Another Good Reason to Increase Internal Security

Well, the much anticipated 2010 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report is out, and once again it is an eye-opener! Let me say what a boon these reports are to the infosec community! Verizon and their team are to be praised and congratulated for all their hard work. These reports really help us keep current so we can protect our information from the right threats in the right ways. I know it’s not a large scale study, but I do feel it gives us good indications of trends and threats in the industry.

This particular threat report mainly gives us the data breach picture for 2009. It was compiled from nearly 900 actual incidents and includes a lot of input from the U. S. Secret Service this year. One of the surprising results of this particular report was the 26% increase in data breaches from insiders. It seems that organized cybercriminals are promising money to insiders with access to administrator level credentials. Unfortunately for these naïve inside individuals, it is proving very easy for the authorities to catch them. Also, it seems, the cybercriminals are usually not even paying them as promised! Despite these facts, it is evidently fairly easy to find plenty of insiders that are willing to sell their credentials. Go figure!

There are several ways to help counter the insider threat. The easiest thing you can do right off the bat is to ensure that those with high level access to the system don’t use the same credentials for their administrator and user accounts. You’d be amazed at what a common practice this is! All cybercriminals have to do is bust a few user level accounts and there is a VERY good chance that they will then be able to gain administrator level access. Administrator level passwords should be long, strong and ONLY used for administration purposes.

Another very effective method to counter the insider threat is to use true multi-part authentication mechanisms for administrative level access to the system; especially with very effective mechanisms such as tokens. Employing this practice means that cyber criminals not only have to steal credentials, they also have to get their hands on a token. And even if they do, it only gives them a short time to act; admin tokens are usually missed very quickly. There is also the option to employ biometrics. These can be problematic, but are improving all the time. And effective and reliable biometrics are even harder to overcome than token use.

You might say that good passwords, biometrics, and tokens won’t keep actual system and database administrators from selling out to the bad guys, which is true. However, there are other mechanisms available that can prevent lone bad-actors from compromising the system. One effective practice is management monitoring of high level access. If, every day, managers are looking at who accesses what and when, then the difficulty of stealing or corrupting data goes WAY up! Also, there are applications out there that can send out alerts when high level access is underway.

Another method, and a tried and true one, is the use of dual controls. If it takes two individuals to access systems, then cybercriminals have to corrupt two individuals and it becomes even easier for the authorities to figure out who the rats are. I don’t recommend this control except for very high value assets. The downside is that it’s a hassle to implement. There ALWAYS has to be at least two individuals available at all times or access becomes impossible. There are vacations, lunches and breaks to consider, and what happens in true emergencies such as floods, snow storms and the like? But this is a control that has been in use since long before computer systems were in place and it has proven to be very reliable.

These certainly aren’t all of the controls available to help counter the inside threat. I’m sure that you can come up with some others if you give it a little thought. But used individually, or even better, in combinations, should go a long way in protecting your data from the bad guys within!

Fighting Second Stage Compromises

Right now, most organizations are fighting a losing battle against initial stage compromises. Malware, bots and client side attacks are eating many security programs alive. The security team is having a nearly impossible time keeping up with the onslaught and end-user systems are falling left and right in many organizations. Worse, security teams that are focused on traditional perimeter security postures and the idea of “keeping the bad guys outside the walls” are likely unaware that these threats are already active inside their networks.

There are a number of ways that second stage compromises occur. Usually, a compromised mobile device or system comes into the environment via remote access, VPN or by being hand carried in by an employee or consultant. These systems, along with systems that have been exploited by client-side vulnerabilities in the day to day network represent the initial stage compromise. The machines are already under attacker control and the data on these machines should already be considered as compromised.

However, attackers are not content with these machines and their data load. In most cases, they want to use the initial stage victims to compromise additional workstations and servers in whatever environment or environments they can ride those systems into. This threat is the “second stage compromise”. The attackers use the initial stage victims as “pivot points” or bots to attack other systems and networks that are visible from their initial victim.

Commonly, the attacker will install bot-net software capable of scanning other systems and exploiting a few key vulnerabilities and bad passwords. These flaws are all too common and are likely to get the attacker quite a bit of success. The attacker then commands the bot victim to scan on new connections or at designated times, thus spreading the attacker’s presence and leading to deeper and deeper compromise of systems and data.

This pattern can be combated in a number of ways. Obviously, organizations can fight the initial stage compromise. Headway has been made in many organizations, but the majority are still falling quite short when it comes to protecting against a growing diverse set of attack vectors that the bot herders and cyber-criminals use. Every day, the attackers get more and more sophisticated in their campaigns, targeting and approach. That said, what can we do if we can’t prevent such attacks? Perhaps, if we can’t prevent them easily, we can strengthen our defenses in other ways. Here are a couple if ideas:

One approach is to begin to embrace enclave computing. This is network and system trust segregation at the core. It is an approach whereby organizations build their trust models carefully, allowing for initial stage compromises and being focused on minimizing the damage that an attacker can do with a compromised workstation. While you can’t prevent compromise, the goal is to create enough defensive posture to give your team time to detect, isolate and respond to the attack. You can read more about this approach in our 80/20 rule of Information Security.

