Deeper Dive into Port 22 Scans

Today, I wanted to take a deeper dive into several port 22 (SSH) scans that a single HoneyPoint deployment received over the last 24 hours. SSH scanning is very common thing right now and our HoneyPoints and firewalls continually experience scans from hosts around the world.

The particular HoneyPoint we are using for this look at the issue is located outside of the US on a business-class network in South America.

Over the last 24 hours this HoneyPoint received SSH probes from 4 specific hosts. These hosts are detailed below:

60.191.x.x – a Linux system located in China on a telecomm company’s network

83.16.x.x – an unknown system located on a consumer (DHCP) iDSL segment in Poland – we could go no further with this host since it is likely to have changed IP addresses since the probe…

218.108.x.x – another Chinese Linux system on yet another Chinese telecomm company’s network (is there anything else in China??? )

216.63.x.x – a NAT device that is front-ending a business network and web server deployment for an optical company in El Paso, TX, USA

The pattern of the probes in each case was the same. Each host completed the 3 way TCP handshake and waited for the banner of the responding daemon. The system then disconnected and repeated the process again in about 90-120 seconds. Basically, simple banner grabbing. The probing system did not send any traffic, just grabbed the banner and moved on.

The HoneyPoint in question was configured to emulate the current version of OpenSSH, so the banner may not have been what the probing attack tool was looking for. It has since been reconfigured to emulate historic versions with known security vulnerabilities.

But, what of the hosts performing the scans? Well, all 3 of them that could be reliably analyzed were found to be running OpenSSH. Two were running 3.6.1p2 and the other was running 3.4p1. Both of these are older versions with known issues.

It is very likely that these are worm/bot infected hosts and the malware is merely looking for new hosts to spread to. Interestingly, 2 of these hosts appeared to be used for regular commerce. Both were acting as a primary web server for the company and one of them even had an e-commerce site running (it also had MySQL exposed to the Internet). No doubt, any commercial activity taking place on the device is also compromised.

MSI has alerted the relevant owners of these systems and at least one of them is moving to handle the security incident. Hopefully, their damage will be minimal and they can rebuild the system easily, since at this point it is likely to also be infected with a root kit. We will advise them as they need help and assist them until they get their problem solved.

In the meantime, I hope this gives you a better look at some of the SSH scanning that goes on routinely. On average, this particular HoneyPoint deployment is scanned for SSH every 5.25 hours. This time varies from locale to locale, with US sites getting scanned more often, particularly on commercial networks. The majority of these scans come from China, with Eastern Europe pulling a distant second. In some cases, some of our US HoneyPoint deployments get scanned for SSH every 1.5 hours on average, so it is a very common attack, indeed.

Obviously, you should check your own network for SSH exposures. You should also take a look at your logs and see if you can identify how your site stacks up against the average time between scans. Feel free to post comments with any insights or time averages you come up. It could make for some interesting reading.

Increase in European “Options” HTTP Scans from Linux Systems

Over the weekend, we saw a large increase in HoneyPoint captures of HTTP fingerprinting scans using the “Options *” technique. Even more interesting was that nearly all of these scans originated in Europe. The scans were all originated from Linux boxes and simple port probes show all of the boxes to be running OpenSSH 4.3 (some with p2). Other ports show no consistency on the originating systems.

Clearly, it could be a coincidence, but for multiple hosts to show only that correlating port, it could also be a specific exploit for OpenSSH 2.4. Additional research shows a few known issues with this version of OpenSSH. Perhaps a new bot-net is being launched by leveraging this vulnerability?

We are deploying additional SSH HoneyPoints to try and capture more data about possible exploitation of systems meeting these implementations.

Editor’s Note: The current version is OpenSSH 4.7/4.7p1 – so if you are using older versions (including 4.2/4.3) you should upgrade as soon as possible to the current revision.

Post revised to update for identified existing OpenSSH issues. 

Laying the Trap with HoneyPoint Personal Edition & Puppy Linux Live CD

Recently, I have been capturing quite a bit of attacker probes and malware signatures using a very simple (and cheap) combination of HoneyPoint Personal Edition (HPPE) and a Puppy Linux Live CD. My current setup is using an old Gateway 333MHz Pentium Laptop from the late 90’s!

The beauty of this installation is that it lets me leverage all of the ease of a Live CD with the power and flexibility of HPPE. It also breathes new usefulness into old machines from our grave yard.

So, here is how it works. I first boot the machine from the Puppy Live CD and configure the network card. From my FTP server (or a USB key) I download the binary for HPPE Linux (available to licensed HPPE users by request), the license and my existing config file. That’s it – run the binary and click Start. Now I am set to trap attack probes and malware to my heart’s content!

It really is pretty easy and the new email alerting now built into HPPE allows me to remotely monitor them as well from my iPhone email. This makes a nice, easy, quick way to throw up HoneyPoints without needing a separate console or a centralized monitoring point.

This setup is very useful to me and has even got me thinking about adding a plugin interface to HPPE in future releases. That would essentially give you the power to write custom alerting mechanisms and even fingerprinting tools for attacking systems.

Give this setup a try and be sure to let me know your thoughts on HPPE. As always, MSI really wants to hear your ideas, input and feedback on our work.

Thanks for reading and have fun capturing attack data. Some of this stuff is pretty darn cool! 😉

VMWare Virtual HoneyPoint Host Appliance

MSI is proud to announce a VMWare appliance based on Damn Small Linux (DSL) for HoneyPoint hosting.

The VM appliance is available free from the HoneyPoint FTP site provided in your license documents. The appliance currently has all available HoneyPoints installed and configured to autostart with the installation.

Root and “dsl” account passwords are “hpss”. Obviously, please change the passwords when you configure the system!

All HoneyPoints have basic configurations provided, and will need to be edited for the location of your console. Currently, they point to 127.0.0.1.

The appliance is capable of being used in any of the VMWare products from Player to ESX and includes use in the OS X Fusion environment.

You can use the VM to emulate entire workstation(s) on the network using Player and such, or use ESX to sprinkle them around your virtual environments en masse. The image is smaller than 60Meg and needs less than 128 Meg of RAM at full utilization. In testing, we easily ran 10 of them on older machines still waiting in the lab for death or recycle….  😉

Let us know if you have any questions, or comments. We really dig this idea and folks seem to really want it.