Brent’s Interview About His Most Recent Book

 

Introduction

In today’s digital age, the importance of cyber-security cannot be overstated. With threats evolving at an unprecedented rate, organizations need to be proactive in their approach to safeguarding their assets. “We Need To Talk: 52 Weeks To Better Cyber-Security” by L. Brent Huston offers a comprehensive guide to navigating the complex world of cyber-security. We sat down with the author to delve deeper into the inspiration, content, and significance of this book.

Interview

Q1: What inspired you to write “We Need To Talk: 52 Weeks To Better Cyber-Security”?

A1: As a virtual CISO and 30+ year security practitioner, I know how important it is to keep the security team engaged with one another, encourage open discussions, and do continual learning. I wrote the book to give security teams a good basis for these discussions every week for a year. Covering the basics and letting the team discuss sticking points and areas for improvement has led my clients to identify some interesting trends and rapidly mature their security programs. I think, literally, “We Need To Talk”. We need it as practitioners, individuals, teams, and organizations. This is a stressful, detail-oriented, rapid-change business, and talking helps nearly everyone involved.

Q2: Why did you feel it was essential to provide such a comprehensive view of cyber-security?

A2: So much of what we do is complex and touches multiple areas of our organization that we must bring the basics to each. I picked the topics for discussion in the book to address the high-level, technical, and procedural controls that almost every organization needs. I threw in some of the more tenacious topics I’ve encountered in my career and a few curve balls that have bitten us over the years. Information security and risk management are broad-spectrum careers, and we need a broad spectrum of topics to help security teams be successful.

Q3: Can you elaborate on how the structure of the book facilitates this year-long journey?

A3: This is a great question. The book idealizes a weekly security team meeting where the team discusses one of the topics and why it is relevant and then works through a series of questions to help them hone and refine their security program. The book includes a topic for each week, appropriate background information about that topic, and a set of questions for discussion by the team. As I piloted the book with my clients, it became clear that these were ultra-powerful discussions and led to some amazing insights. I knew then that I had to write and put the book out there to benefit security teams and practitioners.

Q4: How did leveraging AI tools shape the content and structure of the book?

A4: I used several AI tools to help generate the content of the book. It was written programmatically, in that I wrote some programming to leverage an AI backend to generate the questions and background information for each topic. I then adjusted the code and moderated the output until I got the book I wanted. It took a while, but it was fantastic when completed. I wanted to experiment with writing with AI tools, and since I knew the book I wanted to create had a specific format and content, it seemed like a good experiment. Ultimately, I learned much about working with AI and using Grammarly for editing and self-publishing. I have been absolutely thrilled with the response to the book and how the experiment turned out. In fact, it gave birth to another project that I am just beginning and will pave the way for some exciting new breakthroughs in how to work with AI tools in the coming years.

Q5: What is the one core message or lesson from your book that you’d like security teams to take away?

A5: The one takeaway I would have them consider is that discussion among the security team can really help a lot of the team members and the organization at large. We need to talk more about the work we do, both inside our teams and to the other teams we work with across the enterprise. The more we discuss, the more likely we can support each other and find the best solutions to our common problems and issues. Implementing the strategies, tactics, and insights we discover along the way might just be the change we need to make information security more effective, easier to manage, and even more fun!

Summary

L. Brent Huston’s “We Need To Talk: 52 Weeks To Better Cyber-Security” is more than just a book; it’s a roadmap for security teams to navigate the intricate maze of cyber-security. Through structured discussions, the book aims to foster collaboration, understanding, and growth among security professionals. With the unique blend of AI-generated content and Huston’s vast experience, this book promises to be an invaluable resource for those in the field.

 

* Just to let you know, we used some AI tools to gather the information for this article, and we polished it up with Grammarly to make sure it reads just right!

 

An Example Control Matrix for Supply Chain Security

Per the examples in the last post, here is what the Control Matrix for Vendor Supply Chain Security might look like.
 
In the beginning of the document, you can define the audience, the authors, the update process and the process for handling exceptions. I usually also add a footer that has relevant reference links to products/services/vendors and key terms used in the document.
 
