More on DNS Security Issue Management – Know & Control DNS + SOHO Issues

Just added this to Revision 2 of the whitepaper:

Attack Vector Management

Part of mitigating the risk of this security issue is also managing the availability of the attack vector. In this case, it is essential that security teams understand how DNS resolution operates in their environment. DNS resolution must be controlled to the greatest extent possible. That means that all servers and workstations MUST be configured to use a set of known, trusted and approved DNS servers whenever possible. In addition, proper egress filtering should be implemented to prevent external DNS resolution and contact with port 53 on unknown systems. Without control over desktop and server DNS use, the attack vector available for exploitation becomes unmanageably large. Upper management must support the adoption of these controls in order to prevent compromise as this and other DNS vulnerabilities evolve.

Home User and Small Office Vulnerability

Home users and small offices (or enclaves within larger organizations) should pay careful attention to how their DNS resolution takes place. Many home and small business firewall devices such as Linksys, D-Link, Netgear, etc. are likely to be vulnerable to these attacks and are quite UNLIKELY to be patched to current firmware levels. Efforts must be made to educate home and small office users about this issue and to update all of these devices as the patches and upgrades to their firmware becomes available.

DNS Security Issue Overview & Mitigation Whitepaper

Our engineering team has analyzed the available data on this emerging security issue and the fixes identified. As such, we have prepared the following white paper for our clients and readers.

Please review the paper and feel free to distribute it to your management team, co-workers and others who need to be involved in understanding and remediating the problems emerging with DNS.

You can obtain the white paper here.

If your organization needs any assistance in understanding or managing this vulnerability, please do not hesitate to contact us. We would be happy to assist in any way possible.

Project Pre-Release – Vulnerabilities in Popular Content Management Systems Under Study

Over the next few weeks you will see more details from us about a project that we have been working on. As a part of our relationship with Syhunt, one of our elite partners for application security work, we have been testing and reviewing their new tool, Sandcat4PHP. The tool is a sophisticated and user friendly source code scanner for performing deep analysis of PHP applications including their surrounding javascript and HTML components.

Stay posted here for a pretty in-depth review of the new tool, its use and capabilities. We will be doing that review as a part of the project as well.

First, let me start with the purpose and the scope of the project. In the last few months we have worked with a number of clients who have had issues with the security of their content management system. More than a few of them are using popular products, but several are using proprietary tools as well. As such, we have worked on a few incidents and application reviews. That led to a pretty in-depth discussion between a couple of clients and ourselves about the state of content management system security, in general. As an off shoot of that discussion, we decided to test 5 of the most popular content managers using the new Syhunt PHP scanner, since we needed to review it anyway.

Next, we obtained a couple of lists of popular content managers. Selecting our five was pretty easy and we settled on the following:

WordPress, Joomla!, Mambo, Drupal and BitWeaver

We then downloaded the current versions of the CMS (as of that day, a couple of weeks ago…) and set up our testing environment.

We assessed the entire package, but only as downloaded from the web site. That means in most cases, that we tested only the core components and not any additional modules, plugins or components. We considered whatever was in the default download to be the basis for our work.

To date, we have begun our assessments and review of the CMS tools. We will be in contact with each of the CMS projects about the findings of the assessments and they will receive the details of the tool’s findings prior to public release of the technical details. Statistical and numeric data will also be forthcoming.

For now just let us say that we are evaluating our findings and that the tool performed very very well.

I look forward to sharing the details with everyone in the coming days.

Let me know if you have any questions about the product, the project or the work.

Increases in PHP Scanning

We are detecting increasing PHP scans for a series of known PHP vulnerabilities that thus far are originating from Asia.

To date, we see no new attacks, just checks for known bad pages, particularly admin interfaces and a couple of quick URLs to test for command injections. The scans seem to have begun in the last 24 hours and the traffic appears to be related to a possible new PHP scanner. Likely, some new tool has been released that contains a plethora of PHP vulnerabilities.

