Don’t forget, Brent will be presenting on the SANS webinar today to discuss ICS/SCADA honeypots. Check it out and register here.
See you online and we hope you enjoy the event!
Don’t forget, Brent will be presenting on the SANS webinar today to discuss ICS/SCADA honeypots. Check it out and register here.
See you online and we hope you enjoy the event!
We have begun working on another project around helping organizations better protect their information assets and the reputations of both their employees and their firms at large. As part of that project, we would like to solicit some feedback from the readership of the blog.
Does your organization have a code of conduct for employees? Does is have a written code of conduct for management, board members and/or public relations campaigns?
Is it a living code of conduct or is it a stagnant piece of policy? How often is it updated? Does it cover social media presence, community engagement and/or public perception of the firm or individual?
Who audits the code of conduct and how is it monitored for violations?
Please feel free to give us your thoughts on the code of conduct and which industry you are in. We are taking responses via email (info <at> microsolved <dot> com) or via Twitter (@lbhuston).
Thanks for responding. Responses will be entered into a random drawing for a Starbucks gift card, so respond for a chance to win some java goodness. 🙂
Our Founder and CEO, Brent Huston (@lbhuston) will be leading a SANS webinar on ICS/SCADA honeypots. The webinar is scheduled for November, 25th, 2013 and you can find more information and register by visiting this page.
The webinar will cover when honeypots are and are not useful, basic deployment strategies and insights into using them for detection in field deployments and control environments.
Check it out, tune in and give Brent a shout out on Twitter. Thanks for reading and we hope you enjoy the webinar.
Thanks to the attendees and speakers who participated yesterday in the 3rd Annual ICS/SCADA Security Symposium. It was another great event and once again, the center of the value was in the interactions of the audience with the speakers and each other. It’s great to hear asset owners discuss what is working, what is challenging and what is critical in their minds.
Thanks again to those who attended and contributed to making this event such a wonderful thing again this year. We appreciate it and we can’t wait until next year to do it all again.
Thank YOU!
Over the years, I have watched several infosec teams grow from inception to maturity. I have worked with managers, board members and the front line first responders to help them succeed. During that time I have keyed in on three key items that really mean the difference between success and failure when it comes to growing a teams’ capability, maturity and effectiveness. Those three items are:
Where does your team fit into the picture? Are you working hard on the three key items or have they ever been addressed? How might you bring these three key items into play in your security team? Give us a shout on Twitter (@microsolved or @lbhuston) and let us know about your successes or failures.
Thanks for reading, and until next time, stay safe out there!
Happy Halloween!
This time around, we thought we’d offer up a couple of infosec tricks and treats for your browsing pleasure. Around MSI, we LOVE Halloween! We dress up like hackers, bees and hippies. Of course, we do that most other days too… 🙂
Here are a couple of tricks for you for this Halloween:
Columbia University gives you some good tricks on how to do common security tasks here.
University of Colorado gives you some password tricks here.
and The Moneypit even provides some tricks on cheap home security here.
And now for the TREATS!!!!!
Here are some of our favorite free tools from around the web:
Wireshark – the best network sniffer around
Find your web application vulnerabilities with the FREE OWASP ZED Attack Proxy
Crack some Windows passwords to make sure people aren’t being silly on Halloween with Ophcrack
Actually fix some web issues for free with mod_security
Grab our DREAD calculator and figure out how bad it really is.. 🙂
Put those tricks and treats in your bag and smile. They won’t cause cavities and they aren’t even heavy enough to keep you from running from the neighborhood bully looking to steal your goodies!
Thanks for reading and have a fun, safe and happy Halloween!
This month’s Touchdown Task is to take an hour and give your phone system security a quick review. PBX hacking, toll fraud and VoIP attacks remain fairly common and many organizations don’t often visit the security of their phone systems. Thus, a quick review might find some really interesting things and go a long way to avoiding waste, fraud and abuse.
If you have a traditional PBX/analog phone system, here are some ideas for you to check out.
If you have a VoIP-based system, here are some checks to consider. (Note that this is a STIG in a zip file).
Generally speaking, you want to check passwords on voice mail boxes, give a look over to make sure that the phone system has some general logging/alerting capability and that it is turned on. Pay attention to out going dialing rules and test a few to make sure arbitrary calls can’t be made remotely. On the personnel side, make sure someone is actively monitoring the phone system, auditing the bill against “normal” and adding/deleting entries in the system properly.
