Don’t Forget About VoIP Exposures and PBX Hacking

Posted on April 6, 2012 by Brent Huston

I was browsing my usual data alerts for the day and ran into this set of data. It motivated me to write a quick blog post to remind folks that VoIP scans and probes are still going on out there in the wild.

These days, with all of the attention to mass compromises, infected web sites and stolen credit card data, voice systems can sometimes slip out of sight.

VoIP compromises and intrusions remain a threat. There are now a variety of tools, exploits and frameworks built for attacking VoIP installations and they are a target for both automated tools and manual hacking. Access to VoIP systems can provide a great platform for intelligence, recon, industrial espionage and traditional toll fraud.

While VoIP might be the state of the art for phone systems today, there are still plenty of traditional PBX, auto-attendant and dial-up voicemail systems around too. Now might be a good time to review when those systems were last reviewed, audited or pen-tested. Traditional toll fraud is still painful to manage and recover from, so it’s probably worth spending a few cycles on reviewing these devices and their security postures.

Let us know if your organization could use assistance with these items or with hardening voice systems, implementing detection techniques for them or otherwise increasing voice system security.

HoneyPoint and HITME Helps Clients Take Out Malware

Posted on April 5, 2012 by Brent Huston

I wanted to share some great feedback we received this week from a couple of sources. Both are regarding HoneyPoint — our product for creating a platform of nuance detection and visibility.

The first came from a critical infrastructure team. We notified them of an attack from their environment which was detected on the HITME (HoneyPoint Internet Threat Monitoring Environment). Using our alert, they quickly identified, investigated and isolated a specific machine that been infected with a piece of malware and was now scanning the Internet for other potential victims. They thanked us for the notification and said they truly appreciated our efforts and the work of the HITME team to help protect US critical infrastructures.

The second bit of feedback came from a long-time user of HoneyPoint Wasp, who suddenly began to see a piece of code propagate across a few machines in their workstation space. The code was rapidly identified as a piece of malware that had successfully evaded their anti-virus, but triggered the Wasp white list detection mechanism. Their team traced the infection back to a single USB key, which they impounded and sanitized. Thankfully, they found this infection before it was able to be leveraged by an attacker against them. They were very supportive of HoneyPoint and thanked us for assisting them in their investigation and for teaching them how to use Wasp through our installation services.

Together, these represent just a couple of the stories where HoneyPoint has helped security teams. Some of the people who receive the benefit of our work are not even users of the product or MicroSolved clients at all. It’s just another way that we engage every single day to help make a difference in the security and safety of peoples’ lives.

At MSI, we don’t just make great tools and perform great services, we have spent the last 20 years working hard to help people with information security. It continues to be both our pleasure and our passion.

Thanks for reading!

Three Sources to Help You Understand Cybercrime

Posted on April 3, 2012 by Brent Huston

Cybercrime is a growing threat. I thought I would take a few moments and point you to three recent news articles that discuss U.S. Government views on just how information security is proceeding, how we are doing, and how we should think about the future of infosec. They are all three interesting points of view and represent a wide variety of data seen at high levels:

FBI Director Mueller on cybercrime (RSA Conference, March 2012)

Perspectives on intellectual property theft

How the U.S. is outgunned in cyber-defense

These three links are interesting perspectives on how infosec is changing from a focus on compliance and prevention techniques to fully embracing the need for cross-platform, security-focused initiatives. In addition, more emphasis is on threats and risk while balancing prevention, detection capability, and effective responses when things go wrong.

Long term, this change is an important one if we are to protect ourselves and the data of our customers in the future. Cybercrime won’t go away, but if we can approach security with proactive strategies, we may minimize its effectiveness.

MSI Strategy & Tactics Talk Ep. 27: The 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report

Posted on March 30, 2012 by Mary Rose Maguire

The 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report is out! In this episode of MSI Strategy & Tactics, Adam, Phil, and John discuss the newest report’s discoveries and some of the more interesting discoveries. Discussion questions include:

1. What was the most surprising finding?
2. What is different from the past, any trends?

Listen in and let us know what you think!

Resource:

The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report

Panelists:

Adam Hostetler, Network Engineer, Security Analyst

Phil Grimes, Security Analyst

John Davis, Risk Management Engineer

Mary Rose Maguire, Marketing Communication Specialist and moderator

Click the embedded player to listen. Or click this link to access downloads. Stay safe!

