Noel Brings Reminder to Review DR/BC Plans

For those folks on the east coast, Hurricane Noel should probably figure into your weekend plans. The storm is looking like a near miss for much of the eastern seaboard, but should be a strong reminder for folks to review their Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plans for currency.

If you look in your policies folders and don’t see a DR/BC plan, now might be a good time to form a task group for making them. Given the wacky weather patterns lately, they might prove to be handy in the future. At the very least, you can rest a little easier just knowing they are there.

For those folks wondering what I am talking about, click here for more info on the storm.

If you want to do more reading on DR/BC policies, check out this wikipedia article.

Things You Need to Know about Bot Net Attacks

Bot nets are one of the most common forms of compromise on the Internet today. Bot networks grew out of the explosion of home and user systems and the common availability of high speed Internet connections. Basically, they are little more than systems that attackers have compromised and put under their control that use some type of mechanism to get new tasks or commands and report their results.

Mostly, bot infected computers are home systems that attackers often use for scanning other systems, sending spam or performing other illicit activities. Often, the controller of the bot systems will rent or sell the bot services to others. No matter if they use the systems themselves, or sell their services – usually the master is after one thing, MONEY.

That’s right. They make money from the illicit use of YOUR system, if it belongs to a bot network. They use your hardware and your bandwidth, and they receive the returns. Even worse, if your system would be used in a serious crime, there may be criminal and civil penalties for YOU. While case law continues to grow on this, it appears there may be some capability for some victims of the bot net to come back at you for failing to adequately protect your system – which ultimately caused them damage.

So, the big question is – how do home users protect themselves from bot infections and the other issues associated with them? Primarily, they do by following this advice:

  1. Ensure that your computer has a firewall and anti-virus at all times. Make sure the firewall is engaged and that the anti-virus software is up to date.
  2. Keep your computer current on patches. Turn on the auto-update capabilities of the operating system and make sure you patch your applications if they have available update mechanisms as well. This is a lot like safe sex in that failure to be safe even once can have long term implications on your security.
  3. Consider using a browser that is somewhat hardened or hardening your browser. There are a ton of browsers out there, and a ton of tools for hardening the common ones. Check them out and make sure your browsing tools are protecting you against attack. Don’t use default installs of IE or FireFox – configure them for higher protections, if at all possible.
  4. Consider other security tools and mechanisms. You need spyware tools and other security mechanisms if you travel. Spend some time reading about mobile security and apply what you can to your life.
  5. If in doubt, rebuild your system. THIS IS CRITICAL – there are simply some things that can be done to a computer that impact the long term security of it. If you have doubts about your system’s security – rebuild it and protect it from the start. If you know you have an infection or problem – backup your critical data and rebuild. It is much easier than most other solutions.

Take these steps and some basic vigilance and apply them to your computing experience. Bot nets will continue to be a primary threat to Internet users, but being smart about them and aware of the defenses makes you less likely to be a victim.

WatchDog Content Moving to StateOfSecurity.com

If you are a regular WatchDog product user, then you may already know this, but on November 1, 2007 MSI will move all WatchDog content to this blog and begin to phase out the WatchDog client program.

This is being done to simplify the use and access to the information and to enable users to easily leverage our threat intelligence offerings via RSS and other popular mechanisms without using our locked-in client.

The same information that WatchDog has brought to you for years will continue, but hosted here instead of through the WatchDog client. It will also be stored in the emerging threats category – thus making it easy to subscribe or filter on.

We hope you continue to benefit from our work and insights, and please, let us know how you like the WatchDog content and if we can do something better or more helpful with the data.

Do It Yourself Identity Theft Protection

By now you have probably heard the commercials. The CEO of the company gives you their social security number to prove that they have his identity locked down. He is so confident in their process that he is willing to give the world his name, information and SSN.

I probably get asked twice a week about this service, so I decided to take a look at it a bit closer. What I found was a pretty easy manipulation of the credit management system in the US combined with some customer service and consumer offloading of tedious work. What does that mean? It means that you can outsource your identity theft protection to them or you could save $10 a month and do it yourself – IF YOU REMAIN VIGILANT.

How does it work? It works like this. Inside the US credit reporting system, there exists a  mechanism called “fraud alert”. This mechanism can be placed on any account, at any time, by the consumer. The purpose of the mechanism was originally to give people who have already been a victim of identity theft a tool for ensuring that no further damage would occur. The mechanism works like this:

  1. The consumer, or someone with their power of attorney, contacts the major credit reporting agencies and requests a “fraud alert” be placed on their account.
  2. The credit agency places the “fraud alert” on the appropriate credit file. There is no charge for this, it is required by law.
  3. The credit agency MUST contact the consumer prior to approving any change, addition or new activity on the consumer’s account. Failure to do so is a violation by the credit agency of federal lending laws.
  4. The consumer must either approve or disapprove the addition or change. If they disapprove, the creditor should refuse the account activity – THUS STOPPING THE FRAUD.
  5. ** PAY ATTENTION TO THIS ONE ** The credit reporting agency removes the “fraud alert” after 90 days from the date of placement. The consumer, or their legal agent, may renew the “fraud alert” at any time after that 90 day period.

