The Smart Grid Raises the Bar for Disaster Recovery

As we present at multiple smart grid and utility organizations, many folks seem to be focusing on the confidentiality, integrity, privacy and fraud components of smart grid systems.

Our lab is busily working with a variety of providers, component vendors and other folks doing security assessments, code review and penetration testing against a wide range of systems from the customer premise to the utility back office and everything in between. However, we consistently see many organizations under estimating the costs and impacts of disaster recovery, business continuity and other efforts involved in responding to issues when the smart grid is in play.

For example, when asked about smart meter components recently, one of our water concerns had completely ignored the susceptibility of these computer devices to water damage in a flood or high rain area. Seems simple, but even though the devices are used inside in-ground holes in neighborhoods, the idea of what happens when they are exposed to water had never been discussed. The vendor made a claim that the devices were “water resistant”, but that is much different than “water proof”. Filling a tub with water and submerging a device quickly demonstrated that the casing allowed a large volume of water into the device and that when power was applied, the device simply shorted in what we can only describe as “an interesting display”.

The problem with this is simple. Sometimes areas where this technology is eventually intended to be deployed will experience floods. When that happens, the smart meter and other computational devices may have to be replaced en masse. If that happens, there is a large cost to be considered, there are issues with labor force availability/safety/training and there are certainly potential issues with vendor supply capabilities in the event of something large scale (like Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans).

Many of the organizations we have talked to simply have not begun the process of adjusting their risk assessments, disaster plans and the like for these types of operational requirements, even as smart grid devices begin to proliferate across the US and global infrastructures.

There are a number of other examples ranging from petty theft (computer components have after market value & large scale theft of components is probable in many cases) to outright century events like hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and tornados. The bottom line is this – smart grid components introduce a whole new layer of complexity to utilities and the infrastructure. Now is the time for organizations considering or already using them to get their heads and business processes wrapped around them in today’s deployments and those likely to emerge in the tomorrows to come.

MSI Strategy & Tactics Ep. 17: Thoughts On The SCADA Breach In Springfield, Illinois

What happened with the water facility SCADA breach in Springfield Illinois? ICS-SCADA security has been on our radar for a few months, now. The recent attack on a water plant in Illinois has highlighted existing vulnerabilities that open the door to malware. In this special edition of MSI Strategy & Tactics, Chris Lay, Account Executive, interviews MSI CEO, Brent Huston on the breach. Take a listen! Discussion questions include:

  • Breaking down the nuts and bolts of the attack
  • The similarities and differences of the attack vs. the Stuxnet worm
  • What ICS-SCADA organizations can learn from this attack

Panelists:
Brent Huston, CEO, Founder, and Security Evangelist
Chris Lay, Account Executive
Mary Rose Maguire, Marketing Communication Specialist and moderator

Click the embedded player to listen. Or click this link to access downloads. Stay safe!

Presentation Slides Available from The Ohio SCADA Security Symposium

Although we had a panel discussion, (and some presentations that were confidential) we do have a few we can share. If you’d like to view the slides for them, please visit our presentation page. We’re looking forward to doing this again next year! Thanks to all who came and to our speakers, who were very generous with their time and expertise!

How To Increase Cooperation Between SCADA/ICS and the IT Department

 

Here is a mind map of a set of ideas for increasing the cooperation, coordination and socialization between the ICS/SCADA operations team and their traditional IT counterparts. Last week, at the Ohio SCADA Security Symposium this was identified as a common concern for organizations. As such, we wanted to provide a few ideas to consider in this area. Let us know in the comments or on twitter if you have any additional ideas and we’ll get them added to a future version of the mind map. Click here to download the PDF.

Thoughts From The Ohio SCADA Security Symposium

 

 

This week, I had the distinct pleasure of playing MC at the 1st annual Ohio SCADA/ICS Security Symposium. The event was held in Columbus Ohio and offered a variety of speakers from federal, state and local government, as well as panels on controls that work and projects that have failed to succeed that included representatives from power, gas, water and manufacturing. These were powerful discussions and the content was eye-opening to many of the participants.