Mobile Apps Shouldn’t Roll Their Own Security

Posted on March 29, 2012 by Brent Huston

An interesting problem is occurring in the mobile development space. Many of the applications being designed are being done so by scrappy, product oriented developers. This is not a bad thing for innovation (in fact just the opposite), but it can be a bad thing for safety, privacy and security.

Right now, we are hearing from several cross platform mobile developers that the API sets across iOS, Android and others are so complex, that they are often skipping some of the APIs and rolling their own code methods for doing some of this work. For example, take crypto from a set of data on the device. In many cases, rather than using standard peer-reviewed routines and leveraging the strength of the OS and its controls, they are saying the job is too complex for them to manage across platforms so they’ll embed their own code routines for doing what they feel is basic in-app crypto.

Problems (like those with the password vault applications), are likely to emerge from this approach toward mobile apps. There is a reason crypto controls require peer review. They are difficult and often complex mechanisms where mistakes in the logic or data flows can have huge impacts on the security of the data. We learned these lessons long ago. Home-rolled crypto and other common security routines were a big problem in the desktop days and still remain so for many web applications, as well. Sadly, it looks like we might be learning those lessons again at the mobile application development layer as well.

Basically, the bottom line is this; if you are coding a mobile application, or buying one to access critical data for your organization, make sure the developers use the API code for privacy, trust and security functions. Stay away from mobile apps where “roll your own/proprietary security code” is in use. The likelihood of getting it right is a LOT less than using the APIs, methods and code that the mobile OS vendors have made accessible. It’s likely that the OS vendors are using peer-reviewed, strongly tested code. Sadly, we can’t say that for all of the mobile app developer code we have seen.

As always, thanks for reading and stay safe out there!

Disagreement on Password Vault Software Findings

Posted on March 26, 2012 by Brent Huston

Recently, some researchers have been working on comparing password vault software products and have justifiably found some issues. However, many of the vendors are quickly moving to remediate the identified issues, many of which were simply improper use of proprietary cryptography schemes.

I agree that proprietary crypto is a bad thing, but I find fault with articles such as this one where the researchers suggest that using the built in iOS functions are safer than using a password vault tool.

Regardless of OS, platform or device, I fail to see how depending on simple OS embedded tools versus OS embedded tools, plus the additional layers of whatever mechanisms a password vault adds, reduces risk to the user. It would seem that the additional layers of control (regardless of their specific vulnerability to nuanced attacks against each control surface), would still add overall security for the user and complexity for the attacker to manage in a compromise.

I would love to see a model on this scenario where the additional controls reduce the overall security of the data. I could be wrong (it happens), but in the models I have run, they all point to the idea that even a flawed password vault wrapped in the OS controls are stronger and safer than the bare OS controls alone.

In the meantime, while the vendors work on patching their password vaults and embracing common crypto mechanisms, I’ll continue to use my password vault as is, wrapped in the additional layers of OS controls and added detection mechanisms my systems enjoy. I would suggest you and your organization’s users continue to do the same.

Information Security Is More Than Prevention

Posted on March 23, 2012 by Brent Huston

One of the biggest signs that an organization’s information security program is immature is when they have an obsessive focus on prevention and they equate it specifically with security.

The big signs of this issue are knee-jerk reactions to vulnerabilities, a never-ending set of emergency patching situations and continual fire-fighting mode of reactions to “incidents”. The security team (or usually the IT team) is overworked, under-communicates, is highly stressed, and lacks both resources and tools to adequately mature the process. Rarely does the security folks actually LIKE this environment, since it feeds their inner super hero complex.

However, time and time again, organizations that balance prevention efforts with rational detection and practiced, effective response programs perform better against today’s threats. Evidence from vendor reports like Verizon DBIR/Ponemon, law enforcement data, DHS studies, etc. have all supported that balanced program work much better. The current state of the threat easily demonstrates that you can’t prevent everything. Accidents and incidents do happen.

When bad things do come knocking, no matter how much you have patched and scanned, it’s the preparation you have done that matters. It’s whether or not you have additional controls like enclaving in place. Do you have visibility at various layers for detection in depth? Does your team know how to investigate, isolate and mitigate the threats? Will they do so in a timely manner that reduces the impact of the attacker or will they panic, knee-jerk their way through the process, often stumbling and leaving behind footholds of the attacker?