The main content, of course, is the matrix itself, which usually looks something like this:
 
 
Name of Tier Tier Criteria Required Diligence Required Controls
Critical Risk Vendors Shared IIP that allows duplication of products or differentiator features or R&D; ANY outage of the vendor’s IT operations would harm JIT delivery or line manufacturing Any required regulatory document gathering (SAS70, PCI DSS, HIPAA, etc.); Monthly MSI passive assessment – MEDIUM or HIGH risk issues trigger FULL risk assessment & review of their security audits; MSI monitors vendor list for Targeted Threat Intelligence and if triggered, formal incident response process is required from the vendor
As determined by your firm…
All controls required – NO VARIANCE ALLOWED
High Risk Vendors Shared non-critical IIP that allows feature replication, long term damage to product/brand strategy or R&D; Protracted outage of the vendor’s IT operations could impact production Any required regulatory document gathering (SAS70, PCI DSS, HIPAA, etc.); Quarterly MSI passive assessment – HIGH risk issues trigger FULL risk assessment & review of their security audits
As determined by your firm…
All controls required – NO VARIANCE ALLOWED
Routine Risk Vendors IIP shared at this level represents a potential for reputational or regulatory impacts; Normal vendor level where data sharing occurs Any required regulatory document gathering (SAS70, PCI DSS, HIPAA, etc.); Yearly MSI passive assessment – HIGH risk issues trigger deeper risk assessment
As determined by your firm…
Variance allowed by signed acceptance from steering committee or executive team
Low Risk Vendors Data is not shared with this vendor and compromise of the vendor’s IT operations is unlikely to have any impact Peer review to validate tier eligibility; Contract language review; Financial fraud team validation Only contractual controls and/or SLA required
 
As you can see, the matrix makes the entire program easy to discuss and demonstrate. The more clearly you can define the tiers, their required due diligence, their required controls and other data elements – the easier the process gets. 
 
We hope this helps you put together your own vendor tiering program and easily demonstrate it. If you would like more information about our passive assessment platform or Targeted Threat Intelligence (passive monitoring of vendor-related IOCs and security issues), please touch base with your account executive. Many of our clients are actively using and recommending these offerings for their supply chain security initiatives. We’d love to tell you more about it, so just let us know! 
 

Mapping Control Requirements to Vendor Tiers

Now that you have a proper tier structure set up for your vendors, we will discuss how to map controls to each of those tiers to create a control matrix that you can work from. This control matrix will serve as the basis for the vendor supply chain security effort – essentially providing a skeleton of the due diligence that you will perform for each vendor. Once this matrix is complete, you can use it to clearly and easily demonstrate the work that your organization does on supply chain security to any auditor or regulator who may ask to review it. In our experience, walking them through the matrix, along with providing them a documented process that you follow to enforce the matrix will suffice to meet most regulatory requirements – assuming of course, that you actually perform the work detailed in the matrix.
 
