Malware in Many Places

 

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Just a quick reminder that malware can come in many forms and from many places. These days, it isn’t just phishing, drive-by downloads and stray email attachments that you have to worry about. USB drives, digital picture frames, wireless devices, watches with USB plugs, exercise equipment with public “charge and data monitoring ports” and whole variety of other things.

Basically, today, if it can plug into your systems or talk to your network and has any kind of processing, memory or storage – it can likely carry malware. That’s certainly something to keep in mind as the “Internet of Things” becomes more and more a part of our daily lives. 

All of the usual defenses still apply, but today we need more than just anti-virus to keep us safe. We have to be using a variety of security controls from throughout the spectrum of prevention, detection and response. Since malware can be everywhere, so too must our vigilance against it. 

PS – Those of you with teens and older parents who use/depend on electronics and computers should discuss malware and safer computing with them. They likely have an entirely different risk profile than you do, and they may not be paying as much attention to the impacts that these attacks can have or where they can come from. They may be doing risky things without even knowing it. Talk to them about malware and help keep them safer in the online world.

Come Grow with MicroSolved

MSI is currently seeking two full time team members to help grow our information security offerings to our clients. 

We are seeking a sales person to assist current customers with their needs, conduct campaigns to identify new prospects, work directly with the security engineers to scope engagements and complete the process by closing engagements and working with the project managers to complete the work plan. The successful sales person will be detail oriented, friendly, self motivated and willing to engage with customers with a high level of passion and energy. Our sales process is mature, transparent and client focused and that has helped us become one of the oldest information security firms in the country. The sales position can be filled by someone located anywhere in the mid-west, as long as they are open to some travel to visit clients and occasional travel back to Columbus as needed. 

The other position is a security team member. This is a technical position, with the primary duties being penetration testing of networks, applications and electronic devices. Security team members also back up the risk assessment team, perform consulting duties and help with development of products and services across the MSI offerings. Some security experience is required, along with expected proficiency with operating systems, networking and some basics of coding/scripting. The security team member position should live in Central OH. We need physical presence for much of the work in our lab, so this person has to be close to HQ. 

To apply for either of these positions, please drop us an email with a resume, a short bio and few paragraphs that explain exactly what you bring to the table and why we should add you to our team. Email us at INFO(at sign)microsolved.com. Thanks for reading and we look forward to hearing from you! 

SANS SCADA Security Conference & a DISCOUNT

SANS has allowed us to offer a 10% discount to our readers who attend their SCADA Security Summit. The event is being held in Orlando this year, February 12-13, with optional training courses wrapped around on both sides. We think this is a great event and we are proud to be able to help SANS promote it.

You can get your discount using the discount code: MicroSolvedSCADA

More information about the event follows below (Overview provided by SANS): 

More than 1,200 security analysts and process control engineers, from government and industry, have attended the SCADA Security Summits. That’s because Summits are the one place where the people shaping the future of control systems security come together to share the lessons they have learned and because the Summits give attendees unique, early access to important new information. This year’s program will be no different. If you have any responsibility for security of control systems – policy, engineering, governance or operations you won’t want to miss the 2013 Summit in Orlando, Florida.

 At the Summit you will:

  • Learn why control systems are so difficult to protect and arm yourself with clear case studies showing what’s been done and what can be done to protect SCADA and other control systems.
  • Learn the language of control systems so you can be of more help to the engineers who plan and deploy such systems.
  • Understand the requirements and constraints faced by owners and operators of automation systems. Determine the state of the art in control system security as a benchmark for your own future planning.
  • How to build an ICS security program and develop your team.
  • Better understand what government can and can’t do by learning the requirements, constraints and current capabilities available to secure critical control systems.

 For more information and to register click here  http://www.sans.org/event/north-american-scada-2013

Threat Data Sharing in ICS/SCADA Needs Improvement

I had an interesting discussion on Twitter with a good friend earlier this week. The discussion was centered around information sharing in ICS/SCADA environments – particularly around the sharing of threat/attack pattern/vulnerability data. 

It seems to us that this sharing of information – some might call it “intelligence”, needs to improve. My friend argues that regulation from the feds and local governments have effectively made utilities and asset owners so focused on compliance, that they can’t spare the resources to share security information. Further, my friend claims that sharing information is seen as dangerous to the utility, as if the regulators ever found out that information was shared that wasn’t properly reported “up the chain”, that it could be used against the utility to indicate “negligence” or the like. I can see some of this, and I remember back to my DOE days when I heard some folks talk along the same lines back when we showed up to audit their environments, help them with incidents or otherwise contribute to their information security improvement.

