Public Utility Commission and Homeland Security auditors as well.

These reports will discuss the security measures tested, and provide advice on proactive controls that can be implemented, enhanced, matured or practiced in order to display capabilities in future incidents that reflect the ability to perform more rapid and efficient recovery.

The knowledge transfer session is your team’s chance to ask questions about the process, learn more about the gaps observed in their performance and discuss the lessons learned, suggestions and controls that call for improvement. Of course the session can include discussions of related initiatives and provide for contact information exchange with our team members, in the event that they can assist your team in the future. The knowledge transfer session can also be performed after your team has a chance to perform a major review of the reports and findings.

How to Get Started on Tabletop Exercises from MSI

Tabletop exercises are available from our team for cyber security incidents, disaster preparedness and response or business continuity functions. Exercises are available on an ad-hoc, 1 year, 2 year or 3 year subscription packages with frequencies ranging from quarterly to twice per year or yearly. Our team’s experience is applicable to all utility cyber programs and can include any required government partners, government agencies or regulators as appropriate.

Our team can help develop the scope of threats, cyber attacks or emergency events to be simulated. Common current examples include ransomware, phishing-based account compromises, cyber attacks that coincide with catastrophic events or service disruptions, physical attacks against substations or natural gas pipelines, data breach and compromise of various parts of the ICS/SCADA infrastructure. Our team will work with you to ensure that the scenario meets all of your important points and concerns.

Once the scenario is approved, we will schedule the simulation (which can be easily performed via web-conference to reduce travel costs and facilitate easy team attendance) and build the nuances to create the effects of a real event. Once completed, the reporting and knowledge transfer sessions can follow each instance.

Tabletop exercises can go a long way to increasing cybersecurity preparedness and re-enforcing the cybersecurity mindset of your team. It can also be a great opportunity for increasing IT/OT cooperation and strengthening relationships between those team members.

To get started, simply contact us via this web form or give us a call at (614) 351-1237. We would love to discuss tabletop exercises with you and help you leverage them to increase your security posture.

Security Alert: RSA Breach and 7 Ways to Secure Your Tokens

Posted on June 7, 2011 by Brent Huston

Since the compromise of the RSA environment several months ago, much attention has been paid to the potential impact of the attack on RSA customers.

Given the popularity of the RSA products and the sensitivity of the processes that they protect, the situation should be taken very seriously by RSA token users.

Last night, RSA made a public announcement that their breach and information stolen in that breach has now been used in attacks against RSA customers. The primary focus, as far as is known, has been the defense sector, but it is very likely that additional threat-focus has been placed on other critically sensitive verticals such as financial and critical infrastructure.

There are a number of things that RSA customers should do, in the advice of MicroSolved, Inc. Below is a short list of identified strategies and tactics:

Identify all surfaces exposed that include RSA components. Ensure your security team has a complete map of where and how the RSA authentication systems are in use in your organization.
Establish a plan for how you will replace your tokens and how you will evaluate and handle the risks of exposure while you perform replacement.
Increase your vigilance and monitoring of RSA exposed surfaces. This should include additional log, event and intrusion monitoring around the exposed surfaces. You might also consider the deployment of honeypots or other drop-in measures to detect illicit activity against or via compromised systems available with the RSA exposed surfaces.
Develop an incident response plan to handle any incidents that arise around this issue.
Increase the PIN length of your deployments as suggested by RSA, where appropriate, based on identified risk and threat metrics.
Teach your IT team and users about the threats and the issue. Prepare your team to handle questions from users, customers and other folks as this issue gains media attention and grows in visibility. Prepare your technical management team to answer questions from executives and Board-level staff around this issue.
Get in contact with RSA, either via your account executive or via the following phone number for EMC (RSA’s parent company): 1-800-782-4362

In the meantime, if MSI can assist you with any of these steps or work with you to review your plan, please let us know. Our engineers are aware of the issues and the processes customers are using to manage this problem in a variety of verticals. We can help you with planning or additional detection and monitoring techniques should you desire.

We wish our clients the highest amount of safety and security as we, as an industry, work through this challenge. We wish RSA the best of luck and the highest success in their remediation and mitigation efforts. As always, we hope for the best outcome for everyone involved.

Thanks for your time and attention to this issue. It is much appreciated, as is your relationship with MicroSolved, Inc.