So – at a high level, how do we assign the controls? I usually start at the bottom of the stack of tiers and define the minimum controls first. Thus (referring back to the tier structure defined last time around):
  • Low Risk Vendors– What are the minimum steps we should perform for each vendor in this tier?
    • Controls Required: Scoping peer review to ensure that the criteria for this tier are met; contract and, when applicable, SLA review by the security team against established guidance & regulatory requirements, approval of financial due diligence team to avert fraud, etc. 
      • Comments: Since there are only isolated potentials for digital risk in this tier, we don’t need to perform cyber-security reviews and the like, or accumulate data we don’t need (which wastes time & resources, etc.). If, for example, this is a commodity or non-impactful application provider, we might review their contract for language around malware free deliverables, code security, patch/fix turnaround times, etc., as appropriate for each vendor and the service or good they provide.
  • Routine Risk Vendors – At this level, I try and think of the controls that I would want for just about any vendor that can impact us or our operations, but that aren’t capable of doing much beyond reputational or regulatory damage.
    • Controls Required: All of the controls of the lower level apply and are required. Any control reviews that are required for regulatory compliance over PII that we share (SAS70, PCI-DSS compliance statements, etc.). Plus, at this stage, I would really like some form of cyber-security assessment, which in this case is MSI’s passive assessment tool (that can be run without the vendor’s knowledge or permission) run against them on a yearly basis with NO HIGH RISK issues identified. If a HIGH RISK issue is found, then they would be flagged and would need to have a formal technical review of their security controls performed or even our traditional risk assessment process. Any deviance from the accepted controls would require a signed risk acceptance variance from a management team or steering committee, as an example.
      • Comments: Here, we are defining the basics. What do we need for most vendors that could hurt us? We try to keep the process as simple as possible, so that we can focus on the vendors that have higher risk of actually hurting us and our business. The use of passive assessments here is a powerful new approach to reduce the number of full fledged risk assessments that we need to perform, and the overhead created by dealing with the paperwork and interactions to complete the traditional risk assessment process.
  • High Risk Vendors – Here we build on the controls below for normal vendors to try and achieve a balance between work load and information security needs. We define a level that exceeds best practices and serves to give us more confidence in the vendors that could hurt us at a significant level.
    • Controls Required: All of the controls of the lower levels apply and are now definitely required(no variances accepted at this level for the basic controls defined for lower risk levels). In addition, we need to provide ongoing assessment of the vendor’s security controls, so a passive run is now required without any HIGH RISK findings on a quarterly basis. This is to help us combat control drift and control entropy in the vendor’s security posture. If at any time, a HIGH RISK issue is identified, then a FULL and COMPREHENSIVE risk assessment is required as soon as possible. This risk assessment should include the review of the vendor’s third party risk assessments, vulnerability assessments & penetration tests (these should be provided to us by the vendor, within 3 business days of the request). Failure to pass this risk assessment, respond properly or any significant issues identified that are not mitigated in a timely manner should result in financial and legal consequences for the vendor and their contract with our organization.
      • Comments: Again, we are trying to reduce the incidence of full risk assessments, so that we can focus our attention and limited resources on the vendors that can hurt us significantly and are in the worst security postures. Further, we create an incentive at this level for them to comply and respond rapidly.
  • Critical Risk Vendors – These are the vendors that can REALLY hurt us, so we spend a majority of our attention and resources here. 
    • Controls Required:  All of the controls of the lower levels apply and are now definitely required(no variances accepted at this level for the basic controls defined for lower risk levels). Additionally, passive assessments are now monthly in frequency (or maybe even weekly, depending on your paranoia/risk tolerance). Ongoing monitoring of target threat intelligence data is also required – so we are having MSI monitor social media/public web/deep web/dark web for any events or indicators of compromise that might emerge and be related to our vendors in this tier. At this level, we are performing the full comprehensive risk assessment process on a yearly basis, in addition to the passive work of MSI. While this is tedious, we want to ensure that we have provided the utmost effort on these vendors that can truly hurt us at the most damaging of levels. We can now do this easily without taxing our resources, thanks to the tiering architecture and the use of the focus points provided by MSI through our passive assessment and other services. Any identified MEDIUM or HIGH RISK issue flagged by MSI results in the immediate triggering of an update to the risk assessment process, notification of the vendor for the required response of their security team leadership, and the potential requirement for a formal incident response process for the vendor – which we manage by requiring the delivery of an incident response report and/or attestation by a third party security firm that the situation was mitigated and that our IIP was protected. Failure to pass this risk assessment, respond properly or any significant issues identified that are not mitigated in a timely manner should result in SIGNIFICANT financial and legal consequences for the vendor and their contract with our organization.
      • Comments: Here we leverage ongoing monitoring and take the lead on watching for potential compromises for ourselves and our vendors. Given the large percentage of breaches reported by third parties, we no longer believe that the detection and response capabilities of any partner organization are strong enough, alone, to protect our IIP. Thus the increased due diligence and oversight for the vendors that can hurt us the worst.

As you can see, building from the ground up makes leveraging the tiering process easy and logical. In the next post we will show you an example controls matrix we use to demonstrate and discuss our vendor supply chain security process. Over the years, we have found the matrix to be a powerful, auditor/regulator friendly tool to show clearly and concisely the due diligence process for vendor supply chain security. We hope you find it useful as well. Stay tuned! 

Sorting Vendors into Tiers

Previously, we reviewed some ideas around vendor discovery and laid out an example workflow and process. We also defined some tools and approaches to use for the task.
 