A second idea is to use HoneyPoint decoy hosts on network segments where exposures and initial stage compromise risks are high. These decoy hosts should be dropped where they can be easily scanned and probed by infected hosts. VPN segments, user segments, DMZs and other high exposure areas are likely candidates for the decoy placement. The idea is that the systems are designed to receive the scans. They offer up services that are fake and implemented just for this purpose. The decoy systems have no other use and purpose than to detect scans and probes, making any interaction with them suspicious or malicious. Decoy services, called HoneyPoints, can also be implemented on the servers and other systems present in these network segments. Each deployed HoneyPoint Agent ups the odds of catching bots and other tools deployed by the attacker in the initial stage compromise.

Both of these strategies can be combined and leveraged for even more defense in depth against initial stage compromises. If you would like to learn more about how these tools and techniques can help, drop us a line or give us a call. We would be happy to discuss them with you.

In the meantime, take a look at how your team is prepared to fight initial stage compromises. What you find may be interesting, especially if your team’s security focus has been on the firewall and other perimeter controls.

HoneyPoint Decoy Host Pays Off

Just talked to a client who had dropped a HoneyPoint decoy host in their VPN termination segment a couple of weeks ago. Yesterday, it paid off.

They caught a machine that had passed the anti-virus and patching requirements of the NAC for the VPN. The machine was AV scanned clean. But, immediately upon connection the machine began to port probe hosts around it. This triggered the decoy machine’s HoneyPoints, causing the security team to investigate. The machine was brought in and examined. Closer inspection found it infected with a bot tool that escaped AV detection, but was capable of scanning for bad passwords and a couple of common vulns on surrounding machines. The machine is currently being imaged and rebuilt.

This is an excellent example of how HoneyPoint can help catch bots and malware, even when other controls fail. Defense is depth pays off and the leverage that HoneyPoint provides is often quite powerful, as in this case.

Have you thought about using decoy hosts? If so, how?

Catching PHP RFI Infected Hosts with Log Greps

I posted details here along with a current list of PHP RFI drop hosts that are being used to compromise web servers with vulnerable code.

You can use the list along with grep/regex to scan your outbound web/firewall/proxy logs for web servers that are likely infected with bot code from the scanners using these sites.

The link to the list and such is here: http://hurl.ws/cf5s

This data was entirely generated using captured events from the last several weeks by the Honeypoint Internet Threat Monitoring Environment (#HITME). You can find more information about HoneyPoint here.

If you would like to learn more about PHP RFI attacks, please feel free to drop me a line, check out @lbhuston on Twitter and/or give my RFI presentation slides a look here. If you would like to schedule a presentation or webinar for your group on PHP RFI, HoneyPoint or PHP/web application security testing, please give us a call at 614-351-1237 x206.

As always, we appreciate your reading State of Security and we hope you make powerful use of the information here.

Toata Scanning for Zen Shopping Cart with Brain File – Updated

If you’ve been a long time reader of this blog, then you know about our ongoing efforts to help stem the tide of web application infections. Here is another example of this effort in action.

A couple of days ago the HITME began tracking a series of new scans that are circulating from the Toata bot network. These new scans appear to be aimed at cataloging systems that are running the Zen shopping cart application. As per usual behavior of these tools, it appears that the cataloging is automated and then later, exploitation occurs from either another piece of code or human intervention.

ToataZenBrain102709.txt

Above is a link to a brain file for the Web application scanner that we produce called BrainWebScan. You can use this tool and the brain file above to scan your own servers for implementations of the Zen shopping cart. If you identify servers that have the Zen shopping cart installed, careful review of these systems should be conducted to examine them for signs of compromise. Reviews of the logs for the string “Toata” will identify if the system has already been scanned by this particular attack tool. However, other attack tools are being used that do not create specific named strings in the log files. The vulnerability that these tools are seeking to eventually exploit is unknown at this time, may be an old vulnerability or exploit, or could potentially be a new and previously unknown vulnerability.

Users of the Zen cart application are encouraged to ensure that they are following the best practices for securing the application. The application should be kept up-to-date and the Zen cart vendor website should be carefully monitored for future updates and known issues. Additional monitoring, vigilance and attention to servers running the Zen cart application should be performed at this time. It is probably not a bad idea to have these systems assessed for currently known vulnerabilities in their operating system, content management application and other web components.

If you would like assistance checking your web application or vulnerability assessment performed on your web application, please do not hesitate to contact us for immediate assistance.

