About Brent Huston

I am the CEO of MicroSolved, Inc. and a security evangelist. I have spent the last 20+ years working to make the Internet safer for everyone on a global scale. I believe the Internet has the capability to contribute to the next great leap for mankind, and I want to help make that happen!

Toata Scanning for Zen Shopping Cart with Brain File – Updated

If you’ve been a long time reader of this blog, then you know about our ongoing efforts to help stem the tide of web application infections. Here is another example of this effort in action.

A couple of days ago the HITME began tracking a series of new scans that are circulating from the Toata bot network. These new scans appear to be aimed at cataloging systems that are running the Zen shopping cart application. As per usual behavior of these tools, it appears that the cataloging is automated and then later, exploitation occurs from either another piece of code or human intervention.

ToataZenBrain102709.txt

Above is a link to a brain file for the Web application scanner that we produce called BrainWebScan. You can use this tool and the brain file above to scan your own servers for implementations of the Zen shopping cart. If you identify servers that have the Zen shopping cart installed, careful review of these systems should be conducted to examine them for signs of compromise. Reviews of the logs for the string “Toata” will identify if the system has already been scanned by this particular attack tool. However, other attack tools are being used that do not create specific named strings in the log files. The vulnerability that these tools are seeking to eventually exploit is unknown at this time, may be an old vulnerability or exploit, or could potentially be a new and previously unknown vulnerability.

Users of the Zen cart application are encouraged to ensure that they are following the best practices for securing the application. The application should be kept up-to-date and the Zen cart vendor website should be carefully monitored for future updates and known issues. Additional monitoring, vigilance and attention to servers running the Zen cart application should be performed at this time. It is probably not a bad idea to have these systems assessed for currently known vulnerabilities in their operating system, content management application and other web components.

If you would like assistance checking your web application or vulnerability assessment performed on your web application, please do not hesitate to contact us for immediate assistance.

PS: You can download BrainWebScan for Windows from here: http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/397669/BrainWebScan100Win.zip

Here are an additional set of gathered targets:

//zencart/includes/general.js
//zen/includes/general.js
//ZenCart/includes/general.js
//ZEN/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zen/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zen-cart/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zencart/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zc/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zshop/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
/zencart/install.txt
/zen-cart/install.txt
/zen/install.txt
/zcart/install.txt

Some Laptop Theft Info

As a part of security awareness month, I have mentioned that we really need to focus any preventative mention awareness on laptop theft. As a part of that, I have been working on some interesting research around this threat. There is a ton of information out there on laptop theft. This wikipedia article has a lot of good information. It is a great place to start if you want to build some quick materials. I love the cost estimate of $89,000 on average per lost laptop. This aggregates the work it takes to recover from the loss, the hardware cost, the aggregate average of fines and regulatory losses, etc. That number is a real eye opener for many people who tend to only think about the hardware replacement costs, which is especially true for end users. Also, in my experience, we have timed some of our security engineer ninjas on how long it takes to break a car window, snatch a laptop and bolt. One of our quickest ninjas takes under 12 seconds to get 100′ from the vehicle. Even rounded up to an even 20 seconds, that is not very likely to matter. Timing how long it takes people to go into a convenience store to pay for gas or grab a soda is almost always in the 3-5 minute range. That’s a lot of time for 20 second intervals to occur.

Just something for you to give end users to think about…

Three Ideas to Encourage Employee Net-Cops

Here are three quick ideas about how to encourage your employees to be better “net cops”:

1. Make sure they know who to report suspicious behaviors to and never, ever punish anyone for doing so. Make sure you give them a place to drop anonymous notes too, if that is appropriate for your program. Teach them how to report suspicious emails, calls and information requests. Create an ongoing program reminding them about how to do so.

2. Incent them to report suspicious behaviors. Create an email forward box for spam, phishing and other types of suspicious email. Enter the first people to report each sample into a monthly or quarterly drawing for movie tickets or some small prize. Not only will you get people interested and get more insight into your security posture, you just might learn more quickly when a spam or trojan attack is under way.

3. Hold a security day where you have games and such that back up these ideas. Focus on teaching your people how to recognize social engineering and such and how to report it. Use the opportunity to remind them about the other ideas above. Have some swag made for them that talks about how each of them is a “security agent” or “on the front lines” “investigating threats against your customer’s data” or the like. Get marketing and HR involved to create something memorable.