Once you have the vendors in your supply chain identified, and have obtained and cataloged the relevant data, the next step we suggest is to tier the vendors into levels to make it easier to classify vendors into “object groups”. Once we have the vendors sorted into tiers, we will discuss how to assign required controls to each tier in an easy to manage manner. This greatly simplifies the processing of future vendors that are added to the supply chain, since you need only identify the tier they fit into and then use the control requirements for that tier as your basis for evaluation and risk assessment. 
 
Vendor tiering, done properly, also makes assigning vendors to a given tier trivial in the long term. Our approach, as you will see, provides very clear criteria for the levels, making it easy to add new vendors and simple to manage vendors who change status as the supply chain and product lines evolve.
 
In our suggested model, we have four tiers, comprised as follows (using a product manufacturer as an example, obviously, other types of firms may require alternate specific criteria, but this should serve to lay out the model for you use as a baseline):
 
  • Critical Risk Vendors
    • Criteria: Mission critical “information intellectual property” (IIP) assets are shared with this vendor, where the assets represent a significant portion of the market differentiator or research and development of a product line OR the vendor’s IT operations are critical to our just in time manufacturing or delivery model – that is – ANY outage of the vendor’s IT operations would cause an outage for us that would impact our capability to deliver our products to our customers
      • Examples: Compromise of the IIP data would allow duplication of our product(s) or significant replication of our research; Outages or tampering with the vendor IT operations would impact manufacturing line operations, etc.
  • High Risk Vendors
    • Criteria: Non-critical IIP assets are shared with this vendor such that if said assets were compromised, they would represent damage to our long term product & brand strategies or research and development. Actual product replication would not be enabled, but feature replication might be possible. Outages of vendor’s IT operations at this level, if protracted, could impact our research and development or ability to deliver our products to our customers.
      • Examples: Breach of this vendors network could expose the design specs for a specific part of the product. Compromise of the vendor could expose our future marketing plan for a product and some of the differentiating features that we plan to leverage. If the vendor’s IT operations were disabled for a protracted time, (greater than /48, 72 or 96/ hours), our capability to deliver products could be impacted.
  • Routine Risk Vendors
    • Criteria: Non-critical IIP assets may be shared with this vendor tier, and compromise of that IIP may be damaging to our reputation. The IIP, if compromised, would not allow duplication of our product lines, research or differentiators of our products. In addition to reputational impacts, share of data that could impact our sales pipeline/process and/or other secondary systems or processes may be expected if breaches occur at this level. Regulatory or legally protected IIP also resides at this level.
      • Examples: Organizations where customer data, sales & marketing data, employee identification information, etc. are shared (outsourced payment, outsourced HR, etc.) are good examples here. This is the level of risk for any vendor that you share IIP with, in any form, that does NOT immediately empower delivery of your products or impact your longer term R&D efforts or market differentiators… 
  • Low Risk Vendors
    • Criteria: This tier is for vendors that we share NO IIPwith, in any form, and vendors that could not directly impact our product delivery via an IT operations outage in any way. These vendors, should they experience a breach, would result in little to no impact on the reputation or capabilities of our firm to operate.
      • Examples: Caterers, business supply companies, temporary employment agencies, hardware and software vendors for not manufacturing systems, commodity product or component dealers, packaging material suppliers, transport companies, etc.
 
Building such a tiered approach for your vendors creates an easy to manage way to prioritize them. The tiered approach will also be greatly useful in mapping groups of controls to the requirements for each tier. We will cover that in a future post, shortly. 

How to Use Risk Assessment to Secure Your Own Home

Risk assessment and treatment is something we all do, consciously or unconsciously, every day. For example, when you look out the window in the morning before you leave for work, see the sky is gray and decide to take your umbrella with you, you have just assessed and treated the risk of getting wet in the rain. In effect, you have identified a threat (rain) and a vulnerability (you are subject to getting wet), you have analyzed the possibility of occurrence (likely) and the impact of threat realization (having to sit soggy at your desk), and you have decided to treat that risk (taking your umbrella) risk assessment.

However, this kind of risk assessment is what is called ad hoc. All of the analysis and decision making you just made was informal and done on the fly. Pertinent information wasnt gathered and factored in, other consequences such as the bother of carrying the umbrella around wasnt properly considered, other treatment options werent considered, etc. What business concerns and government agencies have learned from long experience is that if you investigate, write down and consider such factors rationally and holistically, you end up with a more realistic idea of what you are really letting yourself in for, and therefore you are making better risk decisions formal risk assessment.