PS: You can download BrainWebScan for Windows from here: http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/397669/BrainWebScan100Win.zip

Here are an additional set of gathered targets:

//zencart/includes/general.js
//zen/includes/general.js
//ZenCart/includes/general.js
//ZEN/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zen/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zen-cart/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zencart/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zc/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
//zshop/admin/includes/stylesheet.css
/zencart/install.txt
/zen-cart/install.txt
/zen/install.txt
/zcart/install.txt

7 Areas of Concern With Cloud Computing

One of President Obama’s major initiatives is to promote the efficient use of information technology. He supports the paperless office ideal that hasn’t been fully realized in the Paperwork Reduction act of 1995.
Specifically mentioned is Federal use of cloud computing. So good, bad or indifferent, the government is now moving into the world of cloud computing – despite the fact that it is a new way of doing business that still has many unaddressed problems with security and the general form that it is going to take.

The Federal CIO Council (Federal Chief Information Officers Council codified in law in E-Government act of 2002) CTO of Federal Cloud is Patrick Stingley. At the Cloud Computing Summit in April 29 2009, it was announced that the government is going to use cloud for email, portals, remote hosting and other apps that will grow in complexity as they learn about security in the cloud. They are going to use a tiered approach to cloud computing.

Here are seven problematic areas of cloud computing for which solutions need to be found:

  1. Vendor lock-in – Most service providers use proprietary software, so an app built for one cloud cannot be ported to another. Once people are locked into the infrastructure, what is to keep providers from upping the price?
  2. Lack of standards – National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is getting involved and is still in development. This feeds the vendor lock-in problem since every provider uses a proprietary set of access protocols and programming interfaces for their cloud services. Think of the effect of this on security!
  3. Security and compliance – Limited security offerings for data at rest and in motion have not agreed on compliance methods for provider certification. (i.e., FISMA or common criteria. Data must be protected while at rest, while in motion, while being processed and while awaiting or during disposal.
  4. Trust – Cloud providers offer limited visibility of their methods, which limits the opportunity to build trust. Complete transparency is needed, especially for government.
  5. Service Level Agreements – Enterprise class SLAs will be needed (99.99% availability). How is the data encrypted? What level of account access is present and how is access controlled?
  6. Personnel – Many of these companies span the globe – how can we trust sensitive data to those in other countries? There are legal concerns such as a limited ability to audit or prosecute.
  7. Integration – Much work is needed on integrating the cloud provider’s services with enterprise services and make them work together.

Opportunities abound for those who desire to guide cloud computing. Those concerned with keeping cloud computing an open system drafted an Open Cloud Manifesto, asking that a straightforward conversation needs to occur in order to avoid potential pitfalls. Keep alert as the standards develop and contribute, if possible.

Pandemic Planning Update: Consider 10 Day Minimums for Sick Time

Having just read this article, and participated in several discussions around Pandemic Planning, I am of the belief that folks might want to consider mandatory 10 day sick times/work from home times for H1N1 infected employees.

Research shows that infected folks may be contagious for up to 10 days from the onset of their symptoms, even after they “feel better”. The problem with this is that as they “feel better” they may return to work or school, thus exposing others to the virus, albeit, inadvertently. Many people simply think that if they “feel better”, then they must be over the infection and not contagious anymore.

So, as you consider your pandemic plans, please think about the idea of a 10 day work from home program or the like for folks that are symptomatic. Explanation and education of folks carrying the virus can only help, so take the time to explain this cycle to your team.

Thanks for reading and please let us know if you have any questions about pandemic planning or remote working issues. My team and I have been doing quite a bit of consulting lately reviewing pandemic plans and helping organizations make sure that they are prepared and that their remote access systems are robust enough to handle the load and secure enough to be trusted. If we can be of any help to your organization along these lines, please do not hesitate to call or drop us a line!

President of Colombia Has Swine Flu and So Might Other Leaders

This article pointed out the recent diagnosis of President Alvaro Uribe, of Colombia, with swine flu. Even worse, the leaders of Colombia have alerted the other leaders that were involved in a regional South American summit last week. While President Uribe is not considered high risk for death from the disease, this is a new turn in the pandemic and public awareness. To date, Colombia has reported 621 cases with 34 deaths, making the mortality rate .05%.

Meanwhile, in the US and UK, school has just resumed and health officials are closely monitoring schools. Plans for handling outbreaks in the schools vary by district, but several are known to be testing plans for tele-education and remote teaching.

Once again, organizations are urged to undertake some form of pandemic planning and testing, as a “just in case” measure for H1N1 and the possibility of a strong flu season this year. SANS has just launched a site dedicated to pandemic planning and news. Check it out for more information, or give us a call and arrange a time to chat.

