About Brent Huston

I am the CEO of MicroSolved, Inc. and a security evangelist. I have spent the last 20+ years working to make the Internet safer for everyone on a global scale. I believe the Internet has the capability to contribute to the next great leap for mankind, and I want to help make that happen!

Discuss Detection in Depth at CMH ISSA Summit

 

 

On May 18th, I will be presenting on detection in depth at the CMH ISSA Summit. I look forward to a good discussion of the ideals, organizational needs, and maturity models. Given all of the focus on re-allocating resources from “prevention only” strategies to an equal spread across the core values of prevention, detection and response, this is likely to be a useful discussion to many organizations.

Come ready with good questions. I will also be available throughout the Summit for break-out discussions, one-on-ones, and small team meetings. Please reach out via email, phone or Twitter to schedule a sit down. Otherwise, feel free to approach me in the halls and we can have an ad-hoc discussion if you want to learn more about specific detection in depth approaches.
 
I speak on Friday, May 18th at 11:15 am. I hope to see you there!

Follow Up to Out of Band Authentication Post

(This is a commentary follow up to my earlier post, located here.)

A couple of folks have commented on Twitter that they have a fear of using SMS for any sort of security operations. There have been discussions about the insecurity of SMS and the lack of attention to protecting the cellular network by carriers around the world. I generally disagree with blanket statements, and I would push for organizations considering SMS as a means of authentication to undertake a real risk assessment of the process before they jump in.
 
However, if the controls in place in the cell networks meet their appetite for risk, then I think it is a perfectly acceptable business case. It certainly beats in-band simple authentication mechanisms like “pictures of trust” and traditional login/password as a security control.
 
At least in SMS authentication, the attacker would usually need to have control over or access to more than one device belonging to the user. I think this helps make the risk model more acceptable for my views.
 
Other folks discussed how Out of Band Authentication (OOBA) has been done now successfully in many places. I agree with this. We know how to do it. There are a LOT of vendors out there who can successfully integrate, deploy and manage a solution for you. Sadly, though, there are still more than a few who are struggling to get it right or done at all. As with most things in life, it helps to do a little research. Organizations should perform due diligence on their vendors and factor vendor risks into the equation of purchases and project planning. 
 
Lastly, a few folks commented on the fact that they, too, are running into speed bumps with deployments and logistics. Several folks echoed the sentiments of the original challenges and few offered suggestions beyond simply “doing more homework” and looking for “quickly scalable solutions”. The good news with this is that you are not alone out there. Other folks are facing AND BEATING challenges. Feel free to reach out to your peers and discuss what is and what isn’t working for them.
 
As per the original post, the more communication and discussion we can have amongst the community about these topics, the better off we all will be. So, discuss, seriously…
 
##Special thanks to the vendors that replied with case studies, references or stories about how they have done integration and deployment. There are a lot of good vendors out there with knowledge in this area. Careful review of their capabilities will help you sort them out from the less capable. Communication is key.
 
Thanks for reading! 

Are You Attending the 2012 ISSA Central Ohio InfoSec Summit?

 

If you are in the midwest and can make it to Columbus for the ISSA Summit this year, you owe it to yourself to do so. Great speakers, great content, an amazing location and some of the best folks from around the world, for two days focused on infosec. It’s been amazing the past several years. You can find info online about it here

Some of the things I am looking forward to are getting to hear more from Richard Clarke (I might not always agree with his view, but he is an excellent speaker and a very good man.), and the rest of the speakers. In fact, there is not a speaker on the docket that I don’t think is amazing. We have developer insights, business folks, techno geeks, hackers, auditors and even a few MSI folks. 
 
So, if you can come to town and be here May 17th and 18th, do so. If not, you’ll miss out on what is sure to be an amazing event.
 
Special thanks to the Columbus ISSA team for putting the event together. These folks work really hard to pull it off, and the volunteers on the day of the event go above and beyond to make it all happen. Please take a moment at the event and give them a pat on the back. If something would happen to go wrong, or could be done better, drop them a line in email and they will look at improving it next year. Thank them, in person, for all of the things that go right. Seriously, it helps. Even better, volunteer for the Summit and help them and the community out. It’s a great way to give back for all that the community does for all of us, all year long. 
 
Thanks for reading and we’ll see you at the Summit! 

Financial Organizations Struggle with Out of Band Authentication

Many of our client financial organizations have been working on implementing out of band authentication (OOBA) mechanisms for specific kinds of money transfers such as ACH and wires.

 A few have even looked into performing OOBA for all home and mobile banking access. While this authentication method does add some security to the process, effectively raising the bar for credential theft by the bad guys, it does not come without its challenges.

For starters, the implementation and integration of some of the software designed for this purpose has been a little more difficult than expected by many of the teams working on the projects. We are hearing that in some cases, the vendors are having difficulty integrating into some of the site platforms, particularly those not using .NET. Other platforms have been successful, but over time (and many over budget), the lesson learned is this: communicate clearly about the platforms in use when discussing implementations with potential vendors.
 