So why not apply this more formal risk assessment technique to important matters in your own life such as securing your home? Its not really difficult, but you do have to know how to go about it. Here are the steps:

1. System characterization: For home security, the system you are considering is your house, its contents, the people who live there, the activities that take place there, etc. Although, you know these things intimately it never hurts to write them down. Something about viewing information on the written page helps clarify it in our minds.

  1. Threat identification: In this step you imagine all the things that could threaten the security of your home and family. These would be such things as fire, bad weather, intruders, broken pipes, etc. For this (and other steps in the process), you can go beyond your own experience and see what threats other people have identified (i.e. google inquiries, insurance publications).

  2. Vulnerability identification: This is where you pair up the threats you have just identified with weaknesses in your home and its use. For example, perhaps your house is located on low ground that is subject to flooding, or you live in a neighborhood where burglaries may occur, or you have old ungrounded electrical wiring that may short and cause a fire. These are all vulnerabilities.

  3. Controls analysis: Controls analysis is simply listing the security mechanisms you already have in place. For example, security controls used around your home would be such things as locks on the doors and windows, alarm systems, motion-detecting lighting, etc.

  4. Likelihood determination: In this step you decide how likely it is that the threat/vulnerability will actually occur. There are really two ways you can make this determination. One is to make your best guess based on knowledge and experience (qualitative judgement). The second is to do some research and calculation and try to come up with actual percentage numbers (quantitative judgement). For home purposes I definitely recommend qualitative judgement. You can simply rate the likelihood of occurrence as high, medium or low risk.

  5. Impact analysis: In this step you decide what the consequences of threat/vulnerability realization will be. As with likelihood determination, this can be judged quantitatively or qualitatively, but for home purposes I recommend looking at worst-case scenarios. For example, if someone broke into your home, it could result in something as low impact as minor theft or vandalism, or it could result in very high impact such as serious injury or death. You should keep these more dire extremes in mind when you decide how you are going to treat the risks you find.

  1. Risk determination: Risk is determined by factoring in how likely threat/vulnerability realizations is with the magnitude of the impact that could occur and the effectiveness of the controls you already have in place. For example you could rate the possibility of home invasion occurring as low, and the impact of the occurrence as high. This would make your initial risk rating a medium. Then you factor in the fact that you have an alarm system and un- pickable door locks in place, which would lower your final risk rating to low. That final rating is known as residual risk.

  2. Risk treatment: Thats it! Once you have determined the level of residual risk, it is time to decide how to proceed from there. Is the risk of home invasion low enough that you think you dont need to apply any other controls? That is called accepting risk. Is the risk high enough that you feel you need to add more security controls to bring it down? That is called risk limitation or remediation. Do you think that the overall risk of home invasion is just so great that you have to move away? That is called risk avoidance. Do you not want to treat the risk yourself at all, and so you get extra insurance and hire a security company? That is called risk transference.

So, next time you have to make a serious decision in your life such as changing jobs or buying a new house, why not apply the risk assessment process? It will allow you to make a more rational and informed decision, and you will have the comfort of knowing you did your best in making the decision. 

Thanks to John Davis for this post.

Three Things That Need Spring Cleaning in InfoSec

Spring is here in the US, and that brings with it the need to do some spring cleaning. So, here are some ideas of some things I would like to see the infosec community clean out with the fresh spring air!

1. The white male majority in infosec. Yes, I am a white male, also middle aged…. But, seriously, infosec needs more brains with differing views and perspectives. We need a mix of conservative, liberal and radical thought. We need different nationalities and cultures. We need both sexes in equity. We need balance and a more organic talent pool to draw from. Let’s get more people involved, and open our hearts and minds to alternatives. We will benefit from the new approaches!