Give the phone system a bit of your time. You never know what you might learn, and you might avoid tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars in fraud and abuse.
Thanks for reading and I hope you are enjoying the season!
We got a few scans for an old D-Link router vulnerability that dates back to 2009. It’s interesting to me how long scanning signatures live in online malware and scanning tools. This has lived for quite a while.
Here are the catches from a HoneyPoint Personal Edition I have deployed at home and exposed to the Internet. Mostly, this is just to give folks looking at the scans in their logs an idea of what is going on. (xxx) replaces the IP address…
2013-10-02 02:46:13 – HoneyPoint received a probe from 71.103.222.99 on port 80 Input: GET /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxx User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32) WebWasher 3.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://xxxx/ Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46dWA+NXhZQlU1d2VR Connection: keep-alive
2013-10-02 03:22:13 – HoneyPoint received a probe from 71.224.194.47 on port 80 Input: GET /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxx User-Agent: Opera/6.x (Linux 2.4.8-26mdk i686; U) [en] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://xxxx/ Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46InkwYi4qMF5wL05G Connection: keep-alive
This probe is often associated with vulnerable D-Link routers, usually older ones, those made between 2006 and mid-2010. The original release and proof of concept exploit tool is here. The scan has also been embedded into several scanning tools and a couple of pieces of malware, so it continues to thrive.
Obviously, if you are using these older D-Link routers at home or in a business, make sure they are updated to the latest firmware, and they may still be vulnerable, depending on their age. You should replace older routers with this vulnerability if they can not be upgraded.
The proof of concept exploit also contains an excellent doc that explains the HNAP protocol in detail. Give it a read. It’s dated, but remains very interesting.
PS – As an aside, I also ran the exploit through VirusTotal to see what kind of detection rate it gets. 0% was the answer, at least for that basic exploit PoC.
Another quick update today. This time an updated list of the common locations where web scanning tools in the wild are checking for PHPMyAdmin. As you know, this is one of the most common attacks against PHP sites. You should check to make sure your site does not have a real file in these locations or that if it exists, it is properly secured.
The scanners are checking the following locations these days:
//phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php
//phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/Admin/phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php
/Admin/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/_PHPMYADMIN/scripts/setup.php
/_pHpMyAdMiN/scripts/setup.php
/_phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php
/_phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/admin/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/administrator/components/com_joommyadmin/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/apache-default/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/blog/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/cpanelphpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/cpphpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/forum/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/php/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.0.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.0.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.0.2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.1.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.10.2.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.11.0.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.11.1-all-languages/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.11.1.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.11.1.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.11.1.2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.5.5-pl1/index.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.5.5/index.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.1-pl2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.1-pl3/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.4-pl3/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.4-pl4/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.4-rc1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.5/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.6/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.6.9/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.0-beta1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.0-pl1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.0-pl2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.0-rc1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.5/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.6/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.7.7/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.2.3/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.3/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.4/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.5/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.6/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.7/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.8/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.8.9/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.0-rc1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.0.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.0.2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2.9.2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-2/
/phpMyAdmin-2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.0.0-rc1-english/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.0.0.0-all-languages/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.0.1.0-english/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.0.1.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.0.1.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.0.0-english/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.0.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.1.0-all-languages/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.2.0-all-languages/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.2.0-english/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.2.0/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin-3.4.3.1/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin/
/phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin/translators.html
/phpMyAdmin2/
/phpMyAdmin2/scripts/setup.php
/phpMyAdmin3/scripts/setup.php
/phpmyadmin/
/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/phpmyadmin1/scripts/setup.php
/phpmyadmin2/
/phpmyadmin2/scripts/setup.php
/phpmyadmin3/scripts/setup.php
/typo3/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
/web/phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php
/xampp/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php
<title>phpMyAdmin
Just a quick post today, but I wanted to give you some insight into the Telnet scans we have been seeing lately. Here are the passwords that have been used to target logins on port 23 on one of our HITME sensors in the United States. This particular system emulates a login, and the probes appear to be automated. We saw no evidence of any manual probes on this sensor in the last month that targeted telnet.
The passwords used in brute force attacks on telnet (used against the usual root/admin/etc users…):
default
1234
220
428
436
Admin
D-Link
admin
cobr4
dreambox
echo
enable
home-modem
l
password
private
public
root
sh
user
Keep a careful eye on any systems with Telnet exposed to the Internet. They are a common attraction point to attackers.