When I asked on open Twitter with the #ICS/#SCADA hashtags about what hampered utilities from sharing information, the kind Twitter folks who replied talked about primarily three big issues: the lack of a common language for expressing security information (we have some common languages for this (mitre’s work, VERIS, etc.)), legal/regulatory concerns (as above) and the perceived lack of mitigations available (I wonder if this is apathy, despair or a combination of both?). 

I would like to get some wider feedback on these issues. If you don’t mind, please let me know either in comments, via private email or via Twitter (@lbhuston) what you believe the roadblocks are to information sharing in the ICS/SCADA community.

Personally, I see this as an area where a growth of “community” itself can help. Maybe if we can build stronger social ties amongst utilities, encourage friendship and sharing at a social level, empower ourselves with new mechanisms to openly share data (perhaps anonymously) and create an air of trust and equity, we can solve this problem ourselves. I know the government and industry has funded ISACs and other organizations, but it seems to me that we need something else – something more easily participatory, more social. It has to be easier and safer to share information between us than it is today. Maybe, if we made such a thing, we could all share more openly. That’s just my initial 2 cents. Please, share yours.

Thanks for reading, and until next time, stay safe out there!  

What is HPSS? :: The Console

This article builds on the What is HPSS? Series. The original overview article is here

The HoneyPoint Security Server Console is the “brain” of the HoneyPoint product platform. It is the central component responsible for getting alert data from the sensors, tracking and maintaining the alert data, presenting it to the user and safely passing the essential alert data on to the automated plugins or other systems in the security event chain.


HoneyPointConsoleRole

The Console is a GUI application that includes a built-in database engine for tracking Alert Data state and to empower reporting and analysis over time. Alert Data from the sensors are sent to the Console over TCP and the data is encrypted. The Console application runs on Windows, Linux and OS X. 

 

Once the Console receives Alert Data from the sensors, it parses it to validate that the data is good and checks to see what actions it should take based on the alerting configuration, assigned admins list, ignored hosts lists, and other trust rules in place. 

It then presents the alert data to the appropriate mechanisms, alerting users, passing the desired elements of the alert data to syslog/event log on the Console system for upstream processing by SEIMs or other event tools. The Console also passes certain event data as determined by the configuration into the “plugins mechanism”. 

 

The plugins then execute the desired operations on the data, easily allowing the security team to further extend reporting to custom event handlers or perform automated responses. This flexible solution empowers the security team to integrate HoneyPoint Security Server fully into whatever technology platform/response process they desire or have in place.

 

Reporting from the Console is very simple. The included reporting engine can create a wide variety of canned reports in either CSV or HTML format, ensuing that the data in the HoneyPoint system is easy to use. Additionally, other reporting tools like Crystal Reports or the like, or even languages like PERL, Python or Ruby, can easily attach to the Console database to create whatever types of custom reports you desire.

 

All in all, HoneyPoint Security Server was designed to make it easy to use and yet flexible enough for the most demanding and mature infosec teams. The console interface is friendly, functional and easily understandable. Most teams require less than a 30 minute walk through before they are off and running with the basic detection power HoneyPoint provides. When they get comfortable with the system, they quickly master the plugins meta-language and are soon automating large groups of detection and response tasks.

 

To learn more about HoneyPoint Security Server or to get a demo, please contact us. We would be happy to walk you through the product and discuss how it might fit into your environment. There is even a free for personal use “Community Edition” available to get you started or to let you experience the power, ease and flexibility of the platform yourself. Just give us a call to learn more about HoneyPoint Security Server Console. You’ll be glad you did! 


What is this HoneyPoint Thing Anyway?

Launched in 2006, initially as a distributed honey pot product, HoneyPoint Security Server (HPSS) has grown well beyond the initial concept. Today HPSS is a platform of components woven into a tightly integrated, fully capable, extremely flexible threat detection product. Organizations around the world are using it as a means of early detection of internal and external attackers, malware outbreaks and signs of users poking around where they shouldn’t be. Mature organizations have leveraged the product as a means of deterring attacks through automated black holing of scanning hosts on their perimeter, embedded detective controls inside their web applications to cut off users violating their terms of service and gather real world threat metrics to feed back into their mature risk management initiatives.