So, that said, you could save the $10 per month and contact the credit reporting agencies yourself. You simply call them and ask that the “fraud alert” be placed upon your own file. If you do that every 90 days, you will have protection from credit attacks caused by identity theft. The key is, you HAVE to do it every 90 days. Miss a day, and you have exposure…

Before you run to the phones, you should also know that having the “fraud alert” on your accounts can be a bit frustrating if you actually want to use your credit or open new loans, accounts, etc. Sometimes, creditors will simply refuse the accounts until the “fraud alert” is removed – regardless of your consent to open the account. Other than that, it is a pretty tight mechanism for protecting your information.

There has been a lot of media attention to the company in question that has made this service popular. They seem to be everywhere. Their marketing is certainly working – though I would estimate, mostly due to consumer fear. My guess is that it won’t be too long until the fears they seem to be playing to will lead to saturation and slower growth, but my friend Alex always told me “You can sell just about anything for $10 a month.”

So, at the end of the day, is this a service you buy or a task you manage yourself? Is it worth worrying about, or is it something you deal with if you have a problem? Only you can decide if you are capable of managing the work or if you would rather have someone do it for you. No matter what you decide, at least you know the facts. As with most security things, it is less magic and mystery and more of a common thing.

Should you decide to do it yourself, here are the contact numbers for the three primary credit reporting agencies and for the primary checking account verification house in the US (same thing applies)….

Equifax – 1-800-525-6285
Experian – 1-800-422-4879
Trans Union – 1-800-916-8800
Chex Systems (check fraud management) – 1-800-428-9623

Blast(s) From the Past

A few of my HoneyPoints delivered an interesting blast from the past to me this morning. Around 2pm Eastern yesterday, one of our IP ranges got hit by a scan with this signature on port 80:

GET /level/16/exec/-///pwd HTTP/1.0

The web connection was then followed by a series of connections on port 23, though the tool did not do anything more than banner grabbing on the telnet port.

While the scan was obviously an attempt to exploit the old Cisco HTTP vulnerability (circa 2001), I had not seen probes for those issues in quite some time. I also had not seen a tool that also connected on port 23 of the same host and did banner grabbing, so thus why this stood out above the usual noise.

This brought about a very interesting point that many of these old vulnerabilities are making comebacks. Scans for old web vulnerabilities like Unicode issues, Double Decode, Code Red and the ASN.1 worm continue to be among the most seen probes on the Internet. Other folks have talked about the idea that perhaps as more third world countries become more Internet connected, that technology may not be updated there as rapidly – which could cause the lifecycle of older vulnerabilities to either be reborn or at least, eek out a longer existence. Could ancient vulnerabilities like RDS and .HTR buffer overflows still be leveraged for Internet compromise? The possibility is high that some small percentage of systems is likely available as a vulnerable target.

Does this mean that vulnerabilities will have a lifecycle that approaches infinity? If there are still systems out there that are vulnerable, why would some attacker without general worries of discovery not just keep building a super-worm that continually crawls the net looking for every known web vulnerability to date? If incorporated and distributed through bot-net style approaches, this is likely pretty feasible – particularly if you can make the attack smart enough to adapt its vulnerability testing to the specifics of a target – much like a modern scanning tool.

How will some of these older vulnerabilities fair? It remains to be seen, but my bet is that blasts from the past are likely to keep on rolling in some diminutive way. Let’s just say that I think it will be a long time before we live in a Code Red free world.

More People Supporting Honeypots for Corporate Use

Got this off of the wire today. Pretty cool that other folks are beginning to weigh in on the power of honeypots in the corporate world.

Too bad this article doesn’t cover HoneyPoint. Hopefully, more folks will come to see the power of our solution. We just seem to need more marketing around our particular flavor of honey…   😉

Read the article here.

How Can We Get It Right?

The job of the venerable TSA agent seems to be nearly impossible to me. I am just back in the office from a couple of weeks of travel and man, there are just so many issues with airport security I am just amazed that there have been no repeat airline attacks.

In Charlotte, a man made it through the security screening a couple of weeks ago and got on board an aircraft! To make matters worse, the TSA response was to create a process of “Reverse Screening” where the passengers would be screened as they came OFF of the aircraft. Huh? What? Off of the aircraft? Isn’t it likely to be a little too late by then?

Meanwhile, it also came to light while I was traveling that another US airport shut down their security posts at night and that anyone with an official badge was allowed through unscreened. Apparently this had been going on for years, but had only become an issue when a local newsperson penetrated the area in this manner on video. I guess this security team had never heard of social engineering or counterfeiting of badges. Hey, it’s only airline security, right?

The problem is just so large, and the variables so very complex. Add to that the pressure from the American public to get it right – but without inconvenience or delays and you have a patented recipe for failure. I truly believe that the TSA issues are so bad and that the system is so broken that we may need to step back and rethink the entire approach to the solution. What we have now clearly is not working and it seems to me that we have been very “lucky” that there have been no further incidents. The problem with luck though, is that it often runs out…

What do you think about airline security? How much are you willing to tolerate in the name of safety? What do you think we should do to make it better? Drop us a line and let us know your thoughts!