2. The echo chamber. It needs some fresh air. There are a lot of dropped ideas and poor choices laying around in there, so let’s sweep that out and start again. I believe echo chamber effects are unavoidable in small focused groups, but honestly, can’t we set aside our self-referential shouting, inside jokes, rock star egos and hubris for just one day? Can’t we open a window and sweep some of the aged and now decomposing junk outside. Then, maybe, we can start again with some fresh ideas and return to loving/hating each other in the same breath. As a stop gap, I am nominating May 1, a Friday this year, as Global Infosec Folks Talk to Someone You Don’t Already Know Day (GIFTTSYDAKD). On this day, ignore your peers in the echo chamber on social media and actually go out and talk to some non-security people who don’t have any idea what you do for a living. Take them to lunch. Discuss their lives, what they do when they aren’t working, how security and technology impacts their day to day. Just for one day, drop out of the echo chamber, celebrate GIFTTSYDAKD, and see what happens. If you don’t like it, the echo chamber can come back online with a little fresh air on May 2 at 12:01 AM EST. How’s that? Deal? 🙂

3. The focus on compliance over threats. Everyone knows in their hearts that this is wrong. It just feels good. We all want a gold star, a good report card or a measuring stick to say when we got to the goal. The problem is, crime is an organic thing. Organic, natural things don’t really follow policy, don’t stick to the script and don’t usually care about your gold star. Compliant organizations get pwned  – A LOT (read the news). Let’s spring clean the idea of compliance. Let’s get back to the rational idea that compliance is the starting point. It is the level of mutually assured minimal controls, then you have to build on top of it, holistically and completely custom to your environment. You have to tune, tweak, experiment, fail, succeed, re-vamp and continually invest in your security posture. FOREVER. There is no “end game”. There is no “Done!”. The next “bad thing” that visits the world will be either entirely new, or a new variant, and it will be capable of subverting some subset or an entire set of controls. That means new controls. Lather, rinse, repeat… That’s how life works.. To think otherwise is irrational and likely dangerous.

That’s it. That’s my spring cleaning list for infosec. What do you want to see changed around the infosec world? Drop me a line on Twitter (@lbhuston) and let me know your thoughts. Thanks for reading, and I hope you have a safe, joyous and completely empowered Spring season!

Ideas for New MSI Classes, A Poll…

OK folks, here is a quick poll around some of the classes we are considering teaching later this year. We would like your input as to which topics interest you the most. 

If you would like to share your opinions, and tell us your areas of interest, please feel free to either email us the top 3 choices of classes and content you would like to see us focus on, to info@microsolved.com or via Twitter (@lbhuston). The numbers of your choices will suffice.

If you have other ideas you would like to see, please let us know. 

Our idea list:

  1. Honeypots for ICS/SCADA
  2. Basic honeypots for detection
  3. Tampering with active attackers
  4. Tracing international attackers
  5. Social media investigations
  6. Pen-testing REST APIs with Xojo
  7. Mapping business processes to technology & security
  8. Passive assessment techniques
  9. Deep dive research techniques
  10. Mapping TOR hidden sites

Thanks for reading and for sharing your opinions! 

MSI Launches TigerTrax Network Discovery, Mapping & Analysis Service

We are proud to announce the immediate availability of an entirely new service offering in our security tool kit, made possible by TigerTrax™.

This service offering leverages the power of MSI’s proprietary TigerTrax analytics platform to parse, correlate and visualize the configurations (and packet logs (if desired)) from the routers, switches and firewalls of your network “en masse”. 

Our security and analytics teams then create detailed maps of the network as seen from the eyes of the machines, document the various network segments and their relationships, build a hierarchy of powerful machines and segments, identify hardening techniques that could help your organization better secure your network and provide insights into the gap between your organization’s “common wisdom” versus the real environment.

We can even teach “Close The Gap” sessions to help re-align your team’s “common wisdom” with “machine truth” and to help socialize the new knowledge to other groups.

How it works:

  • The client delivers the configuration and log files as needed for the service. MSI can assist with this step, if needed, at an additional hourly consulting fee.
  • The offering uses TigerTrax to perform automated analysis of the configuration and log files as needed – holistically, systemically and “en masse”. 
  • Various data points are delivered to the analysts and security team who then create the documentation, maps and reports. Visualized data is also generated using the TigerTrax platform where appropriate.
  • Any professional services, such as interviews/questionnaires, gap analysis and training are provided by MSI team members using our proprietary delivery methodologies.
  • Completely passive, offline analysis is perfect for critical networks.
Three different levels of service are available, as is single – one time engagements (perfect for M&A activities, and new IT management) or ongoing subscriptions that allow organizations to track changes and maintain knowledge over time. The highest level of service also includes 30 days worth of packet analytics to identify overtly compromised hosts and to determine “normal operating conditions”, which is often quite useful for incident response activities in the future.
 