 

In the world of ICS/SCADA, HoneyPoint has found a quickly growing set of fans. HPSS can be deployed in a completely passive way that has no chance of interfering with critical operations, yet still brings incredible detection capability and vision into even the most sensitive of networks. ICS/SCADA environments have traditionally embraced the honeypot ideal, coining the term “canary” for these tools, but never before have they had such an easy to use, distributable, centrally monitored honeypot capability like HoneyPoint brings to the table.

 

Over the next few months, we will be deep diving into each of the HPSS components, but for now, as a high-level overview, here is a quick and dirty explanation of each of them:

 

  • HPSS Console – This is the central “brain” of the product. Designed as an easy to use GUI application, it receives the alerts detected by the sensor components and presents them to the user for analysis. It includes the “plugin” capability which allows for additional reporting and security automation based on the event data detected. The Console provides for “point and click” easy integration with SEIM products for clients who have deeper back-end data aggregation systems in place.
  • HoneyPoint Agent – This is the original HoneyPoint detection capability. Agent creates “fake services” on the network that have no real use other than detection. Since the services aren’t real, any interaction with them is “suspicious at best and malicious at worst”. Agent is capable of emulating a great variety of services and is completely user configurable. Agent runs on Windows, Linux and OS X. 
  • Wasp – Wasp is HoneyPoint’s hybrid client for Windows systems. It offers many of the port dilation features of Agent, but layers on top of that a whitelisting detection mechanism, file change detection for key files and some simple heuristics to identify the most common signs of intrusion. Tiny footprint, immense flexibility, self tuning whitelisting and no interference with operations make it an excellent choice for critical infrastructure use.
  • HoneyPoint Web – This is a completely emulated web environment with a mock up of applications that the organization uses. The entire environment is “fake” and studded with detection mechanisms that capture and measure attacker behavior, intent and capability. It might seem to be a new version of a banking application “accidentally” exposed to the Internet, or a replica of an HMI or maybe a login portal for Sharepoint/VPN or some other mechanism. What it really is is a detection mechanism for the good guys. Completely customized, able to detect the difference between a human attacker and most malware, it offers organizations a deeper, sneakier way to detect illicit behavior and measure the attacker attention various attack surfaces receive.
  • HoneyElements – Embeddable HTML and Javascript objects that can be added to new or existing real web applications, these HoneyPoints extend detection into the layers of the application itself. Integrates well with automated response and attacker black holing defenses to stop attackers and those engaging in undesired behaviors in real time.
  • HoneyBees – These work with Agent to simulate users authenticating to emulated services with plain text credentials. Organizations use this combination of tools to detect sniffing attacks and other attempts to harvest credentials off the wire or from network monitoring systems. 
  • HoneyPoint Trojans – Trojans are “fake” documents, applications or archives that appear to be real, but are actually detection mechanisms. For example, they might appear to be a PDF of some acquisition plans, while in reality they are armed with code to alert the security team when they have been opened or tampered with. Trojans use many of the same tactics as attackers, but instead of infection as a goal, they provide for detection and alerting.
  • HoneyPoint Handler – The Handler is a mechanism for getting external events into the HoneyPoint data ecosystem. Organizations often use the handler to receive events generated by custom nuance detection scripts. For example, a script might routinely check for new files in a directory or new files that contain the call base64decode(). When the script identifies a new file, the script can send an alert to the Handler, which will create a standard HoneyPoint alert from the script’s data and send it to the Console for easy and standardized security event management.
  • HoneyPoint Decoy Appliances – This is a set of hardened Linux powered devices that serve as an appliance for other components, usually Agent and Web. The appliances are available in three physical form factors (a rack mountable server, a mini-desktop, and a field deployable power substation solid state system) and/or a set of virtual appliances for most common virtualization platforms.
  • HoneyPoint Proxy – Lastly, this component is designed to act as an alerting data aggregator to simplify firewall ACLs that might be deployed between DMZ segments, enclaves or other network segments. The proxy can receive events from HoneyPoints and send them on to the Console without the need to expose the Console to each individual HoneyPoint. This makes managing global and highly distributed deployments significantly easier.