What ideas do you think might get people focused on noticing when bad things are happening? How does your organization encourage your staff to be better detectives?

Why I Think Your Awarness Program is Broken…

Security awareness. I know, I know… This is one of the worst parts of being an infosec person. We all seem to have problems with it. Not so much because the content creation is hard, but because effective content creation is nearly impossible.

For almost 20 years, we in the infosec business have been harping at you about awareness. The story often goes something along the lines of “If only we could teach the users to be more careful and attentive, then we protect them better.” The truth of the matter is though, that the average user either doesn’t care about information security (until it’s too late) or they simply don’t have enough technology skills to protect themselves in a meaningful way. But, and I promise you THIS – the answer is absolutely NOT another poster in the lunch room about not clicking on the dancing gnome or opening emails from people you don’t know…..

I think we are going about this in the wrong way. In fact, I believe that the only prevention focused message you should be sending to your staff on a repeated basis is about laptop theft. I think if you focus all of your prevention awareness on laptop theft, you might accomplish a little bit more, since laptop theft is a pretty personal crime. So, if you must print up some posters – make it about not leaving your laptop in the back of your car, or skip the posters all together!

What do I propose instead? What then will we do with all of that awareness budget???

I propose this. I suggest that you skip prevention awareness and instead focus your staff on being better “net cops”. Yep, you heard me, NET COPS. Why the heck would you do that, you might be saying? Well, the main reason is, according to recent data that profiled data compromises, your team members (as in humans) are twice as likely to notice strange attacker behaviors, security issues and other anomalies versus automated systems like IDS and log monitoring. Plus, people already love to play net cop. Your customer service people love it, your sales people love it and face it, most infosec people love it too. There is a reason why there are so many crime shows on TV. Since people love the idea of being a net cop, let’s focus on teaching them, giving them incentives and helping them help us protect our data more effectively.

This month, as you may know, is security awareness month. As such, throughout the month, we, like other blogs and security companies will be talking a lot about awareness. BUT, on this blog and at MSI, we are going to talk more about teaching your users to be detectives. We think new focus on from “what not to do” to “help us patrol the network” just might work! We’ll never know, unless we try!

Give it some thought and as the month goes on, don’t be shy. Let us know what you think about the idea. Thanks for reading!

Pandemic Planning Update: Consider 10 Day Minimums for Sick Time

Having just read this article, and participated in several discussions around Pandemic Planning, I am of the belief that folks might want to consider mandatory 10 day sick times/work from home times for H1N1 infected employees.

Research shows that infected folks may be contagious for up to 10 days from the onset of their symptoms, even after they “feel better”. The problem with this is that as they “feel better” they may return to work or school, thus exposing others to the virus, albeit, inadvertently. Many people simply think that if they “feel better”, then they must be over the infection and not contagious anymore.

So, as you consider your pandemic plans, please think about the idea of a 10 day work from home program or the like for folks that are symptomatic. Explanation and education of folks carrying the virus can only help, so take the time to explain this cycle to your team.

Thanks for reading and please let us know if you have any questions about pandemic planning or remote working issues. My team and I have been doing quite a bit of consulting lately reviewing pandemic plans and helping organizations make sure that they are prepared and that their remote access systems are robust enough to handle the load and secure enough to be trusted. If we can be of any help to your organization along these lines, please do not hesitate to call or drop us a line!

President of Colombia Has Swine Flu and So Might Other Leaders

This article pointed out the recent diagnosis of President Alvaro Uribe, of Colombia, with swine flu. Even worse, the leaders of Colombia have alerted the other leaders that were involved in a regional South American summit last week. While President Uribe is not considered high risk for death from the disease, this is a new turn in the pandemic and public awareness. To date, Colombia has reported 621 cases with 34 deaths, making the mortality rate .05%.

Meanwhile, in the US and UK, school has just resumed and health officials are closely monitoring schools. Plans for handling outbreaks in the schools vary by district, but several are known to be testing plans for tele-education and remote teaching.

Once again, organizations are urged to undertake some form of pandemic planning and testing, as a “just in case” measure for H1N1 and the possibility of a strong flu season this year. SANS has just launched a site dedicated to pandemic planning and news. Check it out for more information, or give us a call and arrange a time to chat.

Flu Pandemic Begins Early in Japan and Could Accellerate US Season

According to this article, just published, the flu season has unexpectedly begun early in Japan.