Other problems we have been hearing about include: availability issues with the number of outbound phone connections during peak use periods, issues with cellular carriers “losing” SMS messages (particularly a few non-top tier carriers), and integrating solutions into VoIP networks and old-style traditional PBX systems.
 
In many cases, these telephonic and cellular issues have caused the systems to be withdrawn during pilot, even turned off for peak periods during use and other “fit and start” approaches as the rough patches were worked out. The lesson in this area seems to be to design for peak use as a consideration, or at least understand and communicate acceptable delays, outages or round-robin processes, and make sure that your systems properly communicate these parameters to the user.
 
In the long run, proper communication to the users will lower the impact of the onslaught some of these systems call to the customer support and help desk folks.
 
It is getting better though. Vendors are learning to more easily and effectively develop and implement these solutions. The impact on account theft has been strong so far and customers seem to have a rapid adjustment curve. In fact, a few of our clients have shared that they have received kudos from their members/customers for implementing these new tools when they were announced, documented, and explained properly to the user base.
 
If your organization is considering this technology and has struggled with it, or has emerged victorious in the mastery of it; please drop me a line on Twitter (@lbhuston) and let me know your thoughts. The more we share about these tools, the better we can all get at making the road less bumpy for the public.
 
As always, thanks for reading and stay safe out there!

Remember Public Cellular Networks in Smart Meter Adoption

One of the biggest discussion points at the recent MEA Summit was the reliance of Smart Meter technology on the public cellular networks for communication.

There seemed to be a great deal of confusion about negotiating private cellular communications versus dependence on fully public networks. Many folks also described putting in their own femtocell and microcell deployments to greatly reduce the dependence on communication assets that they did not own. However, as you might expect, the purchase, install, management, and maintenance of private cellular infrastructure is expensive, requires skilled personnel, and often bumps into regulatory issues with frequency control and saturation.

Other considerations than cost also emerged with several ICS/SCADA owners discussing prioritization of repair issues versus consumer deployments, problems with negotiating effective, acceptable Service Level Agreements with the cell network vendors and a lack of understanding on the cell vendors’ part about ICS/SCADA deployments/integration/criticality in general.
 
Clearly, more analysis, study, and communication needs to occur between ICS/SCADA researchers/owners/developers and the relevant cellular network engineers/implementation teams to grow mutual knowledge and understanding between the parties. In the meantime, ICS/SCADA owners must strive to clearly identify their needs around cellular technologies, clearly demarcate the requirements for private/segmented/public cellular network use and understand the benefits/issues and threats of what they are utilizing. Cellular communications has a clear role to play in the future of ICS/SCADA, but the waters of how it will be managed, how it will be secured and how smaller organizations can obtain it affordably remain a bit muddy for now.
 
If your organization has winning strategies or has concerns that have arisen with the use of cellular networks, we would love to hear about them in the comments. The more ICS/SCADA owners work together to bring this knowledge forward, the more quickly and effectively we can resolve many of the issues that utilities and other organizations are encountering.

Getting Your ICS/SCADA Components Security Tested

Recently, at the MEA Summit, I had the opportunity to engage in a great discussion with a number of SCADA owners about security testing of their devices. Given all of the big changes underway concerning SCADA equipment, connectivity and the greater focus on these systems by attackers; the crowd had a number of questions about how they could get their new components tested in a lab environment prior to production deployment.

Device and application testing is something that MicroSolved has done for more than a decade. We have tested hundreds of IT hardware products, commercial software loads, web/mobile applications, consumer products, and for the last several years, ICS/SCADA and Smart Grid components. Our lab environments are suitable for a wide variety of testing scenarios and are used by utility companies, manufacturers and software developers from around the world as a trusted source for rational security testing and relevant threat analysis. We have a firm non-disclosure policy for client systems tested and the relevant vulnerabilities discovered and we often work hand in hand with the developers/design engineers to work through both mitigation and/or compensating control development.
 
ICS/SCADA owners should have any new designs assessed prior to implementation, they should have some form of ongoing security assessment (analysis – NOT scanning…) performed against current deployments/threats, plus they should be engaged in testing all new hardware and software platforms before production adoption. Developers, designers and manufacturers of ICS/SCADA/Smart Grid components should be engaging in a full set of product assessments, attack surface analysis, threat modeling and penetration testing prior to the release of the products to market. This will be a value-add to your customers, and ultimately, to the consumer. 
 
If your organization would like to have a device or software analysis performed, or would like to discuss how to engage with MicroSolved to have new equipment or ICS/SCADA deployment ideas modeled, tested and assessed, please contact us. 

Don’t Forget About VoIP Exposures and PBX Hacking

 

 

 

 

 

 

I was browsing my usual data alerts for the day and ran into this set of data. It motivated me to write a quick blog post to remind folks that VoIP scans and probes are still going on out there in the wild.