What are spammers thinking?

Are spammers getting desperate? Recently we’ve seen spammers switch from text based spam, with random paragraphs to images, and then to pdf, which seemed like the new hot spam format. But this morning I had a couple interesting spams get through the spam filter.

One of them looked like this:

H,E_R’E WE GO AGAIN.!

T.H_E B*I-G O.N+E BE_FORE T*H+E SEPTEMBER.R ALLY’!

T*H-E MAR KET IS ABO,UT TO P*O_P’, A’N+D SO IS E X,M’T+!

T ick: —-

5-d+ay po.tentia.l: 0.. 4’0

Firm : EXCHA*NG,E ——- (Ot+her O.T-C*: —–.P K)

A+s+k_: 0..+1+0 (+.25.0.0%) UP TO 2*5.% in 1 day

N*o.t o,n,l*y d’o e+s t,h,i_s f i*r’m h-a v’e gr*eat fu-ndamen’tals,

b u t getti*ng t-h.i s opp+ortunit,y at t,h e righ,t t-i.m e-,

righ_t bef.ore t_h e ra*lly is w+h-a-t m,akes t.h i s d.e a l so sw*eet!

T+h-i.s a gr eat o.,pportunity to at leas,t do’uble up!

I can barely make out what that says, it’s harder to read than 1337 5p34k mxd w/ AOL spk. The PDF spam, while effective at getting through, required the end user to actually open the pdf and read it, but it was actually, you know, readable. I would really like to know who is still making sending out spam like this worthwhile. Do people sit around and decipher it because they think they’re going to get some secret thing nobody else does? Is it still cost effective for spammers to buy email lists from the black market? Ah, If only I had the time to do research on spam. Maybe somebody already did it for me.

VoIP Research on the Rise

So, if you watch any of the vulnerability lists that are out there, you may have noticed a recent spike in vulnerabilities that have been identified in various VoIP implementations from various vendors. If you’re not sure what I’m talking about, you might think about heading on over to http://www.microsolved.com and downloading our free threat intelligence tool, Watchdog.

If you’re already a Watchdog user, you may have noticed that MSI decided to go from green to yellow earlier this week. That decision was based upon the release of several vulnerabilities that have been identified in Cisco’s implementation of various VoIP protocols (oh yeah, and it’s patch Tuesday). Those issues ranged in vulnerabilities that could allow remote code execution to denial of service. We’ve also seen several problems arise in Avaya’s implementation of VoIP protocols over the past couple of months as well.

MSI has been saying that VoIP vulnerabilities were going to start popping up, for some time now. If I remember correctly, we started addressing this in our State of the Threat presentations about a year and a half ago. Over that time we’ve seen significant progress in the tools that have been developed to assist in managing VoIP deployments. While those tools have helped a lot of companies with their VoIP implementations, we’ve also seen them introduce unintended risks into their environments. We’ve also seen many more much more nefarious tools that are allowing attackers to gain access to the VoIP system. And if you consider how useful fuzzing has become at identifying unknown problems in network traffic and applications, the sky is the limit when trying to determine where VoIP vulnerability research is going to end up. That is why MSI is ecstatic to have been approached by several different entities to perform VoIP Risk Assessments on their VoIP systems.

While a VoIP specific Risk Assessment may be a fairly new thing, the premise is not. It’s simply a way of applying a proven methodology to assess whether the new (or old) VoIP system hasn’t introduced unknown risks into the environment. The methodology that we use is very similar to our normal Risk Assessment of an Information Security Program, though there are some minor steps that had to be added and tweaked. The primary goal of these responsible organizations is to ensure that they are performing their due diligence by having a third party assess their VoIP implementations, and we applaud them for their initiative.

New Attack Tools Getting More Sophisticated

Yesterday I followed up on some HoneyPoint traffic signatures that have been floating around for a while. I have been seeing a pretty steady increase in various scans for several types of PHP vulnerabilities over the last few months, so I started looking around at some of the script kiddie PHP scanners that were out there.

Interestingly, I found a couple of scanners on a forum that were pretty advanced. They each include 250 – 300 signatures for PHP vulnerabilities, several modes of “IDS evasion” that are minimally successful, at best, but do have options to adjust scanning speeds, manage scan target lists and other useful stuff. Overall, I was actually impressed with the depth, stability and capabilities that these script kiddy style tools possessed.

I will continue to troll through some more lower end tools and check them out for how their coding has improved. I think it is likely that compared with the many of the script kiddy tools of yesteryear, I will find that even the basic development and coding skills in the lower end of the attacker pool has improved. The attackers who develop basic tools and feed the script kiddy crowd seem to be becoming more and more capable of in-depth coding and development. While far from a shock to infosec folks, it does represent a phase shift that we should be aware of. Likely, their tools will continue to grow in stability and sophistication – all of which makes for more formidable opponents.

Just something to think about….