Flu Pandemic Begins Early in Japan and Could Accellerate US Season

According to this article, just published, the flu season has unexpectedly begun early in Japan.

The WHO has fears that this outbreak could also hasten the beginning of flu season here in the US. This puts additional pressure on the health systems to prepare for vaccinations and on the producers of the vaccines to push forward as quickly as possible.

As we have previously mentioned, it is a good idea for organizations to prepare a pandemic plan to handle outages of staff or remote working arrangements in preparation for the H1N1 flu and other natural emergencies of similar scope. Please, take the time to review your plans, test them effectively or create these plans as soon as practical.

Keep an eye on the WHO and CDC news channels to stay abreast of flu trends and any patterns or new developments. Here are links to their sites.

WHO and the CDC sites.

Thanks for reading!

When The System Works, It Really Works! :)

OK gang, so here is our part of the story.

As many of you may now know, the NCUA issued a fraud alert this week based on a social engineering test we were doing for a client natural person Credit Union. You can find some of the materials at the following URLS:

NCUA Media Release

SANS Storm Center

NetworkWorld

Once we saw the alert from the NCUA, we immediately contacted our Credit Union client about the situation. The client had received the letter and CD set in the mail, just as intended and called for in their testing agreement. However, on their side, the person responsible for the penetration test was out the day the letter arrived. The receiver of the letter followed their incident response process and reported the suspicious activity to the NCUA Fraud Hotline, just as they are supposed to do.

Upon our contact with the CU, the entire situation became apparent and we quickly identified how the process had proceeded. The employee of the CU had followed the process, just as they should, and alerted the proper authorities to the potential for fraud. We immediately contacted the NCUA Fraud hotline and explained that the process was a part of a standard penetration test. Eventually, we talked with executive management of NCUA and offered them any information they desired, including the source code to the tools on the CDs. The NCUA was wonderful to work with, understood the situation and seemed appreciative of our efforts to help ensure that their members were meeting the requirements of NCUA 748, which calls for the protection of member data against illicit access, including social engineering attacks like these.

During our discussion with NCUA executive management, we discussed me reaching out to SANS and such to clarify the situation and to explain that the “attack” was simply a part of a penetration test. I did this as soon as I hung up the phone with NCUA. The handlers at SANS and I traded emails and phone calls and they amended their release to include the penetration testing scenario. The whole point of this was to add clarification and to prevent people from getting “spun up”, since there really was no ongoing attack in progress.

However, in typical Internet fashion, the story had already taken on a life of it’s own. The next thing we know, the press is picking up the story, there’s an article on slashdot and people are in alert mode. We then set about trying to calm folks down and such on Twitter, through email and such.

The bottom line here is this. This was a controlled exercise in which the process worked. The social engineering attack itself was unsuccessful and drew the attention of the proper authorities. Had we been actual criminals and attempting fraud, we would have been busted by law enforcement. The NCUA did a great job of getting the word out that such an attack had occurred and the media and security folks did a great job in spreading the word to prevent further exposures to this threat vector. Everyone, and I do mean everyone, is to be congratulated here for their efforts!

The system worked. Had we been bad guys, we would have been busted. The world was protected, once more, thanks to the vigilance and attention of the NCUA and the security community.

Now, about the testing. MicroSolved, Inc. does, indeed, test social engineering attack vectors as a part of our standard assessments. The social engineering threat is a powerful and valid attack vector that often leads to compromise. Our process for testing these engagements is well scoped, well organized and intensely controlled. The threats we emulate are very real (in this case, we even included typos and such in the fake letter). The simulated malware we use is a custom application, developed in house by my team of engineers and does not propagate in any way. It is safe, effective, tested and has been in use with ongoing revision and testing for more than five years. The entire process for testing social engineering has been performed thousands of times for thousands of clients and will continue to be a part of our testing methodology. We truly believe that information security starts and ends with the people involved in protecting the data.

I hope this answers any questions you may have about the process or the alert. If not, drop me a line at bhuston@microsolved.com and I will try and assist you, if I can. I would really like to thank the NCUA, SANS, my technical team and the customer CU for their help and attention on this project. Thanks also, to all of the security folks and CU folks who helped spread the word about this attack vector. Though the awareness campaign was unintended, it certainly has raised the bar for would be attackers if they hope to exploit this in the future. Thanks for all of your hard work and attention!

Oh, and lastly, no, it is not us sending the laptops to governors of the states. It might not even be us sending the next round of CDs, USB keys or whatever new fraud schemes emerge in the future. But, regardless of whether or not it is us doing a test for your organization, or real criminals attempting to exploit you, don’t fall for it! Report these events to the authorities and let’s make use of the process that we have clearly established!

Thanks for reading and make it a great day!

Update: Thanks to NetworkWorld for their help on getting the word out. Thanks to @alexhutton as well for this article.