 

To learn more about these components and how they can be leveraged to give your organization new, flexible and deep detection capabilities, give us a call. Our engineers would be glad to discuss the technical capabilities and an account executive would be happy to work with you to create a HoneyPoint deployment that meets your needs AND your budget. At MicroSolved, we are passionate about information security and HoneyPoint Security Server is just another that way it shows!

Ask The Experts: Getting Started with Web App Security

Question from a  reader: What should I be paying attention to the most with regards to web applications? My organization has a number of Internet facing web applications, but I don’t even know where to start to understand what the risks and exposures might be.

Adam Hostetler responds:

The first thing I would do is to identify what the applications are. Are they in house developed applications, or are they something like WordPress or another framework? What kind of information do they store (email addresses, PII, etc)? If they are in house or vendor applications, have they been assessed before? With a little knowledge of the applications, you can start building an understanding of what the risks might be. A great resource for web application risks is the OWASP project. https://www.owasp.org

Phil Grimes adds:

When it comes to web applications, I always promote a philosophy that I was raised on and continue to pound into my kid’s heads today: Trust but verify. When an organization launches an internet facing application there is an immediate loss of control on some level. The organization doesn’t know that the users accessing the application are who they say they are, or that their intentions are “normal”. Sure, most people who encounter the app will either use it as intended or if they access the app inadvertently, they may just mosey on about their merry way. But when a user starts poking around the application, we have to rely on the development team to have secured the application. Making sure identity management is handled properly will help us ensure our users are who they say they are, and validating all data that a user might pass to the application becomes an integral part of security to ensure possible attacks are recognized and thwarted.

John Davis comments:

I would say that the most important thing is to ensure that your Internet facing web applications are coded securely. For some time now, exploiting coding weaknesses in web applications has been one of the leading attack vectors exploited by cyber criminals to compromise computer networks. For example, poor coding can allow attackers to perform code injection and cross site scripting attacks against your applications. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), which is accessible on the Internet, is a good place to learn more about secure web application coding techniques. Their website contains lots of free tools and information that will help your organization in this process. There are also professional information security organizations (such as MicroSolved) that can also provide your organization with comprehensive application security assessments.

As always, thanks for reading and let us know if you have questions for the experts.

What Is Your Browser Leaking?

Today in my tweet stream, someone pointed out this site and I wanted to blog about it. The site is called stayinvisible.com and offers a quick view of some of the data that is available to a web site or an attacker who can lure someone to a website. 

The site displays a dump of a variety of common data that you might not be aware of that is leaking from your browser. There are also tips for hardening your browser settings and operating system against some of the methods used to dump the data. 

If nothing else, it might just provide an “ah ha” moment for folks not used to the information security space. Give it a try and let us know what you think of it. 

We have no association with the site, its content or the folks who run it. We just thought it was interesting. Your paranoia may vary. 🙂

CMHSecLunch Announcement

We wanted to take a moment and send out a special announcement to our Columbus, Ohio area readers. Brent Huston is pulling together a monthly casual event for IT and InfoSec focused folks in our area. He posted this a few days ago to Twitter (@lbhuston):

#CMHSecLunch 1st attempt – Monday, Nov 12, 11:30 -1pm at Tuttle Mall food court. Informal lunch gathering of infosec geeks. Be There!

We invite all of our local readers to attend. Just have a casual lunch with infosec friends and great conversations. No sign up, no membership fees, no hassle, no fuss. If you can make it, cool, if not, also cool. So, if you have time, drop in and break bread. We hope to see you there.

Let us know on Twitter or in the comments if you have feedback. 

ICS/SCADA Security Symposium Reminder

COLUMBUS, Ohio October 9, 2012 – The second annual ICS/SCADA Security Symposium, to be held November 1 2012 in Columbus, is designed to serve as a level set for teams and organizations who are actively managing production ICS/SCADA environments. Once again, this full day session will include best practices advice, incident response, detection techniques and a current threat briefing focused on ICS/SCADA providers. Presenters will cover a variety of topics about what is working, what is not working so well in terms of information security, network protection and trust management. To learn more about the event and to see if you qualify to attend, please contact us via email (info<at sign>microsolved(<dot>)com) or via phone by calling 614.351.1237 ext 215. Chris Lay (@getinfosechere) is handling the invitee list for the event and will be happy to discuss the event with you in more detail. Attendance is free of charge, meals will be provided and a limited number of seats are still available if you qualify.