How you perform in the future is largely up to you and your team. Raise your vision, embrace a balanced approach to security and step back from fighting fires. It’s a much nicer view from here.

Secure Networks: Remember the DMZ in 2012

Posted on March 21, 2012 by Brent Huston

Just a quick post to readers to make sure that everyone (and I mean everyone), who reads this blog should be using a DMZ, enclaved, network segmentation approach for any and all Internet exposed systems today. This has been true for several years, if not a decade. Just this week, I have talked to two companies who have been hit by malicious activity that compromised a web application and gave the attacker complete control over a box sitting INSIDE their primary business network with essentially unfettered access to the environment.

Folks, within IT network design, DMZ architectures are not just for best practices and regulatory requirements, but an essential survival tool for IT systems. Punching a hole from the Internet to your primary IT environment is not smart, safe, or in many cases, legal.

Today, enclaving the internal network is becoming best practice to secure networks. Enclaving/DMZ segmentation of Internet exposed systems is simply assumed. So, take an hour, review your perimeter, and if you find internally exposed systems — make a plan and execute it. In the meantime, I’d investigate those systems as if they were compromised, regardless of what you have seen from them. At least check them over with a cursory review and get them out of the business network ASAP.

This should go without saying, but this especially applies to folks that have SCADA systems and critical infrastructure architectures.

If you have any questions regarding how you can maintain secure networks with enclaving and network segmentation, let us know. We’d love to help!

10 Ways to Handle Insider Threats

Posted on March 19, 2012 by Mary Rose Maguire

As the economic crisis continues, the possibility of an insider threat occurring within a company increases. Close to 50% of all companies have been hit by insider attacks, according to a recent study by Carnegie Mellon’s CERT Insider Threat Center. (Click here to access the page that has the PDF download, “Insider Threat Study.”)

It doesn’t help when companies are restructuring and handing out pink slips. The result of leaner departments means that often there are less employees to notice when someone is doing something wrong. Tough economic times may also make it tempting for an employee to switch his ‘white hat’ to a black one for financial gain. Insider threats include employees, contractors, auditors, and anyone who has authorized access to an organization’s computers. How can you minimize the risk? Here are a few tips:

1. Monitor and enforce security policies. Update the controls and oversee implementation.

2. Initiate employee awareness programs. Educate the staff about security awareness and the possibility of them being coerced into malicious activities.

3. Start paying attention to new hires. Keep an eye out for repeated violations that may be laying the groundwork for more serious criminal activity.

4. Work with human resources to monitor negative employee issues. Most insider IT sabotage attacks occur following a termination.

5. Carefully distribute resources. Only give employees what they need to do their jobs.

6. If your organization develops software, monitor the process. Pay attention to the service providers and vendors.

7. Approach privileged users with extra care. Use the two-man rule for critical projects. Those who know technology are more likely to use technological means for revenge if they perceive they’ve been wronged.

8. Monitor employees’ online activity, especially around the time an employee is terminated. There is a good chance the employee isn’t satisfied and may be tempted to engage in an attack.

9. Go deep in your defense plan to counter remote attacks. If employees know they are being monitored, there is a good possibility an unhappy worker will use remote control to gain access.

10. Deactivate computer access once the employee is terminated. This will immediately end any malicious activity such as copying files or sabotaging the network.

Be vigilant with your security backup plan. There is no approach that will guarantee a complete defense against insider attacks, but if you continue to practice secure backup, you can decrease the damage. Stay safe!

MSI Strategy & Tactics Talk Ep. 26: Hacking Back or Strikeback Technologies

Posted on March 16, 2012 by Mary Rose Maguire

Hacking back or strikeback technologies is a system engineering term that could occur in a situation with a positive loop, whereby each component responds with an increased reaction to the response of the other component, and so the problem gets worse and worse. (The Information Security Dictionary: Defining the Terms That Define Security, by Urs E. Gattiker) Recently, a honey pot was created with some strikeback technology in the code. In this episode of MSI Strategy & Tactics, Brent Huston and the techs discuss the various aspects of this technology and how it would affect you. Discussion questions include:

What is the history of strike back, hacking back and how does it apply to today when you have major teams working to take down bot nets and such?
HoneyPoint has a type of technology called “defensive fuzzing” which does something that has been compared to strikeback. How it is different than other technologies?
What is the current take on the legality of strikeback/hacking back? Are organizations being put at risk if they attack their attackers or if their security teams go on offense?