These days, with all of the attention to mass compromises, infected web sites and stolen credit card data, voice systems can sometimes slip out of sight.

VoIP compromises and intrusions remain a threat. There are now a variety of tools, exploits and frameworks built for attacking VoIP installations and they are a target for both automated tools and manual hacking. Access to VoIP systems can provide a great platform for intelligence, recon, industrial espionage and traditional toll fraud.
 
While VoIP might be the state of the art for phone systems today, there are still plenty of traditional PBX, auto-attendant and dial-up voicemail systems around too. Now might be a good time to review when those systems were last reviewed, audited or pen-tested. Traditional toll fraud is still painful to manage and recover from, so it’s probably worth spending a few cycles on reviewing these devices and their security postures. 
 
Let us know if your organization could use assistance with these items or with hardening voice systems, implementing detection techniques for them or otherwise increasing voice system security.

HoneyPoint and HITME Helps Clients Take Out Malware

I wanted to share some great feedback we received this week from a couple of sources. Both are regarding HoneyPoint — our product for creating a platform of nuance detection and visibility.

The first came from a critical infrastructure team. We notified them of an attack from their environment which was detected on the HITME (HoneyPoint Internet Threat Monitoring Environment). Using our alert, they quickly identified, investigated and isolated a specific machine that been infected with a piece of malware and was now scanning the Internet for other potential victims. They thanked us for the notification and said they truly appreciated our efforts and the work of the HITME team to help protect US critical infrastructures.
 
The second bit of feedback came from a long-time user of HoneyPoint Wasp, who suddenly began to see a piece of code propagate across a few machines in their workstation space. The code was rapidly identified as a piece of malware that had successfully evaded their anti-virus, but triggered the Wasp white list detection mechanism. Their team traced the infection back to a single USB key, which they impounded and sanitized. Thankfully, they found this infection before it was able to be leveraged by an attacker against them. They were very supportive of HoneyPoint and thanked us for assisting them in their investigation and for teaching them how to use Wasp through our installation services.
 
Together, these represent just a couple of the stories where HoneyPoint has helped security teams. Some of the people who receive the benefit of our work are not even users of the product or MicroSolved clients at all. It’s just another way that we engage every single day to help make a difference in the security and safety of peoples’ lives.
 
At MSI, we don’t just make great tools and perform great services, we have spent the last 20 years working hard to help people with information security. It continues to be both our pleasure and our passion.
 
Thanks for reading! 

Three Sources to Help You Understand Cybercrime

Cybercrime is a growing threat. I thought I would take a few moments and point you to three recent news articles that discuss U.S. Government views on just how information security is proceeding, how we are doing, and how we should think about the future of infosec. They are all three interesting points of view and represent a wide variety of data seen at high levels:

 
 
 
 
These three links are interesting perspectives on how infosec is changing from a focus on compliance and prevention techniques to fully embracing the need for cross-platform, security-focused initiatives. In addition, more emphasis is on threats and risk while balancing prevention, detection capability, and effective responses when things go wrong.
 
Long term, this change is an important one if we are to protect ourselves and the data of our customers in the future. Cybercrime won’t go away, but if we can approach security with proactive strategies, we may minimize its effectiveness. 

Mobile Apps Shouldn’t Roll Their Own Security

An interesting problem is occurring in the mobile development space. Many of the applications being designed are being done so by scrappy, product oriented developers. This is not a bad thing for innovation (in fact just the opposite), but it can be a bad thing for safety, privacy and security.

Right now, we are hearing from several cross platform mobile developers that the API sets across iOS, Android and others are so complex, that they are often skipping some of the APIs and rolling their own code methods for doing some of this work. For example, take crypto from a set of data on the device. In many cases, rather than using standard peer-reviewed routines and leveraging the strength of the OS and its controls, they are saying the job is too complex for them to manage across platforms so they’ll embed their own code routines for doing what they feel is basic in-app crypto. 

Problems (like those with the password vault applications), are likely to emerge from this approach toward mobile apps. There is a reason crypto controls require peer review. They are difficult and often complex mechanisms where mistakes in the logic or data flows can have huge impacts on the security of the data. We learned these lessons long ago. Home-rolled crypto and other common security routines were a big problem in the desktop days and still remain so for many web applications, as well. Sadly, it looks like we might be learning those lessons again at the mobile application development layer as well.
 
Basically, the bottom line is this; if you are coding a mobile application, or buying one to access critical data for your organization, make sure the developers use the API code for privacy, trust and security functions. Stay away from mobile apps where “roll your own/proprietary security code” is in use. The likelihood of getting it right is a LOT less than using the APIs, methods and code that the mobile OS vendors have made accessible. It’s likely that the OS vendors are using peer-reviewed, strongly tested code. Sadly, we can’t say that for all of the mobile app developer code we have seen.
 
As always, thanks for reading and stay safe out there!