The WHO has fears that this outbreak could also hasten the beginning of flu season here in the US. This puts additional pressure on the health systems to prepare for vaccinations and on the producers of the vaccines to push forward as quickly as possible.

As we have previously mentioned, it is a good idea for organizations to prepare a pandemic plan to handle outages of staff or remote working arrangements in preparation for the H1N1 flu and other natural emergencies of similar scope. Please, take the time to review your plans, test them effectively or create these plans as soon as practical.

Keep an eye on the WHO and CDC news channels to stay abreast of flu trends and any patterns or new developments. Here are links to their sites.

WHO and the CDC sites.

Thanks for reading!

When The System Works, It Really Works! :)

OK gang, so here is our part of the story.

As many of you may now know, the NCUA issued a fraud alert this week based on a social engineering test we were doing for a client natural person Credit Union. You can find some of the materials at the following URLS:

NCUA Media Release

SANS Storm Center

NetworkWorld

Once we saw the alert from the NCUA, we immediately contacted our Credit Union client about the situation. The client had received the letter and CD set in the mail, just as intended and called for in their testing agreement. However, on their side, the person responsible for the penetration test was out the day the letter arrived. The receiver of the letter followed their incident response process and reported the suspicious activity to the NCUA Fraud Hotline, just as they are supposed to do.

Upon our contact with the CU, the entire situation became apparent and we quickly identified how the process had proceeded. The employee of the CU had followed the process, just as they should, and alerted the proper authorities to the potential for fraud. We immediately contacted the NCUA Fraud hotline and explained that the process was a part of a standard penetration test. Eventually, we talked with executive management of NCUA and offered them any information they desired, including the source code to the tools on the CDs. The NCUA was wonderful to work with, understood the situation and seemed appreciative of our efforts to help ensure that their members were meeting the requirements of NCUA 748, which calls for the protection of member data against illicit access, including social engineering attacks like these.

During our discussion with NCUA executive management, we discussed me reaching out to SANS and such to clarify the situation and to explain that the “attack” was simply a part of a penetration test. I did this as soon as I hung up the phone with NCUA. The handlers at SANS and I traded emails and phone calls and they amended their release to include the penetration testing scenario. The whole point of this was to add clarification and to prevent people from getting “spun up”, since there really was no ongoing attack in progress.

However, in typical Internet fashion, the story had already taken on a life of it’s own. The next thing we know, the press is picking up the story, there’s an article on slashdot and people are in alert mode. We then set about trying to calm folks down and such on Twitter, through email and such.

The bottom line here is this. This was a controlled exercise in which the process worked. The social engineering attack itself was unsuccessful and drew the attention of the proper authorities. Had we been actual criminals and attempting fraud, we would have been busted by law enforcement. The NCUA did a great job of getting the word out that such an attack had occurred and the media and security folks did a great job in spreading the word to prevent further exposures to this threat vector. Everyone, and I do mean everyone, is to be congratulated here for their efforts!

The system worked. Had we been bad guys, we would have been busted. The world was protected, once more, thanks to the vigilance and attention of the NCUA and the security community.

Now, about the testing. MicroSolved, Inc. does, indeed, test social engineering attack vectors as a part of our standard assessments. The social engineering threat is a powerful and valid attack vector that often leads to compromise. Our process for testing these engagements is well scoped, well organized and intensely controlled. The threats we emulate are very real (in this case, we even included typos and such in the fake letter). The simulated malware we use is a custom application, developed in house by my team of engineers and does not propagate in any way. It is safe, effective, tested and has been in use with ongoing revision and testing for more than five years. The entire process for testing social engineering has been performed thousands of times for thousands of clients and will continue to be a part of our testing methodology. We truly believe that information security starts and ends with the people involved in protecting the data.

I hope this answers any questions you may have about the process or the alert. If not, drop me a line at bhuston@microsolved.com and I will try and assist you, if I can. I would really like to thank the NCUA, SANS, my technical team and the customer CU for their help and attention on this project. Thanks also, to all of the security folks and CU folks who helped spread the word about this attack vector. Though the awareness campaign was unintended, it certainly has raised the bar for would be attackers if they hope to exploit this in the future. Thanks for all of your hard work and attention!

Oh, and lastly, no, it is not us sending the laptops to governors of the states. It might not even be us sending the next round of CDs, USB keys or whatever new fraud schemes emerge in the future. But, regardless of whether or not it is us doing a test for your organization, or real criminals attempting to exploit you, don’t fall for it! Report these events to the authorities and let’s make use of the process that we have clearly established!