Give is a call today at (614) 351-1237 or email us at info@microsolved.com to start a conversation about how we can help you know the truth about your network!

State Of Security Podcast Episode 3 is Now Available

Episode 3 of the podcast is now available!

In this edition, I sit down with Bill @Sempf to discuss application security, working with development teams and how to get security and dev folks on the same page. Bill goes so far as to recommend a simple 2 step process that you simply have to hear!

Check it out:

And give us feedback on Twitter (@lbhuston) about this and all other episodes or ideas you have about what you would like us to cover. Thanks for listening!  

3 Things I Learned Talking to InfoSec People About Crime

Over the last several years, I have given many many talks about the behavior of criminal rings, how the criminal underground operates and black market economics. I wanted to share with my audiences some of the lessons I have learned about crime. Many people responded well and were interested in the content. Some replied with the predictable, “So what does this have to do with my firewall?” kind of response. One older security auditor even went so far as to ask me point blank “Why do you pay attention to the criminals? Shouldn’t you be working on helping people secure their networks?”  I tried to explain that understanding bad actors was a part of securing systems, but she wouldn’t hear of it…

That’s OK. I expected some of that kind of push back. Often, when I ask people what they want to hear about, or where my research should go, the responses I get back fall into two categories: “more of the same stuff” and “make x cheaper”, where x is some security product or tool. Neither is what I had in mind… 🙂 

Recently, I announced that I was taking this year off from most public speaking. I don’t think I will be attending as many events or speaking beyond my podcast and webinars. Mostly, this is to help me recover some of my energy and spend more time focused on new research and new projects at MicroSolved. However, I do want to close out the previous chapter of my focus on Operation Aikido and crime with 3 distinct lessons I think infosec folks should focus on and think about.

1. Real world – i.e.” “offline” crime – is something that few infosec professionals pay much attention to. Many of them are unaware of how fraud and black markets work, how criminals launder money/data around the world. They should pay attention to this, because “offline” crime and “online” crime are often strongly correlated and highly related in many cases. Sadly, when approached with this information – much of the response was – “I don’t have time for this, I have 156,926 other things to do right now.”

2. Infosec practitioners still do not understand their foes. There is a complete disconnect between the way most bad guys think and operate and the way many infosec folks think and operate. So much so, that there is often a “reality gap” between them. In a world of so many logs, honeypots, new techniques and data analysis, the problem seems to be getting worse instead of better. Threat intelligence has been reduced to lists of IOCs by most vendors, which makes it seem like knowledge of a web site URL, hash value or IP address is “knowing your enemy”. NOTHING could be farther from the truth….

3. Few infosec practitioners can appreciate a global view of crime and see larger-scale impacts in a meaningful way. Even those infosec practitioners who do get a deeper view of crime seem unable to formulate global-level impacts or nuance influences. When asked how geo-political changes would impact various forms of crime around the world, more than 93% of those I polled could only identify “increases in crime” as an impact. Only around 7% of those polled could identify specific shifts in the types of crime or criminal actors when asked about changes in the geo-political or economic landscapes. Less than 2% of the respondents could identify or correlate accurate trends in response to a geo-political situation like the conflict in Ukraine. Clearly, most infosec folks are focused heavily ON THIER OWN STUFF and not on the world and threats around them.

I’m not slamming infosec folks. I love them. I want them to succeed and have devoted more than 20 years of my life to helping them. I will continue to do so. But, before I close my own chapter on this particular research focus, I think it is essential to level set. This is a part of that. I hope the conversation continues. I hope folks learn more and more about bad actors and crime. I hope to see more people doing this research. I hope to dig even deeper into it in the future.

Until then, thanks for reading, stay safe out there, and I will see you soon – even if I won’t be on stage at most events for a while. 😉

PS _ Thanks to all of the wonderful audiences I have had the pleasure to present to over the years. I appreciate and love each and every one of you! Thanks for all the applause, questions and, most of all, thanks for being there!