Organizations should ensure that any systems offering PHP or PHP applications have been properly assessed and patched.

HoneyPoint Security Server users are urged to deploy a web HoneyPoint or HornetPoint and to drop the hosts performing the scans into your firewall or router black hole lists. This should allow you to create a “one strike and you’re out” approach for black holing attacking systems.

Please let us know if you see any new PHP activity. We are currently watching this pattern for any zero-day type activity, but thus far, we have observed only known security issues. being probed.

Snort Issues In Case You Missed Them and Malicious SWF

In case you missed it last week, Snort seems to be suffering from a problem with odd TTL values, which could allow an attack to get by Snort without detection. 2.8.1 has been released and includes the fix for the issue. Users of Snort should upgrade as soon as possible or apply the following workaround until they can update:

/From iDefense/

In the snort.conf file, set the ttl_limit configuration value to 255 as shown below.

preprocessor frag3_engine: ttl_limit 255

This will set the allowable difference to the maximum possible value, and prevent fragments from being dropped.

/End iDefense Content/

Also, SANS is talking about malicious SWF files that have been found online. Looks like they are using some encoded images that can cause some issues with what may be a previously known flash player vulnerability. Advise your users to be wary of flash enabled sites that they would consider “untrusted”. Of course, your milage may vary with this one, but at least awareness might help….

Lastly, as refresher, if you are a Notes/Domino user, it might be a good idea to check out patches that have been released lately. There have been a number of issues in the last few weeks and we are seeing an increase in Domino fingerprinting on some of our non-US HoneyPoints. Looks like quick scans for names.nsf and a couple of other common Notes files. So far though, we have not seen any attacker activity out of the norm, but it may be the precursor to an attack or other activity. Just an FYI…

Fear Renewed: The Cisco Router Rootkit

The media is all abuzz about a possible Cisco router rootkit that may be part of a presentation at a near future security conference.

While various issues with Cisco gear have emerged over the years and there has been at least one really public overreaction on the part of Cisco to vulnerability disclosure talks, there is probably little to really get spun up about here for the average corporate manager or infosec person.

The big news is that hostile, difficult to detect code could be introduced to routers at any point in their lifespan if an attacker has access to introduce images onto the router. This is a common problem with almost every type of device. There have been a number of trojan horse loads for everything from home firewalls to other forms of network gear for a number of years. Sure, the Cisco router is almost ubiquitous, and sure, it powers a lot of the Internet at large, but I think we pretty much always assumed that attackers with physical access and opportunity could introduce bad things to a device if they gained opportunity.

So before you give in to the hype or fear mongering, consider how this is different than any other form of software/firmware or the like. Likely, you already have a process in place for blowing new firmware onto all devices you purchase before putting them into use (right???). If not, it might be time to think about writing one…

Beware of Myanmar Aid Scams & Trojans

Nothing like a disaster to bring out the crimeware.

Keep your eyes open for disaster and aid oriented phishing and trojan scams. There is likely to be the same types of attacks that we have seen with other disasters. We can expect everything from Trojan horses designed to look like headline update tools, phishing schemes asking for donations, basic client-side exploits from web and HTML emails and the usual myriad of outright fraud.

Basically, if you really want to help folks, drop by known and trusted organizations such as the Red Cross, etc.

Be on the look out for strange network activity as this is likely going to be a basis for growing the bot-nets by yet another expansion.

Bot-nets Continue to Grow in Scope and Danger

There is quite a bit of talk online right now about a new bot-net that is supposedly quite a bit larger than Storm. This new bot-net, called Kraken, was discovered and initially revealed by another security team. Various folks are pointing at it as another evolutionary step in the growth of the bot-net threat and as a major new development in the area of cyber-crime.