Thanks for reading and make it a great day!

Update: Thanks to NetworkWorld for their help on getting the word out. Thanks to @alexhutton as well for this article.

Yay! A Winning Anti-Virus Check! Or Not…

So today on my RSS feeds, I saw that a new version of the Sub7 trojan has been released. This new version, called “legends” has some new features and such for exploitation and maintaining control over infected systems.

Being curious, I uploaded the installer to VirusTotal to see what kind of hit ratio I would get. To my surprise, ~96% of the AV software there detected Sub7!

There are two ways to look at this, I suppose. It sure seems like a victory when you get such a high hit rate, but on the other hand there are likely some elements of this extremely well known code that haven’t changed since it first emerged on the scene in the 90’s. So, I would hope that we could detect it with a high accuracy rate. In fact, I had really hoped we could detect it at 100%, but it seems that some AV vendors still miss it. Still 96% is far better than the ~15% detection rate I got on another test like this, just a little bit ago.

The second way to look at it is that we still have long known malware that is not detected by some AV products. Now, given, that is a small percentage, but after all of this time, they can not detect Sub7? That would be pretty horrible if you happen to be a customer of theirs and your data is at risk. Compound this with the data from the breach reports that show increases in custom malware being used in attacks and you can see the problem from a new perspective. If we can’t detect malware from the 90’s across the board, then how can AV hope to continue to be seen as the magic bullet defense against increasingly complex and dynamic attack code in the future? Of course, the answer is, it can not. It NEVER HAS BEEN THE MAGIC BULLET THAT MANY IT FOLKS AND MANAGEMENT FOLKS BELIEVE IT IS.

Where does that leave us? Somewhere between victory and defeat? Right where we have always been, but maybe, just maybe, with a little more argument and knowledge for those “magic bullet” folks!

PS – Here is my VirusTotal submission if you want to check it out.

Remote Access Challenges in Pandemic Planning

One of the tools that organizations are leaning on for pandemic responses is remote access to computing systems. Technologies such as VPNs, Citrix servers, terminal servers and other forms of remote access are widely appearing in the plans we are reviewing and are among the most discussed items in the planning sessions we have been holding with clients.

However, there are some issues that are emerging around many of these tools. To start, they can introduce a great deal of risk to the IT infrastructure and security posture if they are not deployed and managed properly. For example, blindly exposing terminal services, SSH and other remote access technologies to the Internet is a common path to compromise. Attackers are very good at finding these services and exploiting them, either with technical exploits or through credential discovery via social engineering, browser attacks and/or brute force. These exposures are often present in the major data breaches and serve as a danger point for organizations.

Blindly exposing remote access mechanisms such as these is usually a pretty bad approach. A better approach is to leverage a stronger access method such as VPN. VPN technologies are typically built around stronger security platforms and with greater security in place to protect the users and the organizations they serve. They will require a bit more “care and feeding” than blind port forwarding deployments, but they are a much safer solution for remote access to your environment.

VPN technologies also do not need to be expensive. Projects like OpenVPN and other open source approaches have reduced the costs to deploy VPN access to the lowest of levels. Basically, the cost of hardware and the human resources to install and support the system are the only costs involved. Many tools exist in this family and more are emerging every day.

Another significant issue to consider when looking at the remote access capability of your pandemic plan is capacity. More than likely, your solutions were implemented, as are most, with the idea that a somewhat limited subset of your entire employees would be using the access tools at any given time. That may not be the case in the event of a pandemic. The number of employees accessing the system may exceed your current designs and testing, so be sure you think through how you can expand that capacity, rotate shifts or use other techniques to plan for the impact from the surge in demand.

Lastly, be sure and test these mechanisms before you need them. Things in life often don’t work as planned the first time around, so practice for pandemics before one arrives. Have dedicated work from home days, plan for teams or lines of business to practice their plans and create lessons learned feedback loops to capture issues and work on minimizing them.

Preparation will likely pay off, both in the continued operation and bottom line of your business and in the reduction of panic should a pandemic every rear its ugly head. Thanks for reading, and let us know if we can assist you in planning or testing with pandemics in mind. Please, stay tuned to the blog for more information on the possible H1N1 pandemic, pandemic planning and other security issues that might emerge. At MSI, we are dedicated to helping you establish the means and mechanisms to keep your business, your business…