First, I would like to say thank you to all who were involved in the symposium. Their efforts in organizing, executing and attending the event are greatly appreciated. Feedback about the event has been spectacular, and we all look forward to participating again next year.
 
That said, one of the largest identified issues among the conversations at the symposium was the idea that cooperation and coordination between control network operators and engineers and their peers on the traditional business-oriented IT staff is difficult, if not nearly impossible.
 
This seems to be a common conundrum that many organizations are facing. How do you get these two sides to talk? How do you get them to participate in conversations about best practices and technology advances in their respective areas? It seems, that even though these two camps share similar architectures, common dependencies and often similar skill sets, that those things are still not enough to bring them together.
 
In the spirit of the symposium, and in the conversation openness that we identified and encouraged, I would like to ask for your input on this topic. What does your organization do to facilitate open communications between these two groups? What works for your teams? If you haven’t had success, what have you tried and why do you think it failed? Please feel free to discuss in the comments, on the OhioSCADA group on LinkedIn or even reach out to me personally on twitter (@lbhuston).
 
As always, thanks for reading and I look forward to the conversation that follows. Maybe together, we can identify some strategies that work and potentially bridge the gap between these two stakeholding groups. Clearly, from the discussions at the symposium, if we can fix this we can go a long way toward helping ourselves better the security posture and operational capabilities of our environments.

Reason #1 To Attend Ohio SCADA Symposium: DHS Warns “Hacktavists” Are Focusing on Control Systems

The Department of Homeland Security recently warned:

“…that Anonymous hacktivists may cyberattack industrial control systems. In fact, the Department of Homeland Security and Idaho National Laboratory have engaged in mock hack-offs to wreak havoc and to highlight the vulnerabilities at factories, electrical plants and chemical facilities.”

Full story

It isn’t a surprise that attacks are increasing on industrial control systems. Claiming responsibility for knocking out an electricity company may seem cool, but I’m not sure how “cool” it would be when they realized they knocked out their own Internet and cable connection.

This brings up a great reason to attend our Ohio SCADA Security Symposium on November 1. Click here for details!

MSI Announces The Ohio SCADA Security Symposium

The need for the latest information about SCADA/ICS is extended to Ohio businesses and utility companies and supports security for Ohio. We’d like to invite all Ohio SCADA/ICS professionals to attend this free event!

The Ohio SCADA Security Symposium, to be held on November 1, 2011 in Columbus, Ohio, is designed to serve as a level set for teams and organizations who are actively managing production SCADA and Industrial Control System (ICS) environments in Ohio.

A full one day session will include best practices advice, incident response, detection techniques and a current threat briefing focused on SCADA/ICS providers. Presenters will cover a variety of topics about what is working and what is not, in terms of information security, network protection and trust management.

Takeaways from this event will include peer networking, insights into emerging threats, action items for actively improving the availability, integrity and confidentiality of control systems, utility networks, manufacturing lines and other SCADA/ICS concerns.

Topics include: How the State Is Here to Help You, Physical Security, Assessment of SCADA/ICS Environments, Cyber Security, Honey Pots in SCADA/ICS Environments, and The FBI Viewpoint. Key participation will feature NiSource, American Electric Power, American Municipal Power, Greater Cincinnati Water Works, Ohio PUCO, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.

The event runs from 8:30 AM to 6:00 PM. Registration opens at 8:00 AM and is free. Those who work with SCADA/ICS are invited to attend. RSVP’s can be sent to mmaguire@microsolved.com. Please include your contact information. Seating is limited and available ONLY to those individuals actively working in Ohio with SCADA/ICS components.

MSI looks forward to providing an excellent event that will help organizations secure their SCADA/ICS systems and discuss best practices and industry standards at the event!