Bot-nets, it seems, are today’s Internet worms. Their power, capability to produce FUD and impact make them on par with the Slammer, Code Red and Nimda worms of the past as significant threat evolutions. However, just like the worms of yesterday, there are some pretty common – albeit sometimes tough – things you can do to help minimize your risk of exposure.

First, segregate your network. Create enclaves that separate and manage access to servers that hold critical or sensitive data. Basically, segregate any and all user systems into untrusted areas and manage them as if they were untrusted systems (they are!!!)

Next, deploy egress controls as tightly as possible for all user -> Internet activity. Apply egress controls as tightly as possible to all enclaves.

Now, ensure that you have proper preventative and monitoring controls on all of the enclaves. Check for unneeded services, missing patches (OS and applications), bad configurations and known security issues. Mitigate or repair as many as possible. Monitor everything at the egress point for forensics and help with finding infected hosts. Deploy HoneyPoint sensors in user community and all enclaves.

Harden the user systems to the largest extent possible. AV, personal firewalls, patches, consider hardening or changing browsers. No matter what, consider user systems as untrusted hosts!

Educate your users about threats, their responsibilities and security mechanisms for their systems when outside the corporate network.

Monitor, manage and handle incidents quickly and with public consequences. If you find an infected machine and can trace it back to porn downloads on a company machine, fire the person and make a public example of the fact that actions against security policy (you have one of those, right?) have consequences…

Doing these basics will increase your overall security and greatly reduce your risk from bot-nets (and other threats). Is it easy? No. Is it expensive? It can be, depending on your size, complexity and technology level. Is it worth doing? Yes. It reduces risk and is much more interesting than ignoring the problem and/or continually working reactively to various incidents and compromises.

The Application Layer is Where the Action Is…

I thought this particular “hacker” article was pretty interesting. Thanks to Dr. Anton Chuvakin’s “Security Warrior” blog for pointing it out.

Once you look beyond the manifesto hype, you can really get a feel for what it represents. It represents a call to action to remind security professionals that the game has changed. The network and systems that it is composed of remain but a part of the security equation. The real target of the attackers that represent the REAL THREAT is the data that the network and systems hold.

Attackers have definitely moved up the stack. They do not care that most organizations are still focused on the network layer and more than a few are still trying to get the basics of that right. In fact, it simply empowers them more.

Today, attackers are focused on the application. That is true whether you look at holes like SQL injection and XSS or at the browser vulnerabilities that are at the root of a majority of malware and bot-net activity today. Today’s attackers have excellent tools for exploit development that have seriously changed the security landscape. More attackers understand the deeper nuances of computer science than ever before. Man security teams and professionals are lagging behind in knowledge, resources and capability.

One of the big reinforcers of this ideal to me was a presentation I gave a few weeks ago about application security. During the research for it, I found that according to several sources, a HUGE amount – roughly a third – of all reported security incidents last year involved SQL injection and XSS. Almost 2/3s of all reported incidents were web-application focused. Clearly, there is no denying that the attackers have moved up the security stack – the question is – have the defenders…

What are you, your security team and your security partners doing today to ensure that your data is protected tomorrow?

Playing with VoIP Hopper

I have spent just a little time playing with VoIP Hopper, which was updated in mid-February. Thus far, this seems like a pretty useful tool for doing penetration testing and enumeration of your VLAN segments and VoIP deployments.

The tool is very capable. It can easily help you scan your installations with CDP discovery and can be very useful in testing VLAN architectures for common security holes.

It is a command line tool written in C, but you should have no problem compiling it in your favorite Linux environment. It even works nicely on a default BackTrack install, so it playing with it should be easy on your lab schedule.

There has been a lot of attention paid to VoIP security over the last couple of years and this is certainly a nice quick and dirty tool for looking around your install. It also sheds a little light on the mistaken idea that some service providers like to pretend is the gospel – VLANs really won’t keep your VoIP secure. You can use this tool to prove them wrong if they just won’t listen to reason…

Play nice with it and make sure you only use it in the lab or on authorized networks…